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This dissertation presents two lines of research on public finance and banking 
respectively. The research on public finance explores the source of China’s state capacity, 
including fiscal capacity and the bureaucracy, and whether such state capacity promotes 
economic development. The research on banking discusses the discrimination in China’s 
bank loan markets, and the role of political connections and policy uncertainty in 
affecting bank risk-taking in the United States.  
My first chapter is about the state capacity in China. We offer a comprehensive 
study on the causal effects of state capacity in explaining China's spectacular economic 
growth, using rich historical variation and various outcomes in economic performance, 
education, health care, finance, and social unrest. Our estimates indicate that fiscal 
capacity has significantly positive impacts. However, a large size of bureaucracy plays a 
much weaker role, and it cannot reduce the incidence of protests, suggesting the existence 
of overstaffing in the public sector.   
The second chapter analyzes costly discrimination related to physical 
attractiveness and gender in bank loan markets using a market structure-based method. 
 vi 
The rationale is that a concentrated market provides more space for loan officers to 
discriminate against a certain group of borrowers. We find that loan officers prefer good-
looking people and males in relatively risky commercial/industrial loan markets. On the 
other hand, females and especially young good-looking females have an advantage in 
mortgage loan markets. We interpret these different patterns of favoritism as a result of 
differential risk levels associated with the two types of loans.  
The third chapter studies how political connections and their interaction with 
economic policy uncertainty affect banks' risk-taking. Our hypothesis is that policy 
uncertainty increases the option value of waiting but political connections can reduce 
such option value. We find when policy uncertainty is low, politically connected banks 
have a weaker tendency to take on more risk than those without political connections and 
enjoy the quiet life. However, when policy uncertainty is high, politically connected 
banks have much larger amounts of loans, but smaller amounts of loss provision than 
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State Capacity and China's Economic Development1 
State capacity, such as government revenue and the size of bureaucracy, can 
support public goods provision, but is not necessarily beneficial for economic 
development if the taxation cost is high. This is especially relevant for developing 
countries where both the benefit from public goods provision and the taxation cost are 
larger than developed countries. We offer a comprehensive study on the causal effects of 
state capacity in explaining China's spectacular economic growth, using rich historical 
variation and various outcomes in economic performance, education, health care, finance, 
and social unrest. Our estimates indicate that fiscal capacity has significantly positive 
impacts. However, a large size of bureaucracy is not associated with better economic 
development, and it cannot reduce the incidence of protests, suggesting the existence of 
overstaffing in the public sector. Furthermore, the counties located in a provincial capital 
do not have better outcomes. The consistent pattern based on various datasets supports 
the robustness of our conclusions. 
1.1 Introduction  
The idea that state capacity, the presence of state functionaries and agencies, is 
vital for economic development attracts attention among economists (Acemoglu et al., 
2015). It has several components including fiscal capacity, the size of bureaucracy, legal 
capacity and others. The strong state capacity, according to a series of books by Johnson 
(1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990) and Evans (1995), is a key to the economic success 
of East Asian economies. Others, such as Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002), link the 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank for Kishore Gawande’s joint effort.  
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economic failure of African or Latin American nations to their limited state capacity. 
This hypothesis receives support from the cross-country empirical evidence presented in 
Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and the within-country evidence in Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013) and Bandyopadhyay and Green (2012), who find a positive 
association between measures of historical political centralization and present-day 
outcomes. Dincecco and Katz (2014) show that a state's capacity to extract greater tax 
revenues is an important determinant of long-run economic growth in European 
countries. Acemoglu et al. (2015) document municipalities with a larger size of 
bureaucracy have better outcomes in Colombia. 
However, strong state capacity is not necessarily beneficial for economic 
development if the taxation cost is high. This is especially relevant for developing 
countries where both the benefit from public goods provision and the taxation cost are 
larger than developed countries. Although China's experience in the last three decades is 
an impressive part of the ``East Asian Miracle'', there is not a paper investigating the 
association between its state capacity and economic development using plausibly 
exogenous variation. Although China is widely believed to have strong state capacity, it 
is not clear that the spectacular economic growth is a result of such capacity as the debate 
between two Chinese economists shows2. On one hand, building on the inheritance from 
the two-thousand-year empire period and the totalitarian Leninist party, China's 
government maintains a much firmer control over resources compared to most other 
developing countries including most other East Asian economies. The unprecedented 
infrastructural construction and the promotion of mass education, two of the most vital 
                                                 
2 Justin Lin and Weiying Zhang, two well-known Chinese economists in Peking University, recently 
renewed their debate on whether the Chinese government's industrial policies promote economic growth. 
For example, the Caixin Online has an article on their debate: ``Top Chinese Economists Debate Role of 
Gov't in Economy.'' See http://english.caixin.com/2014-07-11/100702693.html. 
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determinants in economic growth, have been actively undertaken by the government, 
though the efficiency of these investments is highly debated. 
On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2015)'s discussions focus on Colombia; 
however, although establishing order is of great importance to Colombia, curbing 
corruption and wasteful public expenditure is more relevant to China. Colombia does not 
have a tradition of strong bureaucracy and experienced long-lasting military conflicts in 
the past century; however, the converse is true for China. China's fiscal revenues 
increased by around 30 percent every year in the first decade of the new century, three 
times the GDP growth rate. Corruption and abuse of public resources trigger widespread 
anger, which partly explains why the anti-corruption movement raised by the new leader 
wins much grassroots support. 
In this paper, we offer a comprehensive study on the causal effects of state 
capacity in explaining China's economic miracle. Using historical variation designed by 
ourselves, we discuss the impacts related to economic performance, education, health 
care, finance, and social unrest of county-level government revenue, the number of public 
employees and whether a county is located in a provincial capital, three dimensions of 
state capacity. To the best of our knowledge, China is the only developing country that 
we can obtain such extensive county-level variables (Henderson et al., 2012).  
Our first historical variation is related to three concurrent rebellions (Taiping 
Rebellion, Nian Rebellion and Dungan Revolt) in 1851-1880, which were repressed by 
local armed forces. To finance the wars, the local armed forces usually set tax bureaus to 
collect a form of transit/commercial tax (Lijin), which led to large variation in fiscal 
capacity across the country. Although the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and Civil War 
between the Nationalist Party and Communist Party (1946-1950) were also large-scale 
wars, there was not a comparable change in local variation in fiscal capacity since the 
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central government commanded army forces and mobilized the resources across the 
country (and obtained international aids).  
Following Sng (2014)'s use of the number of counties as a measure of the size of 
bureaucracy, we introduce the number of ancient counties in an ancient prefecture as an 
instrumental variable for the current size of bureaucracy. Since the setting of prefectures 
changed radically, there should be not direct impact from this historical variation on 
present-day outcomes after controlling a rich set of covariates. A prefecture in China is a 
level of jurisdiction between the provincial level and the county level, similar in size to a 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the United States. On the other hand, our use of the 
distance to the ancient postal route as an instrumental variable for the current size of 
bureaucracy is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2015)'s use of royal roads in Colombia. In the 
counties closer to the route, the government maintained more control. This comparable 
instrumental variable with Acemoglu et al. (2015) makes it possible for a direct 
comparison between our results. The distance to the ancient postal route had no direct 
impact on current outcomes since these roads are no longer used. Furthermore, in 
regressions using both instrumental variables together, we obtain very similar estimates 
of the impacts of the size of bureaucracy, and the overidentifying test cannot reject the 
validity of these instrumental variables.  
We find very significantly positive impacts of per capita government revenue on 
almost all the indicators of economic development. For example, with 100 percent higher 
per capita government revenue, the night lights scaled by population are 120 percent 
higher, the probability having treated water is 30 percentage points higher, and the 
average educational attainment is 1 year longer. In other words, counties with per capita 
government revenue at the 75 percentile have 100 percent more night lights, are 25 
percentage points more likely to have treated water, and have 0.9 year longer average 
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educational attainment than counties at the 25 percentile. Since GDP reporting in China is 
widely criticized for manipulation, these variables are more likely to provide us the real 
picture of economic development. Moreover, the number of manufacturing firms and 
their production, the number of telephones, deposits, loans, the number of hospital beds 
are all improved significantly. These results are robust with a large set of covariates and 
province fixed effects. Taxation is costly, and hence if the value of public goods provided 
by the government cannot offset the costs in collecting taxes (e.g., Feldstein, 1978; 
Browning, 1987; Snow and Warren, 1996), we may see a negative impact of government 
revenue. Therefore, our results imply that the value of public goods provided by the 
government is high. 
Moreover, we also conduct more tests to show the better economic outcomes are 
not direct impacts of ancient economic development. For example, if the population 
change from 1851 to 1880 reflects the economic development before the wars, then it is 
reasonable to think the population change from 1776 to 1820 and population change from 
1820 to 1851 also reflect such pre-war economic development, and consequently we 
should document similar strong first-stage effects when using the first two population 
changes. However, we cannot find any impact of the population change from 1776 to 
1820 (from 1820 to 1851) on current government revenue. 
On the other hand, the impacts of per capita public employees are much weaker 
and even negative. It can neither improve economic performance significantly nor reduce 
the incidence of protests. These protests might target the government, but can also target 
firms such as polluting firms or employers that delay wage payment. Because of long-
term military conflicts, it is important to have a sufficient number of government 
employees to maintain social order in Colombia. Moreover, military conflicts make it 
more dangerous to become a government employee and tend to restrict the size of 
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bureaucracy and the productivity of the limited government employees should be 
relatively high (Downs, 1993). On the other hand, China does not experience large-scale 
wars during the last 60 years. Wide evidence shows that it is attractive to become a public 
employee and the size of China's bureaucracy experiences stable expansion. Therefore, 
the existence of overstaffing in the public sector can reduce the productivity of public 
employees.  
Finally, although it is commonly thought that a provincial capital has some 
privileges in China, we find that counties located in a provincial capital do not have better 
outcomes except a slightly a higher educational attainment. These results are useful for us 
to understand which ingredients of a strong government are vital for economic 
development.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The rest of Section 1 is a review of the 
related literature. Section 2 describes the datasets; Section 3 and 4 demonstrate the 
empirical strategies and results for government revenue using the two instrumental 
variables; Section 5 and 6 report the results for the size of bureaucracy and being located 
in a provincial capital. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
1.1.1 Related Literature  
China's state capacity building has received attention among economists. Sng and 
Moriguchi (2014) compare ancient state capacity in China and Japan. They find that 
before 1850, China's ruler kept taxes low and government small compared to Japan. In a 
large domain, the ruler's inability to closely monitor bureaucrats creates opportunities for 
the bureaucrats to exploit taxpayers. To prevent overexploitation, China's ruler had to 
keep taxes low and government small. Therefore, they conjecture that a greater state 
capacity might have prepared Japan better for the transition from stagnation to growth in 
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the 19th century. Mattingly (2015) studies the impact of Japanese colonialism on state 
building in Manchuria. The Japanese invested in state capacity but governed through 
extractive institutions. Relying on the fact that the provincial borders between Manchuria 
and nearby Inner Mongolia were drawn to divide a previously unified and homogenous 
region, Mattingly (2015) implements a regression discontinuity design that compares 
Manchuria with neighboring areas in Inner Mongolia. He finds that Japanese rule was 
associated with both higher state capacity and higher levels of long-run economic 
development. Focusing on Sichuan, Lu et al. (2016) instrument for state capacity by 
collecting data on the path of the Central Red Army during the Long March. They show 
that counties along the path of the Red Army had more Communist party members. If the 
path taken by the Red Army was conditionally exogenous, controlling for geographic 
factors, it should only affect future development outcomes via its impact on local state 
capacity. They find that their measure of stare capacity-the number of party officials-is 
positively correlated with several measures of economic development after the 
introduction of market reforms in 1978, but had a negative impact on grain output prior to 
1978. They interpret this finding as consistent with the argument that state capacity has a 
positive impact on development when it complements markets, as has been the case in 
the post 1978 reform period, but that it has no such positive effects when the state 
attempts to substitute directly for the market. Cheng (2016) finds the differential 
enforcements of the one-child policy in China's public sector and non-public sector, and 
attributes this phenomenon to the different levels of state capacity in the two types of 
sectors.  
Beyond China, our focus on the long-run impacts of state capacity is closely 
related to Dincecco and Katz (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2015). Using fiscal 
centralization and the establishment of a limited government in 11 European countries 
 8 
during four centuries as plausibly exogenous variation, Dincecco and Katz find that a 
higher per capita government revenue is an important determinant of long-run economic 
growth. Part of our discussion also focuses on per capita government revenue; however, 
we make use of rich county-level variation in state capacity and outcomes, which can 
eliminate the confounding impacts of other factors and provide strong identification. Our 
discussions on the size of bureaucracy are related to Acemoglu et al. (2015)'s research on 
Colombia. The major difference is that although establishing order is of great importance 
to Colombia, curbing corruption and wasteful public expenditure is more relevant to the 
latter. This could explain why we cannot find a comparable productive impact of a larger 
size of bureaucracy in China. We notice that Acemoglu et al. (2015) also discuss the 
spillover effects of neighboring municipalities; unfortunately, our historical variation is 
measured at the ancient prefecture level and we do not realize that any nationwide data 
exist at the ancient county level. Since a current county and many of its neighboring 
counties are located in the range of the same ancient prefecture, it is difficult to identify 
spillover effects separately in our case.  
Moreover, our use of variation in local government revenue induced by the 
differential scales of the wars in 1851-1880 is closely related to the literature on the 
relationship between wars and state building. This literature takes inspiration from 
historical works that investigate the relationship between external conflicts and fiscal 
innovations that enabled states to gather greater wartime funds. Tilly (1990) famously 
argued that ``states made war, and war made states''. North and Weingast (1989) and 
Dincecco et al. (2011) build theoretical frameworks that explain how armed conflicts 
gave monarchs the incentive to create an effective fiscal infrastructure. Specifically, with 
more opportunities for territorial expansion or threats of outside attack and internal risks 
of overthrow, monarchs had more military expenditures to replenish their injured and 
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dead soldiers, and needed to gather larger tax revenues. Therefore, they had to increase 
the tax level or expand its tax base. Economic historians have shown that warfare was a 
major driver for European states to expand fiscal capacity (Hoffman and Rosenthal, 
1997; O'Brien, 2005; Besley and Persson, 2009; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). In this view, 
the absence of interstate competition in China and the resulting low fiscal demand were 
the primary reasons for low taxation in Qing China before 1850 (Rosenthal and Wong, 
2011), and the large-scale civil wars in 1851-1880 could explain the rapid increase in tax 
revenue after then. An excellent review on the state capacity literature can be found in 
Johnson and Koyama (2016).  
 
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Similar to most other studies using historical variation in China such as Sng and 
Moriguchi (2014) and Bai and Jia (2016), our historical variation is from the ancient 
prefectures in China Proper as shown in Figure 1, where the ethnic Han group dominates 
in both ancient times and now. For border regions, the ancient Chinese government could 
only maintain some military control and did not establish effective jurisdictions in 
general, and hence there was no historical variation in state capacity we need in this 
study. Our historical variation corresponds to the 18th and 19th centuries, when this 
country was ruled by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). We notice that most other papers on 
China's economic history are confined to the Qing dynasty because of relatively richer 
data available than earlier periods. Our major explanatory variables and outcomes are 
measured at current counties in the 23 provinces and province-level municipalities 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) in China proper. We drop counties in Ganzi 
and Aba, two Tibetan prefectures in Sichuan province and similar to Bai and Jia (2016), 
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counties in Chengde prefecture of Hebei province (except one) because of missing 
historical variation. Finally, we drop about 100 counties missing local government 
revenue or the number of local public employees, our main measures of state capacity. 
Our final sample includes 2104 non-district counties and county-level districts, though in 
some regressions the number of observations is slightly smaller.  
There are two main types of counties in China: non-district counties and county-
level districts. In general, the former have a long history and are more distant from the 
prefecture government seat. Some county-level districts were transferred directly from 
non-district counties; however, the majority of county-level districts were established by 
cutting parts of a non-district county or combining parts of several different non-district 
counties. Therefore, the majority of county-level districts were established after 1930. 
Not surprisingly, we document stronger first-stage effects for non-district counties 
because they usually have a much longer history than county-level districts. We notice 
that more non-district counties transformed to county-level districts over time after 2000, 
and hence non-district counties in this paper refer to the status in 1999. 
The data on local government revenue and public employees, our main 
explanatory variables, are obtained from the National Prefecture and County Finance 
Statistics Compendium, published by China's Ministry of Finance. The yearbooks started 
in 1993, but many provinces reported data only for non-district counties but not for 
county-level districts. The 1999 yearbook was the first issue that reports full fiscal 
statistics for both types of counties. Variable definitions changed radically in the 
yearbooks after 2006, and hence most authors use the 1999 to 2006 yearbooks (Han and 
Kung, 2015; Lu and Landry, 2014). Because we will also make use of outcomes in 2000 
population census, we use the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 
1999 and 2000 (after translating 2001 GDP in 2000 yuan using CPI deflators provided by 
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the National Bureau of Statistics) and the logarithm of average per capita public 
employees in these two years as our two main explanatory variables. This practice 
reduces the impacts of skewness and makes the impacts of different dimensions of state 
capacity comparable. Government revenues referred in these yearbooks include two 
major categories: budgetary revenues and government fund revenues. Budgetary 
revenues includes value-added tax, business tax, personal income tax, corporate income 
tax, urban maintenance tax, agricultural tax accruing to county governments. The same 
kind of tax revenue can accrue to different levels of government according to a certain 
sharing rule (Liu, 2015)3. Government fund revenues include land use fees and various 
extra-budgetary items. Notice that although land use fees became a very important part of 
local government revenue after 2000, they were not very important in 1999 or 2000. 
Moreover, These government revenues do not include transfers from upper-level 
governments because they reflect state capacity of upper-level governments. Local public 
employees include those working in governments, semi-government organizations (such 
as women's union, writers' union) and state-owned enterprises, but do not include those 
working in collective firms or retired. This is partly because the dataset does not 
distinguish the three types of public employees. Moreover, these sectors are all tightly 
controlled by the state and serve policy purposes, and their managers have administrative 
rankings, especially in our sample period.  
China's GDP is probably manipulated as many observers criticize. In this 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure, lower-level government officials are appointed by 
upper-level government officials, and hence government officials have a strong incentive 
to increase their chance for promotion by manipulating GDP reporting (Li and Zhou, 
                                                 
3 For example, 75 and 25 percents of value-added tax accrue to the central government and 
prefecture/county governments respectively; 60, 15, 25 percents of corporate and personal income tax 
accrue to the central government, provincial governments and prefecture/county governments. 
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Landry, 2008; Jia et al., 2015). With more public employees, the inflation in GDP 
reporting could be higher and introduces an overestimation bias for the size of 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, government officials in more developed areas (and more 
government revenue) are more willing to stay in their place, and therefore have a weaker 
incentive to manipulate GDP reporting. This tends to induce an underestimation bias for 
local government revenue.  
To avoid this additional source of endogeneity, we make use of high-resolution 
data on light density measured by satellites at night and processed by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Each satellite-year dataset is a grid reporting 
the intensity of lights, for every 30 arc-second output pixel (approximately 0.86 square 
kilometers at the equator). The digital number measuring the intensity of lights is an 
integer between 0 (no light) and 63. We count and aggregate the digital number for a 
county using the Arc-GIS software, normalize by the population (in 10,000 people) and 
then take logarithm. Because the light measures are not strictly comparable across year 
(Henderson et al., 2012), we use the light data in 2000 in the main analysis, though we 
find the light data in 2001 provide the same results. These data have been used by 
Bleakley and Lin (2012), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Pinkovskiy (2013), Lu 
and Landry (2014), Lowe (2014), Baum-Snow et al. (2015), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-
Martin (2016), Storeygard (2016), and have been shown to proxy well for local economic 
activities and correlate strongly with other welfare proxies (Henderson et al., 2012). 
Similar to them, we also find the county-level night light variable is highly correlated 
with GDP (both in logarithm).  
Our ancient variables, including the population change from wars in 1851-1880, 
the number of counties per 10 thousand people in 1820, our major instrumental variables, 
and the set of covariates from Bai and Jia (2016), are recorded at the ancient prefecture 
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level (except distance to the ancient postal route, which is recorded at the ancient county 
level). To obtain a clean measure of the scale of the wars, we define the population 
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. In the pre-industrial era, the population growth was relatively stable 
during 3 decades without wars. Therefore, if the population growth rate is the same 
between 1820-1851 and 1851-1880 without wars, we should have a hypothetic 






. However, because of the wars, the actual 
population in 1880 deviates from the hypothetic population, and thus the gap between 
them can be attributed to the wars. This practice is similar to Chen and Zhou (2007), who 
measure the severity of the 1959-1961 famine using the excess mortality rate in famine 
years over normal years. To mitigate the impacts of outliers, we winsorize the population 
change at the largest and smallest 1 percentiles. Alternatively, we also consider the case 
simply using the population change between 1851 and 1880 as the scale of the wars, and 
the results are identical. We notice that migrating to safe areas do not pose an issue: since 
we want to measure of the scale of the wars, population increase from migration means 
this area was affected by the wars to a smaller extent. However, more than 95 percent of 
population changes in our sample are smaller than 0, most variation in the population 
change should result from casualties rather than migration.  
The data on population are obtained from the China Population History edited by 
Ge (2005), a widely cited book in China's economic history papers, while the number of 
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counties in an ancient prefecture in 1820 is calculated based on the Comprehensive 
History of Administrative Divisions in China edited by Zhou (2013). Using the Arc-GIS 
software, we calculate the distance from a current county to the ancient postal route, 
another instrumental variable for current local government revenue, based on the shape 
file provided by Tuan-Hwee Sng. Sng plotted the ancient postal route according to the 
description in the Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty (Da Qing huidian, 2006, 
Yongzheng edition). 
Most of the information on whether a current county is located in the range of a 
certain ancient prefecture can be approximately observed from CHGIS. The setting and 
boundaries of prefectures changed radically after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, and 
hence a current prefecture usually spans several ancient prefectures. Therefore, a distinct 
advantage in using data at the current county level is that we can link a current county to 
the ancient prefecture its area belongs to much easily, while it is difficult and arbitrary to 
link a current prefecture to a certain ancient prefecture. In practice, we also try to link a 
current county to the ancient prefecture its area belongs to using Zhou (2013), which 
provides ancient maps for every province with details about ancient prefectures and 
counties. When Zhou (2013) does not provide enough cues, we search the information on 
the Baidu Baike, an online dictionary like Wikipedia and usually contains details about 
the administrative changes for prefectures and counties. In occasional cases, a current 
county spans more than one ancient prefecture, then we select the ancient prefecture 
where the county government seat is located.  
1.2.1 Full Sample  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of main variables for the full sample. The 
mean and median per capita county government revenue are 261 yuan and 182 yuan, 
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about 4 percent of the corresponding mean and median per capita GDP. These ratios are 
low, because the 1994 tax-sharing reform deprived of a large share of revenue accruing to 
local governments originally (Zhang and Zou, 1998; Zhang, 2006) and the land user fees 
had not yet become a significant part of local government revenue at that time. Public 
employees take up about 2 percent of the total population on average. There are about 14 
percent of counties located in provincial capitals, both in the Qing dynasty and now; 
however, as we discuss later, the composition of counties in provincial capitals changed 
to some extent. On average, the mean population loss in 1851-1880 is about 25 percent of 
the 1851 population or around 100 million nationwide, reflecting the devastating impacts 
of the wars. Although the median population loss from wars is much smaller than the 
mean in magnitude, we remember the normal population change without wars should be 
well larger than 0. The mean number of counties per 10 thousand people in an ancient 
prefecture is 0.05, that is, one county has 200 thousand residents on average, coinciding 
with what was reported by Sng and Moriguchi (2014). The mean distance to the ancient 
postal route is 80 kilometers with a large standard deviation, which can potentially 
provide large variation in local government revenue. 
The ratio of households having treated water, average educational attainment, and 
unemployment rate, are constructed from the 2000 population census. Although it is a 
wide complaint that China's GDP is misreported, the population census is of high quality 
and these variables are hence much more reliable than GDP. The poor quality of drinking 
water has been a serious threat to human health in the underdeveloped areas around the 
world for centuries. As of 2008, almost 900 million people still relied on unsafe drinking 
water (World Health Organization, 2011). The health benefits of treated water have been 
extensively studied, including Merrick (1985), Jalan and Ravallion (2003) Cutler and 
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Miller (2005); Kremer et al. (2011), Bennett (2012), Zhang and Xu (2016). On average, 
46 percent of households have treated water and the standard deviation is large.  
The average educational attainment is 7.5 years, slightly less than the complete 
primary and junior middle schooling (8 or 9 years), suggesting the success of this country 
in promoting junior middle schooling. The mean unemployment rate is 0.03, lower than 
those in western countries. However, at that time the country was still dominated by 
state-owned enterprises in urban areas and agriculture in rural areas, where the hidden 
unemployment was prevalent. As documented by many papers, such as Song et al. 
(2011), and Cheng (2015, 2016), state-owned enterprises may pursue policy objectives 
and not see the maximization of profits as the only major concern. Therefore, a low 
unemployment rate is not necessarily a signal of a good economy, and may reflect the 
dominance of state-owned enterprises and agriculture. 
Although we find that a large size of bureaucracy is not as productive as 
government revenue, it may still perform a role in maintaining social stability, another 
important concern of the Chinese government. From a practical point of view, we can 
determine whether more local government employees reduce the incidence of protests. 
Recently, economists have become interested in learning the causes of protests (Jia, 
2014a; Kung and Ma, 2014; Cao and Chen, 2016; Liu, 2016). We obtain the number of 
protests at the county level from the Global Data on Event, Location and Tone (GDELT) 
Project, and use the logarithm of 1 plus average protests per million people in 2000-2001 
and the dummy variable for having protests as two dependent variables. These protests 
might target the government, but can also target firms such as polluting firms or 
employers that delay wage payment. The GDELT Project monitors the world's print, 
broadcast, and web news (Schintler1 and Kulkarni, 2014). It claims that ``through its 
ability to leverage the world's collective news media, GDELT moves beyond the focus of 
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the Western media towards a far more global perspective on what's happening and how 
the world is feeling about it.'' Therefore, it should be the best dataset available on the 
incidence of protests in this country. We find that on average 40 percent of these counties 
had protests 2000-2001, and the number of protests per million people was 5 with a 
noticeable skewness.  
1.2.2 Non-district Counties 
For almost all the non-district counties, we can obtain more measures of 
economic development from the China County Socioeconomic Statistical Yearbooks and 
Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms. Non-district counties are usually large and have a 
long history, and for this reason our historical variation can have stronger first-stage 
effects. We notice that more non-district counties transformed to county-level districts 
over time after 2000, and hence we remind readers that non-district counties in this paper 
refer to the status in 1999. These outcomes include the per capita number and the value of 
production of above-scale (annual sales revenue larger than 5 million yuan) 
manufacturing firms, the number of telephones per capita, per capita residents' deposits, 
per capita amount of loans, the share of middle school students in population aged 10 to 
19, the share of primary school students in population aged 5 to 14, and the per capita 
hospital beds. We use the average of 2000 and 2001 for these outcomes except the share 
of middle school and primary school students (and deflate 2001 value into 2000 yuan for 
firm production, residents' deposits and loans). For the share of middle school and 
primary school students, we use the data in 2000 because only the 2000 population 
census contains the number of population in different age groups (in five years). This 
share can reflect the local educational achievements better than the normalization with 
the total population since we can mitigate the impacts of age composition. Furthermore, 
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we use the logarithm of these variables to account for their skewness except the shares of 
middle school and primary school students.  
As shown in Table 2, because non-district counties are usually more distant from 
the prefecture core than county-level districts, the average per capita government revenue 
in non-district counties is 20 percent lower than county-level districts, and average per 
capita GDP is also 18 percent lower, though the per capita number of public employees is 
very similar to that of county-level districts. 
1.2.3 Preliminary Check 
As a preliminary check, in Figure 2 and 3, we present the scatter plots of the 
correlation between outcomes and logged per capita government revenue or logged per 
capita public employees for the full sample. The strong positive relationship between 
night lights scaled by population, ratio of households having treated water, average 
educational attainment and per capita government revenue is consistent with the 
regression results in Section 3. Interestingly, the relationship between the unemployment 
rate and per capita government revenue is also positive. Although in western countries a 
lower unemployment is usually associated with a higher GDP growth (Okun's law), 
China's economy was not very market-oriented around 2000, and a lower unemployment 
rate might reflect the dominance of state-owned enterprises and agriculture. With a larger 
share of private firms, worker's mobility is stronger. 
Figure 3 shows a very weak relationship between night lights scaled by 
population and per capita public employees and a negative relationship between other 
outcomes and per capita public employees. These graphs suggest that more public 
employees are not as productive as government revenue. This is reasonable. Although a 
higher amount of government revenue usually can bring more public goods, more public 
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employees cannot necessarily perform the same role. However, we realize a possibility 
that a county with a large share of public employees might not accommodate a large 
number of population because of worse geographic or climatic conditions, which also has 
a negative impact on economic development. This means that the simple correlation 
might present a stronger negative relationship than the conditional one. 
Box plots in Figure 4 show the differences in outcomes between counties in non-
provincial capitals and provincial capitals. Consistent with the general impression, 
counties in provincial capitals have a higher level of economic development. Different 
from the U.S., a provincial capital in China usually controls more resources than other 
prefectures in the corresponding province, and it is not surprising that counties in a 
provincial capital are more developed. Provincial capitals are usually along the Yangtze 
River and Yellow River (the two major rivers in China) or are coastal areas, which should 
give them an economic advantage. However, a provincial capital is usually located in the 
central part of the province, which make it convenient to control the whole province but 
the place is not necessary associated with best natural conditions. Therefore, it is too 
early to assert a positive impact of being in a provincial capital on economic development 
before accounting for such confounding factors.  
 
1.3 Local Government Revenue 
1.3.1 OLS Results 
This section analyzes the impacts of county government revenue on various 
outcomes. In linear regressions, we will estimate the following equation: 
1 2 3is is is s isy Statecap X          (2) 
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In this equation, i indicates the county i in province s. The variable y represents the 
outcomes such as the logarithm of night lights scaled by population, share of households 
having treated water, average educational attainment and unemployment rate in 2000 for 
the full sample and many other outcomes for non-district counties. Statecap, the variable 
of major interest, is the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 1999-
2000 (after translating 1999 revenue in 2000 yuan using the CPI deflators). X is a rich set 
of county characteristics. s  are province fixed effects.  
X include two set of covariates. The first set of covariates are measured at the 
current county level, including the logged area of a county, an indicator whether the 
county is located in a coastal prefecture, an indicator whether the county is located in a 
provincial capital, latitude, and longitude terms4 (we call them ``Covariate set 1''). We 
notice that counties in coastal areas and provincial capitals are usually more developed. 
Most counties located in the current provincial capitals are also located in ancient 
provincial capitals, and hence we treat the indicator whether the county is located in a 
provincial capital as exogenous. In Section 5 we relax this assumption and consider the 
impacts of being located in a provincial capital. Latitude and longitude can capture the 
remaining spatial correlations not fully accounted for by province fixed effects (Bai and 
Kung, 2015). For example, latitude can affect crop adoption by virtue of its association 
with climate (Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs 1998; Sachs 2001). Since China is affected by 
the monsoon characteristics of northeast Asia (Zhang and Lin 1992) and in the summer 
the monsoon blows from southeast to northwest but reverses in the winter, it is necessary 
to also control longitude. 
                                                 
4 We do not add squared terms because of the collinearity. 
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The second set of covariates are measured at the ancient prefecture (the current 
county is located in) level (Bai and Jia, 2016), including an indicator whether there is a 
main river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, average 
transportation condition, logged population in 1820, three types of crop (foxmillet, rice 
and sweet potato) suitability (Jia, 2014a), language fragmentation index, the number of 
presented scholars (Jinshi), an indicator for treaty ports (we call them ``Covariate set 2''). 
These covariates can account for the impacts of other factors affecting the outcomes 
directly. For example, fragmentation indices can proxy differences in racial and ethnic 
groups in a certain place, which potentially have a negative impact on economic 
development (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). China Proper is dominated by ethnic Han, and 
hence language fragmentation can reflect more group differences than the usual racial 
and ethnic fragmentations. Culture might have a causal effect on economic development, 
such as Tabellini’s (2010) findings using European regions, and Jiang and Kung (2015), 
Chen, Kung and Ma (2016)'s analysis on China. Similar to other papers (Bai and Jia, 
2016; Chen, Kung and Ma, 2016; Yan, 2016), here we use the number of presented 
scholars as a proxy for culture. Jia (2014b) finds that being a treaty port during 1841-
1943 promotes long-run economic development even if the treaty ports were abolished 
for half a century.   
Table 3 reports the OLS results of the impact on night lights scaled by population. 
With 100 percent higher per capita government revenue, the night lights scaled by 
population are 60 percent higher. In other words, counties with per capita government 
revenue at the 75 percentile have 50 percent more night lights than counties at the 25 
percentile (the gap of logged per capita government revenue of the two percentiles is 
0.86). This impact is highly significant and robust with different sets of covariates and 
fixed effects. 
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1.3.2 Population Change from Wars as an IV 
The reverse causality may exist here, for example, a county with better economic 
performance can provide more revenue to the local government. Specifically, a strong 
economy can usually bring more value-add tax, personal and corporate income taxes. In 
addition, a strong economy also pushes up housing price, and in turn boosts land use fees. 
Moreover, the geographic and climate conditions may be not fully controlled, which can 
bias up or down the estimates. For example, many cities were built in strategically 
important places with inconvenient transportation conditions. To deal with the 
endogeneity issues concerning with government revenue, I use the percentage of 
population change in 1851-1880 mainly due to three concurrent wars (Taiping Rebellion, 
Nian Rebellion and Dungan Revolt), defined in Equation (1), as the instrumental 
variable. These wars enhanced the local governments' ability of tax collection in affected 
areas permanently but should have few direct impacts on current economic development 
after controlling a rich set of covariates. Thus, I will estimate a first stage in the 
following: 
1 2 3 ,is is is s isStatecap HIS X e         (3) 
where Statecap is the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 1999-2000, 
and HIS is the percentage of population change in 1851-1880 mainly due to the three 
concurrent wars. 
Compared with most European countries and Japan at the same time, Qing China 
had collected lower tax revenue. Land taxation was the most important source of 
government revenue in Qing China before 1850. Every land-holding household was 
obligated to pay the land tax, the amount of which was determined based on the size and 
quality of the land the family held (Chu, 1962). Although the government also imposed 
head tax, starting from 1712, the government decided not to collect additional tax 
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revenue from the extra number of population. According to Sng and Moriguchi (2014), 
Chinese state's annual revenue on the eve of the Opium War (1839-1842) was equivalent 
to 2 % of its national income at the maximum, while the comparable number for the 
Tokugawa shogunate was more than 15 %, even if the two countries had similar economy 
and cultural tradition. A peaceful environment and the Confucian ideology of 
``benevolent rule'' (Elliott, 2009; Rowe, 2009) can explain the difference between China 
and European countries partially. On the other hand, Sng and Moriguchi (2014) argue 
that severer agency problems in a bigger country like China explain why the Qing 
government tried to keep taxes low and government small compared to Japan. Agency 
problems increase with the geographical size of a domain. In a large domain, the ruler's 
inability to closely monitor bureaucrats creates opportunities for the bureaucrats to 
exploit taxpayers. To prevent overexploitation, the ruler has to keep taxes low and 
government small. 
The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1872) was the largest war in China since the Qing 
conquest in 1644, and perhaps the largest civil war in world history (Ho, 1959). The 
estimates of war deaths range from 20 to 70 million, as well as millions more displaced. 
The major affected areas by this rebellion was the southern part of this country, including 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan, the most populous and developed 
provinces, as shown in the southeastern part of Figure 5. The Nian Rebellion was an 
armed uprising that took place in northern China from 1851 to 1868 influenced by the 
Taiping Rebellion with about 0.1 million deaths. Qing government usually called them 
together as ``Fa (Taiping) and Nian''. The Dungan Revolt (1862-1877) was a uprising by 
members of the Muslim Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups in China's Shaanxi, Gansu 
and Yunnan provinces, as well as in Xinjiang. When the Qing government sent army in 
these provinces to help repress the Taiping rebels, Muslims realized such an opportunity 
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for their own agenda. A recorded 20.77 million people died in Shaanxi and Gansu 
(Yunnan was also affected by the Muslim rebellion), as shown in the northwestern part 
and southwestern parts of Figure 5, due to massacres or deaths in battle, as well as the 
disruption of farming and supply lines during the war. The total deaths was therefore 
close to 100 million and hence three times of the deaths during the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945) as part of the World War II. Although not every death can be attributed to 
the wars, we do not realize any other reason can explain such a scale of deaths, and the 
varying scales of deaths across areas. 
Since the most influential and earliest rebellion is the Taiping Rebellion, we 
provide more background about it based on Luo (2013) and Jiang (2012). From this 
background we can see the plausible exogeneity of the rebellion and the large variation 
across areas it provides. This rebellion was initiated by Xiuquan Hong, born in 
Guangdong province in 1814. After the defeat of Qing China by the British Navy, Hong 
Kong became a colony of the British and Christianity began to influence the neighboring 
Guangdong province heavily. In 1847 Hong studied with the American Southern Baptist 
missionary, Reverend Issachar Jacox Roberts, for two months in Guangzhou, during 
which time he gained most of his knowledge of Christianity (De Bary and Lufrano, 
2000). After then, he established a distorted version of Christianity, and by 1850 he had 
between 10,000 and 30,000 followers  in Guangxi province, a neighboring province of 
Guangdong. Most of these followers were Hakka (a branch of ethnic Han), a group 
reaching the southern China relatively late, and the conflicts between them and the earlier 
arriving groups were an important reason for the uprising because the local governments  
in Guangxi province usually stood with the earlier arriving groups (the group conflicts 
were not important beyond the origin of the uprising). In January 1851, Hong declared 
the founding of the ``Heavenly Kingdom of Transcendent Peace (Taiping Tianguo)'' and 
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initiated the rebellion in Guangxi. In March 1853, Hong's forces managed to take 
Nanjing, the most strategically important city in the southern China, and made it as the 
capital of their movement till 1864. During this period, his forces were once sent to as 
north as Hebei province (close to Beijing) and as west as Tibet. The Qing government did 
not have enough soldiers and funds to repress Taiping rebels, and hence encouraged the 
gentry class to organize army and collect a form of transit/commercial tax (Lijin) to 
finance the battles. In a place with more battles and more deaths, generals needed greater 
tax capacity to replenish their injured and dead soldiers, and hence more Lijin collected. 
On the other hand, because of Hong's anti-Confusion ideology and practice, most 
members of the gentry class supported the Qing government. In 1864, Nanjing was 
captured by the local forces organized by the gentry class. In 1872, the last Taiping rebels 
were cleared.  
We emphasize there existed large variation including within-province variation in 
the scales of the wars. Although the Taiping Rebellion influenced most parts of the 
country, it never captured a whole province. In addition, these three rebellions were 
repressed by local armed forces rather than the national armed forces, and the funds for 
military expenditure were collected locally. For these reasons, there was large variation in 
fiscal capacity across the country induced. Although the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 
and Civil War between the Nationalist Party and Communist Party (1946-1950) were also 
large-scale wars, there was not a comparable change in local variation in fiscal capacity 
since the central government commanded army forces and mobilized the resources across 
the country (and obtained international aids).  
Starting in two thousand years ago, China's government encouraged agriculture 
and discouraged commercial and industrial activities. The newly introduced commercial 
tax stood for an important transformation in China's tax system. Beginning in Yangzhou 
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prefecture of Jiangsu province in 1853, Lijin was soon collected by local governments in 
most provinces (Luo, 1936; Luo, 2013). The nationwide Lijin revenue was 1170 silver 
taels, about 11 percent of the total government revenue (105 million). This number 
increased to 4318 silver taels in 1911, about 14 percent of the total government revenue 
(302 million). Since Lijin accrued to local governments, the share of Lijin revenue in 
local government revenue should be much higher. Lijin was canceled in 1931, but the 
Nationalist government and the Communist government introduced new commercial 
taxes in 1931 and 1950 respectively. The persistence of the government revenue size can 
be explained in at least two ways. Firstly, since these new governments claimed 
themselves as ``liberators'', it was hard for them to cut spending on public service and 
hence the tax revenue, as widely documented in the political science literature. Second, in 
a nondemocratic regime, there are few restrictions on the expansion of the government, 
and the existing tax collection capacity is effective in supporting such expansion. 
Overtime, Commercial tax becomes very important now, whereas land tax, the major tax 
in ancient China, becomes trivial. Therefore, these wars enhanced the local governments' 
ability of tax collection in affected areas permanently but should have few direct impacts 
on current economic development after controlling a rich set of covariates. 
1.3.3 A Quantitative Test of Lijin and the Wars 
Although data on nationwide Lijin collected at the ancient prefecture level are not 
available, we can obtain the ancient prefecture-level Lijin collected in Zhejiang province 
in the Late Qing period from Luo (1936). Zhejiang is one of the most developed 
provinces in China, and more importantly, its northern and western parts were influenced 
by the wars heavily, while the rest were intact. We normalize the Lijin revenue by the 
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population in 1880 and take logarithm, and then regress it on the population change from 
the wars. 
We find that with one more percentage point change in population, per capita 
Lijin revenue increases by 3 percent. This is significant under the 1 percent level, and the 
R-squared is above 0.4. This result confirms our explanation of the relationship between 
the wars and Lijin. 
1.3.4 2SLS Results: Full Sample 
Using the population change as a proxy for the strength of the wars, we find a 
strong impact of the wars on current government revenue as shown in the lower part of 
Table 4. With one more percentage point change in population, per capita government 
revenue increases by 0.5 percent. Both Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F statistic are well larger than 16.38, the Stock-Yogo weak identification 
test  (Stock and Yogo, 2005) critical value for 10 % maximal IV size (1 endogenous 
variable and 1 instrumental variable), and well larger than 10 suggested by the rule of 
thumb, thus we can reject the weak IV hypothesis firmly. With a larger scale of wars and 
more deaths, generals needed greater tax capacity to replenish their injured and dead 
soldiers, will be important. This verifies North and Weingast (1989)'s and Dincecco et al. 
(2011)'s theoretical predictions. 
The 2SLS results of the impact on night lights scaled by population, as we can see 
in Table 4, are twice the magnitude of the OLS results. These suggest that many currently 
prosperous counties were not located with great geographic and climate conditions, and 
strong fiscal capacity can alleviate the disadvantages. This is not very surprising since 
many important cities, such as Beijing, Nanjing and Luoyang, were built mainly due to 
their strategic positions even if natural conditions were not more favorable than 
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neighboring places. With 100 percent higher per capita government revenue, the night 
lights scaled by population are 120 percent higher. In other words, counties with per 
capita government revenue at the 75 percentile have 100 percent more night lights than 
counties at the 25 percentile. This impact is significant and robust with different sets of 
covariates. The weak-IV-robust Anderson-Rubin Wald test also shows a significantly 
positive impact of per capita government revenue. We prefer the regression results with 
province fixed effects. In their paper about Colombia, Acemoglu et al. (2015) just present 
the results with department (province) fixed effects. In a much larger and more diverse 
country like China, the differences across provinces might affect both historical and 
current local government revenue in ways that cannot be fully controlled, and hence the 
exclusion constraint might be violated without province fixed effects. For example, we 
try a simple linear regression with logged night lights scaled by population on province 
fixed effects, and find a significantly negative impact of Hebei province dummy. 
However, after adding log per capita government revenue, its sign turns opposite and 
significant. This fact implies that it is necessary to control province fixed effects. 
Table 5 reports the impacts on the ratio of households having treated water, 
average educational attainment and unemployment rate in 2000. With one hundred 
percent higher per capita government revenue, the probability having treated water is 30 
percentage points higher, and the average educational attainment is 1 year longer. In 
other words, counties with per capita government revenue at the 75 percentile are 25 
percentage points more likely to have treated water, and have 0.9 year longer average 
educational attainment than counties at the 25 percentile. The effects are very precisely 
estimated. These extra outcomes are constructed from the 2000 population census, which 
is generally regarded as having high quality. Interestingly, there is not an effect on the 
unemployment rate, which perhaps reflects the impacts of the two counteracting factors. 
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As explained before, a strong economy can boost employment, however, in a transitional 
economy like China, a lower unemployment could also reflect the dominance of state-
owned enterprises and agriculture and hence an underdeveloped labor market. 
1.3.5 2SLS Results: Non-district Counties 
Table 6 reports more outcomes for the sample of non-district counties. These 
outcomes include the per capita number and the value of production of above-scale 
(annual sales revenue larger than 5 million yuan) manufacturing firms, per capita number 
of telephones, per capita residents' deposits, per capita amount of loans, the share of 
middle school students in population aged 10 to 19, the share of primary school students 
in population aged 5 to 14, and the per capita hospital beds. We use the logarithm of 
these dependent variables except the shares of middle school and primary school students 
to account for their skewness. Compared with GDP, these outcomes should have 
experienced a less amount of manipulation, partially because they are less aggregated 
than GDP. We find significantly positive impacts of per capita government revenue on all 
the outcomes except the share of primary school students. In China, primary schooling is 
almost universal, and hence a further increase in local government revenue should have a 
very limited impact. Overall, these results suggest strong positive impacts of local 
government revenue on economic development. Furthermore, we notice that the first-
stage effect for these non-district counties is stronger than that for the full sample. As 
explained earlier, non-district counties usually have a long history and hence our 
historical variation can have a stronger first-stage effect on them, while the majority of 
county-level districts were established after 1931.  
Similar to the U.S., China's county governments undertake the task in building 
local infrastructure and providing education and health care service. For example, 
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extensive media coverage and scholars' reports focus on the difficulties of poor counties 
in providing public goods after the 1994 tax sharing reform. This reform deprived of a 
large share of taxation power from local governments. On the other hand, counties in 
good standing in taxation can provide more high-quality public service. Unlike 
corruption, taxation is rarely a pure rent-seeking activity. For example, Sng and 
Moriguchi (2014) provide extensive evidence that the higher government revenue in 
ancient Japan explains why it could provide more public service and prepare Japan better 
for the transition from stagnation to growth. Devarajan, Xie and Zou (1998) show that if 
the government subsidizes private providers of public capital, economic growth and 
welfare are higher than under laissez-faire. Taxation is costly, and hence if the value of 
public goods provided by the government cannot offset the costs in collecting taxes, we 
may see a negative impact of government revenue. Therefore, our results clearly show 
that the value of public goods such as education, health care, treated water and others 
provided by the government is high. 
1.3.6 Robustness Check 
For the validity of our instrumental variable, population change from wars should 
not related to pre-war economic development. Although in our main regressions we 
already control logged population size in 1820, which could have a relationship with pre-
war economic development. In this part, we conduct two tests on this problem. Firstly, 
we do a placebo test by constructing population change using prefecture-level population 
data in 1776, 1820, 1851, 1880. For example, the population change from 1776 to 1820 is 
defined as population in 1820 minus population in 1776 divided by population in 1776. If 
the population change from 1851 to 1880 reflects the economic development before the 
wars, then it is reasonable to think the population change from 1776 to 1820 and 
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population change from 1820 to 1851 also reflect such pre-war economic development, 
and consequently we should document similar strong first-stage effects when using the 
first two population changes. However, using the three population changes in the first-
stage regression (3) with a full set of covariates and province fixed effects, we find that 
estimates of the population change from 1776 to 1820 (from 1820 to 1851) on the logged 
per capita government revenue is -0.03 (-0.26) with p-values of 0.15 and 0.43, whereas 
the estimates for the population change from 1851 to 1880 is -0.5 with p-value of 0.00.  
Second, As explained by Acemoglu et al. (2002), Nunn and Qian (2011) and 
others, urbanization level is a good indicator of ancient economic development. 
Therefore, we use Rozman's (1974) four-part classification of Chinese urbanization level 
for ancient prefectures in the Qing dynasty: largest (population of 300,000 and above), 
mid-level (population between 70,000 and 300,000), small (population between 30,000 
and 70,000), and smallest (population below 30,000), similar to Bai and Jia (2016). We 
regress population change from wars on the dummy variables for a largest city and a 
smallest city and the full set of covariates, and cannot find an impact of either dummy 
variable under the 10 percent significance level, and the p-value of the joint test is 0.18. 
This suggests that population change from wars is unrelated to ancient economic 
development. However, in the 2SLS regressions with the share of urban population or 
(other outcomes related to economic development in the following tables) as dependent 
variables, we find significant impacts of government revenue under the 1 percent level. 
Moreover, we classify current counties (though not for prefectures because the total 
population and urban population in prefectures are much higher than those in ancient 
prefectures on average) into four categories with the same cutoffs, we find that more 
government revenue significantly decreases the chance of being a smallest city under the 
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5 percent level, and increases the chance of being a largest city with a p-value close to 
0.15. 
There are two questions related to the other channels. First, a higher tax level 
might reduce the opportunity cost of becoming a rebel, which means that the wars could 
be the result of taxation. North and Weingast (1989) describe how the increased tax level 
led to a coalition formed against the English Crown in 17th century. However, as 
explained earlier, Qing China had collected lower tax revenue before these wars, and the 
major cause of the wars were the influence of Christianity and the conflicts between 
groups. Second, population losses might increase marginal productivity and wage level 
(North and Thomas, 1976). This argument might be effective for manufacture and 
agriculture, but is less plausible for commercial activities which the newly introduced tax 
(Lijin) was targeting. In particular, population losses could lead to a decline in 
commercial activities, and hence the impacts of government revenue are likely 
underestimated in our study. 
To enhance our argument that the wars in 1851-1880 transformed the tax system 
from a mainly land tax based system to a system in which commercial and industrial 
taxes are important, we gather ancient prefecture-level land tax revenue in 1820 from 
Liang (1981). This land tax revenue could reflect the ``natural'' tax level.  
We find a strong relationship between logged land tax revenue per capita and 
current per capita government revenue, significantly under the 5 percent level, in an 
unconditional regression. However, after conditioning on other covariates and province 
fixed effects, the relationship disappears completely. This fact implies that the land tax 
                                                 
5 In this regression we include the logarithm of the number of current population besides other covariates, 
since in the regression of population change from wars on the dummy variables for a largest city and a 
smallest city we also include logged ancient population. 
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revenue reflected the impacts of these covariates. And after the wars, the land tax was no 
longer very important and hence left few impacts on current government revenue.  
We notice that beyond local government revenue, there were limited changes in 
other dimensions of local governments in Qing dynasty, especially those in the same 
province. Although provincial governors gained more power relative to the central 
government, local governments are too small to gain additional power. Moreover, there 
was almost no change in the structure of prefecture and county governments after the 
wars. We also notice that the size of bureaucracy was not affected by the wars too much. 
Using logged per capita public employees as an additional covariate does not affect the 
impacts on any outcome. This means that the effects of  population change resulting 
from these wars mainly enter the current government revenue rather than the number of 
current public employees.  
In addition, although the taxation power was decentralized very much during and 
after the wars, the power of appointing local government leaders was still controlled by 
the central government. For example, provincial governors usually could stay in a 
province for less than 5 years (Li, 2012, 2015).  
 
1.4 Local Public Employees: Number of Ancient Counties as an IV 
1.4.1 OLS results 
In this section, we estimate the impacts of the size of bureaucracy, another 
dimension of state capacity. For this purpose, we replace Statecap, the variable of major 
interest, with the logarithm of average per capita public employees in 1999-2000 in 
Equation (2). Table 7 shows the OLS results of the impact on per capita GDP. In the 
regressions with different sets of covariates and province fixed effects, we cannot find 
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any significant effect of per capita public employees. This result coincides with the 
simple correlation shown in Figure 3. Since we use log-log regressions in the two 
sections, the magnitudes can be compared in a consistent way. 
1.4.2 Number of Ancient Counties as an IV 
The reverse causality may exist here as well. For example, a county with better 
economic performance can afford a larger number of public employees. Not surprisingly, 
people tend to attain a position in a more developed area or a place with better economic 
potential, as suggested by the tremendous differential in the numbers of testers in civil 
service examinations across different parts of contemporary China. This issue tends to 
inflate the real impact of the size of bureaucracy on the economic development. On the 
flipside, we realize a possibility that a county with a large share of public employees 
might not accommodate a large number of population because of worse geographic or 
climatic conditions, which have a negative impact on economic development. 
To solve this issue, an ideal instrumental variable is the number of ancient public 
employees. However, these data are not available. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, only 
the county magistrate and a very limited number of formal employees were paid by the 
government, whereas the majority of public employees were employed and paid by the 
county magistrate, and hence there was not official statistics on the actual number of 
public employees (Chu, 1962). In 1800, there were only around 20,000 ranked officials 
governing a population that might have exceeded 300 million, or a ratio of one official 
per 15,000 people (Sng, 2014), which underestimates the real size of bureaucracy to a 
large amount. As Needham and Huang (1974) put it, ``Chinese bureaucratic government 
always appeared impressive in breadth while remaining shallow in depth.'' Moreover, we 
do not know the number of ranked officials at the ancient prefecture level. 
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For this reason, following the similar practice of Sng (2014), we use the logged 
number of ancient counties in an ancient prefecture scaled by population in 1820 as an 
instrumental variable. Counties in the Qing dynasty are comparable in size, with a 
population ranging from 100 thousand to 300 thousand (Sng and Moriguchi, 2014). Sng 
(2014) finds that the number of ancient counties in an ancient prefecture declines with the 
distance from Beijing, the national capital, and this cannot be fully explained by the 
spatial distribution of the population. His explanation is that the weakening monitoring in 
a longer distance induced the emperor to downsize the government there. In our paper, 
we implicitly control the distance to Beijing through the inclusion of latitude and 
longitude. After controlling these, the number of counties still maintains a large 
explanatory power as we see later. Sng (2014)'s use of the number of counties as a 
measure of the size of bureaucracy and his explanations are also in line with G. William 
Skinner's observation that there were more counties in China during periods of disunity 
than during periods of unification. In the sixth century when China was divided into three 
empires, the three administrations of Northern Zhou, 
Northern Qi, and Chen together governed approximately 2300 counties. Less than 
half a century later, when Sui, an offshoot of Northern Zhou, reunified China, the number 
of counties, now under a single central authority, shrunk to 1255 (Skinner, 1977, 21). 
Furthermore, we notice that the setting and boundaries of prefectures changed radically 
from the Qing dynasty till now, and hence there should be very limited direct impacts of 
county density at ancient prefectures on current outcomes. 
Moreover, our use of the number of ancient county density gains support from 
Chu (1962), a famous book discussing the local governments in the Qing dynasty. He 
notices a county government in the Qing dynasty was the dictatorship by the magistrate. 
To carry out taxation, justice and other aspects of administration, he usually employed 
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clerks, runners, personal servants, private secretaries and etc. Though under different 
titles, these employees usually involved the functions nominally belonging to others, 
which facilitated the control by the magistrate. The result is that the government size 
tended to inflate to a comparable size across counties, even if a county was relatively 
smaller. Indeed, the fixed cost in establishing a county government and setting up its 
main structure is large compared with the marginal cost in employing an extra employee, 
and hence a relatively small county still has an incentive to maintain a large number of 
public employees.  
Consider a numerical example. At the beginning, there are two types of 
employees under titles A and B in county X, with one employee under each title. To 
monitor the title A employee, the county magistrate employs another title B employee; 
and to monitor the original title B employee, the county magistrate employs another title 
A employee. In this way, the total number of employees increases to 4. Now consider 
county Y, with two employees under each title at the beginning. Suppose the similar 
expansion mechanism works, then the number of employees increases to 6. Therefore, 
the ratio of public employees for these two counties increases from 1/2 to 2/3. When the 
government size is large, the numbers of public employees in different counties tend to 
converge to a similar value. For this reason, an ancient prefecture with a large number of 
ancient counties tended to have more public employees. Moreover, the number of 
counties in a prefecture was very stable and does not change with population growth, 
even after the three horrifying wars mentioned above.  
Figure 6 plots the number of counties per 10 thousand people in the 19th century. 
We notice that prefectures close to Beijing (the Northern part) had a higher county 
density indeed, as found by Sng (2014). Many western prefectures also had a relatively 
higher county density, partly resulting from a relatively lower population density, which 
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suggests the need for controlling the ancient population size and province fixed effects as 
we do. 
1.4.3 2SLS Results: Full Sample 
Similar to the OLS results, we find a weaker and unstable impact of local public 
employees on night lights as shown in Table 8. In the regression with a full set of 
covariates, the p-value is just about 0.5, and hence the estimate is much noisier than the 
regression results for government revenue. The ancient county density is indeed highly 
positively correlated with per capita current public employees. With a full set of 
covariates, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is larger than 16.38, the Stock-Yogo weak 
identification test critical value for 10 % maximal IV size (1 endogenous variable and 1 
instrumental variable), and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is close to 8.96, the 
test critical value for 15 % maximal IV size, and is also close to 10 suggested by the rule 
of thumb. We also notice the R-squared in the first-stages are large either including 
covariates or not, suggesting the validity of the instrument (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Moreover, we notice that the weak-IV robust Anderson-Rubin Wald test gives the similar 
results, and hence mitigates the concern about a weak IV. 
To gain more insights on the real impacts of the size of bureaucracy, in the first 
three columns of Table 9 we report the impacts on the ratio of households having treated 
water, average educational attainment and unemployment rate in 2000. In stark contrast 
with the results for public revenue, we cannot find any impact of per capita public 
employees on these economic indicators. The weak-IV robust Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
confirms this fact with large p-values.  
Although we find that a large size of bureaucracy is not as productive as 
government revenue, it may still perform a role in maintaining social stability, another 
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important concern of the Chinese government. For example, more local government 
employees might reduce the incidence of protests. We use two dependent variables 
constructed from the GDELT Project: the logarithm of 1 plus average per million people 
protests in 2000-2001, and an indicator variable for having protests in 2000-2001. As 
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9, we do not find an impact of per capita public 
employees on the incidence of protests. It seems that more public employees just eat 
more public funds, and the governments cannot constrain their tendency to expand 
(Downs, 1993). 
1.4.4 2SLS Results: Non-district Counties 
In Table 10, we further explore more outcomes for the sample of non-district 
counties as in Table 8. These outcomes include the per capita number and the value of 
production of above-scale (annual sales revenue larger than 5 million yuan) 
manufacturing firms, per capita number of telephones, per capita residents' deposits, per 
capita amount of loans, the share of middle school students in population aged 10 to 19, 
the share of primary school students in population aged 5 to 14, and the per capita 
hospital beds. Compared with GDP, these outcomes are measured more accurately. We 
use the logarithm of these variables (after scaled by population) except the shares of 
middle school and primary school students to account for their skewness. In contrast with 
the results in Table 6 for government revenue, the impacts of per capita public employees 
are much smaller and noisier. The weak-IV robust Anderson-Rubin Wald test gives the 
similar results.  
Interestingly, we observe a significant increase in the number of hospital beds per 
capita. Of course, one possibility is that a large size of bureaucracy might be effective in 
providing better health care service. In China, most high-quality hospitals are public, and 
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hence the public employees might promote the development of a better health care 
system. On the other hand, till recently, the medical service payment for public 
employees is managed under a separate system from that for other citizens. Public 
employees do not need to pay medical insurance and usually can enjoy higher quality 
service, which encourages wasteful use of medical resources by them. Therefore, it is not 
clear whether the increase in the number of hospital beds represents the real improvement 
in general welfare. 
Together, the impacts of local government employees are much limited for almost 
all the outcomes. This finding is very different from what found by Acemoglu et al. 
(2015) for Colombia. Because of long-term military conflicts, it is important to have a 
sufficient number of government employees to maintain social order. Moreover, military 
conflicts make it more dangerous to become a government employee and tend to restrict 
the size of bureaucracy and the productivity of the limited government employees should 
be relatively high (Downs, 1993). On the other hand, China does not experience large-
scale wars during the last 60 years. Wide evidence shows that it is attractive to become a 
public employee and the size of China's bureaucracy experiences stable expansion. 
Although taxation is rarely a pure rent-seeking activity, the extra public employees may 
not provide more public goods and may be associated with more rent-seeking activities. 
Therefore, the existence of overstaffing in the public sector can reduce the productivity of 
public employees. 
1.4.5 Robustness Check 
For the validity of our instrumental variable, logged ancient county density should 
not related to ancient economic development. To test this, we regress logged ancient 
county density on the dummy variables for a largest city and a smallest city and the full 
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set of covariates, and cannot find an impact of either dummy variable under the 10 
percent significance level, and the p-value of the joint test is 0.12. This suggests that 
logged ancient county density is unrelated to ancient economic development. 
 
1.5 Local Government Employees: Distance to Ancient Postal Route as an IV 
1.5.1 2SLS Results: Full Sample 
In this section, we consider an alternative instrumental variable for local 
government employees: the distance from a current county to the ancient postal route. 
This is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2015)'s use of the distance to the royal roads in 
Colombia. We find that the distance is highly correlated with current government 
employees, but not local government revenue. This is in line with the fact that closer to 
the postal route, the more control by the government in the Qing dynasty. Since these 
roads were no longer used, they had limited direct impacts on current outcomes. The 
distance to the ancient postal route is calculated using the shape file provided by Tuan-
Hwee Sng in the Arc-GIS software. Sng plotted the route according to the description in 
the Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty (Da Qing huidian, 2006, Yongzheng edition). 
Therefore, the postal route refers to the mid-18th century, though there were few changes 
in the route during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). 
Figure 6 shows the map of the ancient postal route (green lines). The most salient 
feature of these roads is that they were designed to connect Beijing and provincial 
capitals, which facilitated the central government's control over the country. In addition 
to achieving this purpose, they generally choose the most cost-saving route. Therefore, 
after controlling the indicator for being located in a provincial capital and other 
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covariates in our regressions, the distance to the ancient postal route is plausibly 
exogenous, as noticed by Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2012). 
We present the results for the full sample in Table 11. With 100 percent higher 
per capita government revenue, the night lights scaled by population are 270 percent 
lower, and the average educational attainment is 3.4 years shorter. These estimates are 
economically large and statistically significant.  The weak-IV-robust Anderson-Rubin 
Wald test also reports the similar results. The results using the distance to the ancient 
postal route is particularly intriguing since the route is directly comparable with 
Acemoglu et al. (2015)'s ancient royal roads in Colombia. The Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic is close to 16.38, the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical value for 10 % 
maximal IV size (1 endogenous variable and 1 instrumental variable), and the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is close to or larger than 8.96, the test critical value 
for 15 % maximal IV size, and hence mitigates the concern about a weak IV. 
1.5.2 2SLS Results: Non-district Counties 
Table 12 reports the results for non-district counties. We find that the size of 
bureaucracy has negative impacts on all these outcomes, though not always significant. 
These results are in line with those obtained using ancient county density as an 
instrumental variable. Overall, both types of treatment effects identified for different 
``complier'' groups indicate negative impacts of the size of bureaucracy on economic 
development. 
Furthermore, in regressions using both instrumental variables together, we obtain 
very similar estimates of the impacts of government revenue, and the overidentifying test 
cannot reject the validity of these instrumental variables. 
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1.6 Being in a Provincial Capital 
In this section, we explore whether being in a provincial capital promotes 
economic development (Kung and Ma, 2014). Box plots in Figure 4 show that counties in 
provincial capitals have a similar level of night lights as other counties, but a higher ratio 
of households having treated water and a higher average educational attainment. A 
provincial capital is usually located in the central part of the province, which make it 
convenient to control the whole province but the place is not necessary associated with 
best natural conditions. On the other hand, provincial capitals are usually along the 
Yangtze River and Yellow River (the two major rivers in China) or are coastal areas, 
which should give them an economic advantage. In this section we relax the assumption 
of exogeneity of being in a provincial capital and use the indicator of being in a 
provincial capital in ancient times as the instrumental variable.  
Although most of counties maintain the same status in ancient times and now, we 
notice some counties changed their status. Notably, the prefectures that serve as a 
provincial capital in Anhui, Henan, Guangxi, and Hebei changed; moreover, though the 
prefectures that serve as a provincial capital in other provinces are the same, their 
boundaries might have changed, and hence there were still some counties in these 
provinces changing their status. In this section, we exclude counties in the four province-
level municipalities directly under the central government - Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin 
and Chongqing, because being located in a provincial capital is not meaningful for these 
counties. 
As shown in Table 13, we find that counties located in a provincial capital do not 
have a higher level of night lights. The average educational attainment is 0.6 years higher 
and significant under 10 percent level. We also find a higher unemployment rate in 
counties located in a provincial capital. Both Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and 
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Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic are well larger than 16.38, the Stock-Yogo weak 
identification test critical value for 10 % maximal IV size (1 endogenous variable and 1 
instrumental variable), and well larger than 10 suggested by the rule of thumb. It seems 
that being in a provincial capital is only barely beneficial for economic development. 
When looking at more measures of economic development in Table 14, we 
generally find that counties located in a provincial capital achieved worse performance, 
though they are statistically insignificant. These results imply that the apparent advantage 
for these counties could result from better geographic or climate conditions to a large 
extent, rather than stronger state capacity. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Although China's experience in the last three decades is an important part of the 
``East Asian Miracle'', there is not a paper discussing the association between its state 
capacity and economic development using possibly exogenous variation. In this paper we 
offer a comprehensive study on the causal effects of state capacity in explaining China's 
economic development, using rich historical variation and various outcomes in economic 
performance, education, health care, finance, and social unrest. Our estimates indicate 
that a state's capacity to extract greater revenues has significantly positive impacts on 
economic development. However, a large size of bureaucracy performs a much weaker 
and even negative role, and it cannot reduce the incidence of protests. Furthermore, the 
counties located in a provincial capital do not have better outcomes. The consistent 
results based on various datasets support the robustness of our conclusions.  
To the best of our knowledge, China is the only developing country that we can 
obtain such extensive county-level variables (Henderson et al., 2012), and hence we can 
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make use of rich variations in state capacity and outcomes across the country. Since the 
existing literature usually focuses on one dimension of state capacity or a limited number 
of outcomes, our study can be also valuable in understanding the role of state capacity in 
other countries. Moreover, further research could verify whether there is a relationship 



















Figure 1.1: Sample Selection: China Proper
China Proper
Border Regions
Note: the green part is China Proper, where our historical variation is available; the yellow part
are border regions. Source: CHGIS, Version 4, Cambridge: Harvard Yenching Institute,
January 2007.
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Note: these graphs show the correlation between logged night lights scaled by population,
ratio of households having treated water, average educational attainment, unemployment rate
with logged per capita government revenue for the full sample.
46






-6 -5 -4 -3 -2
Log per capita public employees







-6 -5 -4 -3 -2
Log per capita public employees







-6 -5 -4 -3 -2
Log per capita public employees





-6 -5 -4 -3 -2
Log per capita public employees
Unemployment rate Fitted values
Note: these graphs show the correlation between logged night lights scaled by population,
ratio of households having treated water, average educational attainment, unemployment rate
with logged per capita public employees for the full sample.
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Note: these box plots show the differences in logged night lights scaled by population, ratio of
households having treated water, average educational attainment, unemployment rate between
counties in a provincial capital and those not for the full sample. Here “1” stands for counties
in a provincial capital, while “0” stands for counties not in a provincial capital.
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Note: this figure shows the population change resulting from the three wars in 1851-1880 at
the ancient prefecture level based on Equation (1). The dark color stands for less population
loss, while the light color stands for more population loss. The Taiping rellion had the largest
impact on the southeastern part, the most populous and developed provinces in this country.
On the other hand, the Dungan Revolt had the largest impact on the northwestern and
southwestern parts.
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Note: this figure shows the number of counties per 10 thousand people in the 19th century at
the ancient prefecture level. The dark color stands for a higher county density, while the light
color stands for a lower county density.
50
Figure 1.7: China’s ancient postal route
Note: the green lines stand for the ancient postal route in Qing dynatsy, and the green points
are provincial capitals. The shape file is provided by Tuan-Hwee Sng, who plotted it according




Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables: full sample
N Mean Stardard dev. Median
Panel A: Explanatory variables and instruments
Per capita government revenue 2104 261.1 292.94 181.62
Log per capita government revenue 2104 5.26 0.71 5.20
Pop change from wars (ancient prefecture) 2104 -0.25 0.30 -0.03
Per capita public employees 2104 0.021 0.009 0.019
Logged per capita public employees 2104 -3.95 0.37 -3.96
Counties per 10 thousand people (ancient prefecture) 2104 0.05 0.03 0.05
Logged counties per 10 thousand people (ancient prefecture) 2104 -3.13 0.59 -3.09
Current provincial capital 2104 0.14 0.34 0
Ancient provincial capital (ancient prefecture) 2104 0.15 0.36 0
Distance to ancient postal route 2101 79.85 106.23 40.95
Logged distance to ancient postal route 2101 3.12 2.03 3.74
Panel B: Outcomes
Per capita GDP 2063 6216.22 6452.34 4409.29
Night lights per 10 thousand people 2100 103.31 96.84 83.83
Logged night lights per 10 thousand people 2100 4.23 0.99 4.44
Have treated water 2104 0.46 0.31 0.36
Average educational attainment 2104 7.46 1.21 7.35
Unemployment rate 2103 0.03 0.04 0.02
Protests per million people 1678 5.19 36.3 0
Have protests 1678 0.40 0.49 0
Note: the full sample, including both county-level districts and non-district counties. Source:
China Population History edited by Ge (2005); Comprehensive History of Administrative Divi-
sions in China edited by Zhou (2013); Sng (2014) and Sng and Moriguchi (2014); Bai and Jia
(2016); CHGIS, Version 4; National Prefecture and County Finance Statistics Compendium;
2000 Population Census; GDELT Project; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of main variables: non-district counties
N Mean Stardard dev. Median
Panel A: Explanatory variables and instruments
Per capita government revenue 1569 205.97 159.73 165.15
Logged per capita government revenue 1569 5.13 0.61 5.11
Pop change from wars (ancient prefecture) 1569 -0.25 0.30 -0.03
Per capita public employees 1569 0.022 0.008 0.020
Logged per capita public employees 1569 -3.88 0.31 -3.91
Counties per 10 thousand people (ancient prefecture) 1569 0.06 0.03 0.05
Log counties per 10 thousand people (ancient prefecture) 1569 -3.06 0.58 -3.01
Current provincial capital 1569 0.08 0.28 0.00
Ancient provincial capital (ancient prefecture) 1569 0.11 0.32 0.00
Distance to ancient postal route 1567 85.43 110.22 47.30
Logged distance to ancient postal route 1567 3.37 1.88 3.88
Panel B: Outcomes
Per capita GDP 1554 5306.67 4492.63 4013.69
No. of firms per 10 thousand people 1568 2.08 3.26 1.32
Per capita firm production 1568 6290.69 11820.94 2561.29
Per capita telphone 1559 0.18 0.11 0.15
Per capita residents’ deposit 1557 6001.34 5430.58 4504.07
Per capita loan 1560 5801.69 5143.05 4424.11
Secondary education ratio 1569 0.32 0.08 0.33
Primary education ratio 1569 0.61 0.08 0.61
Per capita hospital beds 1569 0.004 0.002 0.003
Note: non-district counties. No. of firms per 10 thousand people and Per capita firm production
refer to manufacturing firms with annual sales revenue larger than 5 million yuan. Secondary
education ratio is the number of secondary school students scaled by the number of people aged
10 to 19; Primary education ratio is the number of primary school students scaled by the number
of people aged 5 to 14. Source: China Population History edited by Ge (2005); Comprehen-
sive History of Administrative Divisions in China edited by Zhou (2013); Sng (2014) and Sng
and Moriguchi (2014); Bai and Jia (2016); CHGIS, Version 4; National Prefecture and County
Finance Statistics Compendium; 2000 Population Census; China County Socioeconomic Sta-
tistical Yearbooks; Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms.
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Table 1.3: Linear regressions of night lights on logged per capita local government revenue
Dep. var: Night lights (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov revenue 0.738*** 0.695*** 0.630*** 0.601***
(0.0650) (0.0442) (0.0423) (0.0419)
Covariate set 1 Y Y
Covariate set 2 Y
Province FE Y Y Y
N 2100 2100 2100 2100
Adj. R-sq 0.280 0.592 0.603 0.619
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported
by satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Gov rev-
enue is the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 1999-2000 (after translating
1999 revenue in 2000 yuan). Covariate set 1 are covariates measured at the current county
level, including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefec-
tures, indicator for locating in provincial capitals. Covariate set 2 are covariates measured at
the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in) level, including whether there’s main
river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in
1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmil-
let), language fragmentation index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports.
Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.4: 2SLS regressions of night lights on logged per capita local government revenue
Dep. var: Night lights (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gov revenue 1.370** 1.016*** 1.146*** 1.243***
(0.583) (0.182) (0.272) (0.297)
Covariate set 1 Y Y
Covariate set 2 Y
Province FE Y Y Y
N 2100 2100 2100 2100
1st-stage Dep. var: Gov revenue (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pop change from wars -0.290** -0.683*** -0.493*** -0.470***
(0.129) (0.114) (0.096) (0.096)
Cragg-Donald F 31.41 104.41 64.10 50.00
Kleibergen-Paap F 5.04 35.75 26.65 20.11
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.015 0.330 0.457 0.490
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported
by satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Gov rev-
enue is the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 1999-2000 (after translating
1999 revenue in 2000 yuan). Covariate set 1 are covariates measured at the current county
level, including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefec-
tures, indicator for locating in provincial capitals. Covariate set 2 are covariates measured at
the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in) level, including whether there’s main
river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in
1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmil-
let), language fragmentation index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports.
Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.5: 2SLS regressions of several outcomes on logged per capita local government revenue
Dep. var: Have treated water Edu attainment Unemp rate
(1) (2) (3)
Gov revenue 0.278*** 1.028*** 0.012
(0.088) (0.247) (0.009)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y
N 2104 2104 2103
1st-stage Dep. var: Gov revenue (1) (2) (3)
Pop change from wars -0.472*** -0.472*** -0.472***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Cragg-Donald F 50.37 50.37 50.43
Kleibergen-Paap F 20.44 20.44 20.45
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.00 0.00 0.16
R-squared 0.491 0.491 0.491
Note: Have treated water is the ratio of households having treated water in 2000; Edu attain-
ment is the average educational attainment in 2000; Gov revenue is the logarithm of average
per capita government revenue in 1999-2000 (after translating 1999 revenue in 2000 yuan). Co-
variates include covariates measured at the current county level, including logged county area,
latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator for locating in provin-
cial capitals; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in)
level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood
in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitabil-
ity (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number of presented
scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: 2SLS regressions of more outcomes on logged per capita local government revenue, non-
district counties
Dep. var: No.firms Firm productionTelephone Deposit Loan Sec schoolPri schoolHospital bed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gov revenue 0.850*** 1.295*** 0.724*** 0.760*** 0.759*** 0.068*** 0.014 0.667***
(0.177) (0.213) (0.118) (0.140) (0.115) (0.022) (0.017) (0.114)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1568 1568 1559 1557 1560 1569 1569 1569
1st-stage Dep. var: Gov revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pop change from wars -0.636*** -0.636*** -0.630***-0.632***-0.635***-0.638***-0.638*** -0.638***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Cragg-Donald F 79.29 79.29 72.29 76.87 77.59 79.16 79.16 79.16
Kleibergen-Paap F 41.64 41.64 40.81 40.60 40.93 41.64 41.64 41.64
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00
R-squared 0.393 0.393 0.387 0.391 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392
Note: Gov revenue is the logarithm of average per capita government revenue in 1999-2000
(after translating 1999 revenue in 2000 yuan). We use the logarithm of these dependent variables
(after scaled by population) except the shares of middle school and primary school students.
Covariates include covariates measured at the current county level, including logged county
area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator for locating in
provincial capitals; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county is
located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of
drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of
crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number
of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Linear regressions of night lights on logged per capita public employees
Dep. var: Night lights (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employees 0.0811 -0.137* 0.0568 0.0779
(0.110) (0.0808) (0.0738) (0.0722)
Covariate set 1 Y Y
Covariate set 2 Y
Province FE Y Y Y
N 2100 2100 2100 2100
Adj. R-sq 0 0.417 0.488 0.521
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported
by satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Public
employees is the logarithm of average per capita public employees in 1999-2000. Covariate
set 1 are covariates measured at the current county level, including logged county area, lati-
tude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator for locating in provincial
capitals. Covariate set 2 are covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county
is located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of
drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of
crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number
of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.8: 2SLS regressions of night lights on logged per capita public employees
Dep. var: Night lights (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employees -0.833 -0.508 0.206 0.568
(0.547) (0.509) (0.594) (0.765)
Covariate set 1 Y Y
Covariate set 2 Y
Province FE Y Y Y
N 2100 2100 2100 2100
1st-stage Dep. var: Public employees (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of counties 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.131*** 0.103***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036)
Cragg-Donald F 175.97 79.24 44.40 20.36
Kleibergen-Paap F 35.76 26.23 13.64 8.28
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.09 0.30 0.74 0.48
R-squared 0.077 0.240 0.334 0.360
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported by
satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Public em-
ployees is the logarithm of average per capita public employees in 1999-2000; No. of counties
is the logarithm of the number of ancient counties in the ancient prefecture (the current county
is located in) scaled by 1820 population. Covariate set 1 are covariates measured at the current
county level, including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal
prefectures, indicator for locating in provincial capitals. Covariate set 2 are covariates measured
at the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in) level, including whether there’s main
river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in
1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmil-
let), language fragmentation index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports.
Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.9: 2SLS regressions of several outcomes on logged per capita public employees
Dep. var: Have treated water Edu attainment Unemp rate No. of protests Have protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public employees -0.033 -0.294 -0.003 0.105 -0.095
(0.233) (0.887) (0.022) (0.850) (0.400)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 2104 2104 2103 1678 1678
1st-stage Dep. var: Public employees (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of counties 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Cragg-Donald F 20.68 20.68 21.10 24.00 24.00
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.41 8.41 8.59 9.71 9.71
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.89 0.74 0.88 0.90 0.81
R-squared 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.377 0.377
Note: Have treated water is the ratio of households having treated water in 2000; Edu attainment
is the average educational attainment in 2000; Public employees is the logarithm of average per
capita public employees in 1999-2000; No. of protests is the logarithm of 1 plus average per
million people protests in 2000-2001; Have protests is an indicator variable for having protests
in 2000-2001. No. of counties is the logarithm of the number of ancient counties in the ancient
prefecture (the current county is located in) scaled by 1820 population. Covariates include co-
variates measured at the current county level, including logged county area, latitude, longitude,
indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator for locating in provincial capitals; and
covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in) level, including
whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899,
logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet
potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi),
and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.10: 2SLS regressions of more outcomes on logged per capita public employees, non-district
counties
Dep. var: No.firmsFirm productionTelephone Deposit Loan Sec schoolPri schoolHospital bed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public employees 1.306* 0.325 0.253 0.412 0.645 -0.048 -0.064 0.941**
(0.777) (1.201) (0.551) (0.663) (0.564) (0.098) (0.072) (0.382)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1568 1568 1559 1557 1560 1569 1569 1569
1st-stage Dep. var: Public employees (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No. of counties 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090***0.090*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Cragg-Donald F 18.83 18.83 18.76 18.31 18.33 18.78 18.78 18.78
Kleibergen-Paap F 7.18 7.18 7.16 7.03 7.03 7.16 7.16 7.16
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.12 0.79 0.67 0.57 0.27 0.60 0.37 0.05
R-squared 0.402 0.402 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402
Note: Public employees is the logarithm of average per capita public employees in 1999-2000;
No. of counties is the logarithm of the number of ancient counties in the ancient prefecture
(the current county is located in) scaled by 1820 population. We use the logarithm of these de-
pendent variables (after scaled by population) except the shares of middle school and primary
school students. Covariates include covariates measured at the current county level, including
logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator
for locating in provincial capitals; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the cur-
rent county is located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the
incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition,
three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index,
the number of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at
prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.11: 2SLS regressions of several outcomes on logged per capita public employees
Dep. var: Night lights Have treated water Edu attainment Unemp rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public employees -2.749** 0.142 -3.370*** 0.008
(1.268) (0.296) (1.275) (0.031)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y
N 2100 2101 2101 2100
1st-stage Dep. var: Public employees (1) (2) (3) (4)
Postal route 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Cragg-Donald F 13.24 13.70 13.70 13.55
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.93 9.25 9.25 9.17
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.79
R-squared 0.360 0.359 0.359 0.359
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported by
satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Have treated
water is the ratio of households having tap water in 2000; Edu attainment is the average edu-
cational attainment in 2000. Postal route is the logarithm of the distance to the ancient postal
route. Covariates include covariates measured at the current county level, including logged
county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures, indicator for locat-
ing in provincial capitals; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county
is located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of
drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of
crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number
of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.12: 2SLS regressions of more outcomes on logged per capita public employees, non-district
counties
Dep. var: No.firmsFirm productionTelephone Deposit Loan Sec schoolPri schoolHospital bed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public employees -1.652 -4.396** -0.527 -1.640* -2.078** -0.198* -0.073 -0.239
(1.084) (1.967) (0.619) (0.939) (1.000) (0.117) (0.077) (0.501)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1566 1566 1557 1555 1558 1567 1567 1567
1st-stage Dep. var: Public employees (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Postal route 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090***0.090*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Cragg-Donald F 13.85 13.85 13.46 14.04 14.11 13.87 13.87 13.87
Kleibergen-Paap F 10.60 10.60 10.25 10.76 10.79 10.60 10.60 10.60
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.05 0.00 0.37 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.07
R-squared 0.402 0.402 0.401 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402
Note: Postal route is the logarithm of the distance to the ancient postal route. We use the loga-
rithm of the dependent variables (after scaled by population) except the shares of middle school
and primary school students. Covariates include covariates measured at the current county level,
including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures,
indicator for locating in provincial capitals; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture
(the current county is located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length,
the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condi-
tion, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation
index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered
at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.13: 2SLS regressions of several outcomes on being located in a provincial capital
Dep. var: Night lights Have treated water Edu attainment Unemp rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current capital 0.069 0.034 0.617* 0.015*
(0.242) (0.057) (0.323) (0.009)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y
N 2023 2027 2027 2026
1st-stage Dep. var: Current capital (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ancient capital 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.457***
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Cragg-Donald F 383.31 383.45 383.45 383.52
Kleibergen-Paap F 27.13 27.04 27.04 27.05
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.78 0.57 0.08 0.07
R-squared 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.337
Note: night lights are the logarithm of per 10,000 people night light digits in 2000 reported by
satellites and processed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Have treated
water is the ratio of households having tap water in 2000; Edu attainment is the average educa-
tional attainment in 2000. Covariates include covariates measured at the current county level,
including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating in coastal prefectures;
and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county is located in) level, includ-
ing whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of drought/flood in 1800-1899,
logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of crop suitability (rice, sweet
potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number of presented scholars (Jinshi),
and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.14: 2SLS regressions of more outcomes on being located in a provincial capital, non-district
counties
Dep. var: No.firmsFirm productionTelephone Deposit Loan Sec schoolPri schoolHospital bed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current capital -0.046 -0.455 -0.344 -0.471 -0.383 -0.010 0.006 -0.374*
(0.384) (0.615) (0.342) (0.382) (0.319) (0.036) (0.029) (0.219)
Covariates & Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1533 1533 1524 1522 1525 1534 1534 1534
1st-stage Dep. var: Current capital (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ancient capital 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.337*** 0.339***0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Cragg-Donald F 181.10 181.10 177.47 179.75 177.98 179.19 179.19 179.19
Kleibergen-Paap F 17.46 17.46 17.15 17.46 17.25 17.25 17.25 17.25
Anderson-Rubin P-value 0.90 0.42 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.78 0.83 0.03
R-squared 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196
Note: we use the logarithm of these dependent variables (after scaled by population) except the
shares of middle school and primary school students. Covariates include covariates measured at
the current county level, including logged county area, latitude, longitude, indicator for locating
in coastal prefectures; and covariates measured at the ancient prefecture (the current county is
located in) level, including whether there’s main river, logged river length, the incidence of
drought/flood in 1800-1899, logged population in 1820, transportation condition, three types of
crop suitability (rice, sweet potato and foxmillet), language fragmentation index, the number
of presented scholars (Jinshi), and treaty ports. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture, *




Product Market Structure and Discrimination in Bank Loan Markets1 
This paper analyzes costly discrimination related to physical attractiveness and 
gender in bank loan markets using a market structure-based method. The rationale is that 
a concentrated market provides more space for loan officers to discriminate against a 
certain group of borrowers. Using several unique datasets and online maps containing 
information on market structure and household finance, we find that loan officers prefer 
good-looking people and males in relatively risky commercial/industrial loan markets. 
On the other hand, females and especially young good-looking females have an 
advantage in mortgage loan markets. Although the disadvantage of bearing and raising 
children cannot be easily disentangled from discrimination in labor markets, it does not 
pose an issue in mortgage loan markets. We interpret these different patterns of 
favoritism as a result of differential risk levels associated with the two types of loans. 
2.1 Introduction  
Access to credit from institutional sources, such as small business loans and 
mortgage loans, represents an important way to improve welfare of households. 
Therefore, it is a concern that a growing body of evidence suggests that owners of small 
businesses from some demographic groups, such as minorities and females, may have 
less access to institutional financing (Bates 1973, 1991; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998; 
Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). There are more successful male entrepreneurs than female 
entrepreneurs, therefore, in small business loan markets loan officers may think male 
entrepreneurs have a better repayment ability and see gender as a signal regarding 
                                                 
1 I benefit very much from constant discussions with Jason Abrevaya and Daniel Hamermesh. I also thank 
Yan Dong and Xue Li for providing part of the data used in this study. 
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creditworthiness, but does it really signal quality or is it just a prejudice? Although the 
literature of labor economics usually find females receive lower wages than males, the 
disadvantage of bearing and raising children could be associated with real productivity, 
but such a disadvantage should not pose an issue in small business loan markets. 
Moreover, mortgage loans are very safe, it may be not necessary for loan officers 
consider gender as a signal regarding creditworthiness. Then given most loan officers are 
males, will females, especially good-looking females, be treated better than males? 
Our paper sheds light on particular factors that influence observed differences in 
the credit market. We do so by using a market structure-based method founded on 
Becker's (1957) costly discrimination theory. That is, in a concentrated market, banks 
have large market power, and consequently their loan officers can discriminate against 
certain groups of borrowers without worrying about being driven out of the market. On 
the other hand, discriminating loan officers are more likely to be driven out of a 
competitive market. We analyze costly discrimination in China's bank loan markets using 
several unique datasets and online maps. China provides an excellent case for this kind of 
research. Although studies about the United States find that Dun \& Bradstreet credit 
scores and FICO scores provide cost effective methods for lenders to evaluate loan 
applications and monitor borrowers (e.g. Frame et al, 2001; Akhavein et al. 2005; Berger 
et al. 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007), there is not such information available in China. 
Since 2000, China's bank industry has experienced large-scale deregulation, with many 
markets witnessing an explosive growth in the number of different banks and the number 
of bank branches. Many new loan officers have very limited experience in dealing with 
borrowers, and hence they probably choose borrowers based on some simple 
demographic characteristics.  Moreover, China has experienced a housing boom since 
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2000, and thus home as collateral is very safe. Therefore, it could be easier to detect 
discrimination in this market. 
We examine two types of possible discrimination related to household heads' 
physical attractiveness (Hamermesh and Biddle,1994) and gender, and the two types of 
markets under consideration are the commercial/industrial loan (small business loans in 
the U.S.) markets and the mortgage loan markets. Physical attractiveness or beauty is 
rated by the student surveyors of the household finance data we use, with rankings 
between 1 and 10. To follow the usual practice and to accommodate the distribution of 
beauty ratings, we classify those with a rating of 8-10 as good-looking people, and those 
with a rating of 1-2 as bad-looking people, although different classifications yield 
qualitatively identical results. Our complementary evidence shows that the beauty rating 
is highly positively correlated with height and negatively correlated with weight. Our 
prediction is that costly discrimination will tend to decline in a more competitive bank 
loan market. That is, if less attractive individuals or those of a certain gender have higher 
default rates and hence are less likely to obtain a loan or are forced to pay higher interest 
rates, more market competition should not reduce these productive lending practices  (in 
that case they are no longer prejudice).   
For commercial/industrial loans, we use a novel identifying technique based on 
both the community identifier and information collected from online maps. As 
documented in the literature, commercial/industrial loans for small businesses are usually 
relationship-based (e.g., Peterson and Rajan, 1994, 2002), and for this reason, we use 
community-level market concentration. As opposed to borrowers of mortgages, 
entrepreneurs' collateral is generally much less liquid and has greater volatility in value, 
and they usually need to borrow from the same bank many times. This means that 
monitoring is paramount and therefore, the distance between a bank and a small business 
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should be relatively short. Realizing this fact, we find the number of different banks 
within two kilometers of the community office where a household is located2. In China, 
each community has an official identifier which can be found at the National Bureau of 
Statistics website3. Actually, we also find that market concentration in this circle and that 
of larger/smaller circles are highly correlated. Gan (2016) notes that this community 
identifier contains information about whether the community is located in an urban or a 
rural area, and he uses this information to measure China's urbanization. He also remarks 
that very few papers make use of the information from this community identifier, not to 
mention the information collected from online maps based on the community identifier. 
This is not particularly surprising, as the usual publicly available datasets do not contain 
the community identifier. Even if some administrative datasets do include it, the 
statistical information regarding economic development is not available at the community 
level, and for this reason the usual research cannot be improved with the community 
identifier. However, we find that the community-level market concentration has larger 
variation than the prefecture-level market concentration, can mitigate the impacts of other 
prefecture-level confounding factors, and hence can provide larger identification power 
for our work.   
Because households often move out of their original community after they 
purchase a new home, and because borrowing in each of these instances is a one-time 
transaction, the prefecture-level market concentration is more appropriate for mortgage 
loans. A prefecture in China is a level of jurisdiction between the provincial level and the 
county level, similar in size to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the United States.  
In the following sections of this paper, community-level market structure refers to the 
                                                 
2 A community office is the smallest level government unit in China. 
3 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/tjyqhdmhcxhfdm/2013/index.html 
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market structure within the 2-kilometer circle of the community office in which a 
household is located, and prefecture-level market structure relates to market structure in 
the prefecture where a household is located.  
Our principal findings are summarized as follows. First, generally speaking, we 
find that in a more concentrated commercial/industrial loan market, i.e., those with a 
higher Herfindahl index (HHI), good-looking people are more likely to obtain loans than 
average-looking people, and when they do, those loans tend to have lower interest rates, 
while the converse is true for bad-looking people. For example, with a one-standard-
deviation increase in the community-level HHI, the chance that a good-looking male will 
obtain a loan is 20 percentage points higher compared with an average-looking male. The 
magnitude is similar for good-looking females compared with average-looking females. 
Moreover, our results show that males have an advantage over females. Second, in 
contrast to most findings in labor markets, we detect that females have a strong advantage 
in a more concentrated mortgage loan market, and this is especially the case for younger, 
good-looking females. Although the disadvantage of bearing and raising children cannot 
be easily disentangled from discrimination in labor markets, it does not pose an issue in 
mortgage loan markets, and hence this explains such findings. Third, both the descriptive 
statistics and regression estimates evaluated at the mean HHI indicate the existence of an 
advantage associated with good-looking people in the two types of markets, and an 
advantage associated with females in mortgage loan markets. We think that this fact is 
also of some importance. Loan officers can obtain almost the same hard information, 
such as education, family income, home ownership, retirement status, and household 
register (``Hukou'') as researchers, and it is costly to collect further information from 
these small borrowers. Therefore, conditioning on these pieces of hard information, the 
observed premium or penalty probably reflects discrimination related to physical 
 71 
attractiveness and/or gender. Although some regressions do not produce significant 
results for the variables of major interest, we are encouraged by the fact that only the 
results in the expected direction are significant. Moreover, it is probably unnecessary for 
bank loan officers to discriminate against the same person in more than one way. They 
can reject the application, require a higher interest rate or a larger share of down 
payment, but not necessarily use all of them together. In summary, the consistent pattern 
shown in various regressions suggests the existence of costly discrimination in Becker's 
sense in bank loan markets.  
Our findings also shed light on the importance of analyzing different loan markets 
separately. Commercial/industrial loans are usually riskier than mortgage loans, and 
hence bank loan officers probably want to take borrowers' physical attractiveness or 
gender as a sign of creditworthiness, even if the signal is not really associated with better 
quality. Indeed, we find some evidence that good-looking people might be more willing 
or able to communicate verbally, which signals a better-quality borrower. Because there 
are more successful male entrepreneurs than female entrepreneurs, gender can be seen as 
a signal in commercial/industrial loan markets. Therefore, both the findings related to 
physical attractiveness and gender support the interpretation of the role of gender or 
physical attractiveness as a signal. However, in a more competitive market, it is less 
likely for loan officers to use this signal. This implies that this signal is not effective in 
revealing the real credentials of borrowers, and hence is in line with Cavalluzzo et al. 
(2002) and other papers on U.S. small business loan markets. On the other hand, 
mortgage loans are pretty safe, and it is thus more likely for loan officers to enjoy visual 
pleasure. Notice that both of these are consistent with Becker's costly discrimination, but 
are different from statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination is toward less 
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creditworthy groups of borrowers, and hence this kind of discrimination will not decline 
in a more competitive market.  
Together, our paper makes three major contributions. First, this is the first paper 
to relate a beauty premium in credit markets to market structure. Moreover, there are very 
few papers that discuss a gender premium in bank loan markets. Secondly, we analyze 
commercial/industrial loan markets and mortgage loan markets separately, and find very 
different patterns in loan pricing behavior. This strongly implies that, in future research, it 
is important to study different kinds of loan markets separately. Although some 
researchers have examined costly discrimination in small business loans using the market 
structure-based method, there are few studies on mortgage loans. Thirdly,  this is the 
first study to connect a community identifier and bank branch information collected from 
online maps. Although this paper studies China in empirical work, our methods can be 
generalized to the research on other countries with an identifier on small geographical 
areas available. In other words, we collect new data, analyze them with new methods, 
deliver bring new findings. 
The field of discrimination in bank loan markets is much less developed than it is 
in labor markets, partly due to limited data availability. Our research aims to elevate the 
discussions in this field by using new technique and unique datasets. Bank loan terms are 
usually set by regional offices and probably the headquarters, and hence are usually 
considered much more standard than labor contracts, especially within the same bank in a 
certain province. Moreover, the conditions or requirements can usually be found in 
brochures at bank branches or online and are therefore are quite transparent. However, 
our findings imply that loan officers still have great freedom in choosing borrowers. Our 
explanation is that there are severe asymmetries of information in bank loan markets 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and thus it is difficult for banks to set a rigorous standard for 
 73 
their loan officers. Therefore, bank loan officers are granted great autonomy in selecting 
qualified borrowers and setting corresponding credit terms. Conversations with several 
bank managers support this possibility. On the other hand, many borrowers might not 
understand complex financial products very well, and may therefore rely on the 
explanations provided by bank loan officers.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to 
Becker's theory on costly discrimination and the institutional background. Section 3 gives 
a review of the related literature; Section 4 presents the empirical strategy; Section 5 
describes the dataset; Section 6 and 7 demonstrate the results and robustness check for 
the two kinds of bank loan markets; Section 8 is a discussion of our findings. Finally, 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2.2 Theory and Background 
2.2.1 Theory 
In his seminal work, The Economics of Discrimination, Becker (1957) models 
discrimination as a personal prejudice against a particular group. In his model, 
discrimination is costly. Competition should mitigate the presence of this type of 
discrimination over time. 
But more concentrated markets do not exert the same pressure for cost 
minimization. Thus, in the absence of competition, it may be possible to sustain 
noneconomic discrimination. For example, in labor markets, a discriminating employer 
foregoes the opportunity to hire cheaper labor and thus achieves a lower profit, which 
leaves a competitive advantage for nondiscriminating employers. In competitive markets, 
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the nondiscriminating employers drive out discriminating employers and no wage gap 
will exist if there are enough nondiscriminating employers. 
There are actually two types of costly discrimination in Becker's spirit. Consider 
bank loan markets: loan officers might simply dislike a certain group and be willing to 
pay to avoid such a group. However, loan officers might be more likely to decline loan 
applications from a certain group because they think these borrowers are more likely to 
default, though after controlling for differences in the verifiable credentials, they are not 
more likely to underperform other groups. In this sense, group attributes serve as a signal 
or ``soft information''. In a competitive bank loan market, there is less space for loan 
officers to discriminate against a certain group of borrowers in either way. Costly 
discrimination is different from the statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 
1973). According to the theory of statistical discrimination, borrowers who are 
discriminated against are more likely to underperform other groups, and hence this kind 
of discrimination would not disappear in a competitive market. 
Discrimination toward a certain demographic group in the bank loan markets can 
be carried out in two ways, a lower approval rate, or worse credit terms (e.g., a higher 
interest rate). A financial institution that would normally loan funds at rate r, could 
require r+t, where t is the discrimination coefficient, or interest premium that must be 
charged in order to compensate for having to deal with the group toward which the lender 
has a prejudice. However, because of the presence of asymmetric information in credit 
markets, the extent to which lenders vary interest rates depending on the attributes of 
borrowers is unclear. Interest rates may therefore be not always a desirable place to look 
for evidence of discrimination (Petersen, 1981; Duca and Rosenthal, 1994). If lenders act 
on their prejudices by turning down certain groups at disproportionate rates, then denial 
rates would exceed expected levels after controlling for the creditworthiness of these 
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borrowers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in equilibrium both credit rationing and 
limited rate flexibility can occur. 
Most of the credit market literature does not consider the relationship between 
competition and discrimination, and instead estimates some variant of the following 
econometric model: 
' ,Y D X        (1) 
where Y represents either approval rates or interest rates charged, X is a vector of 
demographic and risk (and any other relevant) characteristics, and D represents an 
indicator variable for demographic groups of major interest. Then   captures 
differences in Y because of all of the characteristics associated with D that are not 
captured in X. These differences may include statistical and prejudicial discrimination as 
well as economic differentials not properly accounted for by X. In this paper, we will 
exploit variation in concentration across bank loan markets and estimate equations in the 
following form: 
'
1 2* ,Y D Market D X          (2) 
Under this specification, 2  continues to reflect across-group differentials that 
can arise from a variety of sources that we expect to be invariant with respect to market 
structure, including statistical discrimination, omitted variables, and possibly prejudicial 
discrimination. In contrast, 1  reflects differentials associated with lender market power 
in households' local area, proxied here by the HHI or other measures of lender market 
concentration. Wider differentials in less competitive lending markets are consistent with 
Becker's costly discrimination. 
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2.2.2 Background: China's Banking Reform 
Prior to 1978, the Chinese financial system followed a mono-bank model 
(People’s Bank of China) whereby all the bank branches were part of one administrative 
hierarchy. In 1978, a banking reform was put on the agenda and various banking 
functions were devolved from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank of 
China. Four specialized state-owned banks, the Bank of China (BOC), the Agriculture 
Bank of China (ABC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC), and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the so-called ``Big Four'', were established. In 1985, 
additional changes were implemented that were designed to give these institutions greater 
scope in raising and allocating capital. The four banks are now national commercial 
banks that compete with each other (Lin and Zhang, 2009). 
In the middle and late 1980s, banking reform turned to bank ownership; during 
this period, the existing banking system structure was held constant. Ownership reform 
was introduced incrementally. The first Chinese-foreign joint-equity bank, China and 
South Sea Bank Ltd., was formed in 1984. Two years later the Bank of Communications, 
the first domestic joint-equity bank, was established. In 1991, Shenzhen Development 
Bank, also a domestic joint-equity bank, was successfully listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, becoming the first partially public-owned bank in China.  
In 1995, the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law were promulgated. 
With the implementation of the Commercial Bank Law, urban and rural credit 
cooperatives started to merge and form city-level commercial banks, which were owned 
by the state, state-owned enterprises, or private capital. Compared with the ``Big Four'', 
joint-equity banks, urban and rural commercial banks and credit unions witnessed a 
larger expansion over the last two decades. In 2006, the urban commercial banks were 
allowed to establish branches beyond their home province. Although before then, urban 
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commercial banks were usually very small and focused on their home city, starting then 
their expansion has been accelerating. Till now some of them have become Fortune 500 
companies. 
Before 1993, the government allowed foreign banks to establish branches in 
certain cities to conduct foreign-currency business with foreign firms and citizens only. 
Starting in 1993, the banking sector started lifting various geographic and client 
restrictions on foreign bank lending. The government allowed foreign banks in China to 
conduct both foreign- and local-currency business with foreign firms and citizens, and to 
conduct foreign-currency business with domestic firms. Under the WTO agreements, 
restrictions on the operations of foreign financial institutions in the Chinese financial 
sector were relaxed in stages (Lin, 2011). In the banking sector, foreign banks were 
scheduled to receive treatment identical to that of national institutions and to provide 
Rmb (China's currency) business to Chinese firms and individuals by December 2006. 
From 2001 to 2011, the number of foreign bank branches in China soared from 200 to 
800. However, the market share of foreign banks is still much smaller than that of native 
banks. 
Overall, these bank deregulation policies led to more competitiveness in China's 
bank loan markets, and they can provide plausibly exogenous temporal variation to our 
study. China's bank deregulation is comparable to that happened in the U.S. from the 
1970s to the 1990s, though because of lack of comprehensive bank-level data as the Call 
reports in the U.S., the former is still underexplored in the literature. 
Figure 1 plots the mean and standard deviation of prefecture-level HHI by year, 
using the bank branch data obtained from China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), the bank regulatory agency in this country. As we can see, the average HHI 
declined from 0.24 in 1995 to 0.13 in 2013, coinciding with the establishment and 
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expansion of various types of banks induced by the bank deregulation. Although the 
standard deviation of HHI also decreased, the ratio of standard deviation and mean 
actually increased from 0.5 to 0.7. These facts imply there is large variation in bank 
market concentration across time and areas. A market of great economic importance is 
usually more attractive to firms, meaning that market concentration is usually correlated 
with the economic importance of a market, such as GDP and population size. For this 
reason, we also plot the mean and standard deviation of prefecture-level logged GDP 
(those of logged population are very stable across year and hence are not plotted here). 
Although there is a negative correlation between average HHI and average logged GDP 
as expected, we notice that the standard deviations seem uncorrelated and hence much 
variations in HHI is probably not explained by the economic level of a prefecture. In 
empirical parts, we will also control the measures of economic level, and the results are 
intact. 
2.2.3 Variation in Market Concentration across Areas 
There are three main sources of variation in market concentration across areas, 
which shows that the observed differences in the treatment of different demographic 
groups should not result from unobserved variables or reverse causality. First, this 
variation can be traced to historical differences. During the era of the planned economy 
(the 1950s to the mid-1990s), financial institutions belonged to the government and 
channeled funds to local governments and state-owned enterprises, and it is rare for 
households to obtain credit from banks. The ``Big Four'' banks, along with many urban 
commercial banks and credit unions have a history dating back to the planned economy 
era, and hence the current market structure in a given area is heavily influenced by the 
historical existence of the branches of these banks. In areas where the central government 
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put on its list of priorities, there would be more bank branches, especially branches 
belonging to the ``Big Four'' banks. In addition, joint-equity banks were usually 
established before the planned economy era, but they were closed in the planned 
economy era. After the country returned to a market economy, these banks expanded in 
their original places quickly in their respective regions. 
Secondly, the central bank of China has 9 regional bureaus as well as a bureau in 
every prefecture. According to the 1995 Commercial Bank Law and the 2002 Guidelines 
for Commercial Banks to Establish New Branches4, establishing a new bank branch 
needs to be approved by the corresponding prefecture bureau of the central bank. 
Therefore, an important source of variation in market concentration across areas comes 
from the different policy preferences of regulators. We also realize that, in a more 
concentrated market, dominant players probably have a larger influence on the local 
regulator's policy, and as a consequence the current market structure tends to persist. 
Similarly, in a more competitive market, players have limited influence on the local 
regulator's policy, and the market will still be competitive.  
Thirdly, a market of great economic importance is usually more attractive to 
firms, and hence there should be more applications for establishing new branches. These 
differences in economic levels can bring differences in approval rates and credit terms 
across the country. For example, an area with a higher credit risk would be compensated 
by a lower approval rate and a higher interest rate. However, differences in economic 
levels should not lead to large differences in approval rates and credit terms among 
different demographic groups in the same area except via  correlation with the market 
                                                 
4 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-02/22/content 285872.htm 
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concentration. This is verified by the fact that our results are intact after purging the 
impact of economic level from market concentration.   
Figure 2 plots the prefecture-level average HHI during 2009-2013 for the 31 
provinces or province-level jurisdictions in mainland China. The darker color stands for a 
higher market concentration level, whereas the lighter color stands for a lower market 
concentration level. As can be seen in this graph, the northeastern and western parts, 
which are relatively poor compared to other parts of the country, have a higher market 
concentration level on average, whereas the northern and southeastern parts, which are 
relatively wealthy,  have a lower market concentration level on average. However, we 
can find large variation in a relatively small region, which implies that our measure of 
market concentration is not very likely to reflect factors specific to a certain region.   
 
2.3 Related Literature 
2.3.1 Product Market Structure and Discrimination 
The relationship between discrimination and product market structure in labor 
markets has attracted economists' attention for a long time. Milgrom and Oster (1987) 
propose the invisibility hypothesis that job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily 
discovered by potential new employers, but that promotion enhances visibility and 
alleviates this problem. Then, in a competitive labor market equilibrium, firms profit by 
hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low-level jobs. As a result of the inefficient and 
discriminatory wage and promotion policies, disadvantaged workers experience lower 
returns to investments in human capital than other workers. Ashenfelter and Hannan 
(1986) examine the relationship between product market competition and employment by 
linking data on female employment with measures of market concentration in the banking 
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industry. Their results provide strong support for a negative relationship between market 
concentration and the relative employment of women. This relationship is primarily due 
to differences across markets rather than individual firms. A more recent  and influential 
paper about discrimination and market structure in labor markets, Black and Strahan 
(2001), documents that male bank employees' wages fell much more than women's after 
deregulation. This suggests that rents in a more concentrated market were shared mainly 
with men, while women's share of employment in managerial positions also increased 
following deregulation. Our results do not present a consistent disadvantage of females in 
bank loan markets, and we find that females actually have an advantage in mortgage loan 
markets. The banking industry is an ideal place to test discrimination using a market 
structure-based method. Many industries, such as wholesale and retail industries, are 
contestable markets with few entry costs, and for this reason the market concentration 
level may not reflect real market power. On the other hand, for utilities and other 
``natural monopoly'' markets, there is no variation in market concentration. The banking 
industry is regulated by the government and has large variation in market concentration, 
which makes it easier to test discrimination based on market structure.  
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) examine the small business loan markets and find 
substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by African Americans and 
white males using the 1993 Survey of Small Business Finances. Consistent with Becker's 
(1957) theory, they also find increases in competition in the firm’s local banking market 
reduces these differences. They also find female borrowers are less likely to obtain a loan 
in a more concentrated market. Similar to them, we find a male premium in a more 
concentrated commercial/industrial loan markets; however, we find that women are 
treated better in a more concentrated mortgage loan market. Moreover, Mitchell and 
Pearce (2009) also test the discrimination toward minorities using the market structure 
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method and find similar evidence. Other research also discuss the impacts of market 
structure on small business loans using the Surveys of Small Business Finances, such as 
Berger et al. (1998) and Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998).  
Overall, in contrast to the large volume of empirical literature on labor markets, 
the discussions on discrimination in loan markets especially bank loan markets are still 
very scarce. This is perhaps not surprising. Although the Federal Reserve's Survey of 
Consumer Finances contains abundant information on household asset and income, it 
does not have enough geographic identifiers (MSA or county) to link with market 
structure data, not to mention measures on beauty and many other individual 
characteristics. In addition, the most recent Small Business Survey is the 2003 version, 
and we do not realize a paper testing discrimination in mortgage loan markets related to 
market structure. Our paper will provide a test of Becker (1957)'s theory in a case study 
of bank loan markets. Because we obtain prefecture and community identifiers for our 
sampled households, we can link the prefecture-level and community-level bank 
concentration information with households' borrowing history. Our results therefore 
provides a stronger identification than using province-level data. 
2.3.2 Physical Attractiveness 
Our interest in physical attractiveness is inspired by the influential work by 
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994). They develop a theory of sorting across occupations 
based on looks and derive its implications for testing for the source of earnings 
differentials related to looks. Holding constant demographic and labor-market 
characteristics, they find that plain people earn less than people of average looks, who 
earn less than the good-looking, and the effects are slightly larger for men than for 
women. Later papers, such as Hamermesh and Abrevaya (2013), find that such a beauty 
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premium exists in many western countries and is related to better life satisfaction. They 
also discuss the measurement error issue in beauty resulting from different practices in 
recording individuals' beauty. Hamermesh (2011) reviews the literature on beauty 
economics. However, the surveys on such a beauty premium in developing countries such 
as China are still very limited. Compared to the western countries, anti-discrimination 
laws are non-existent or weakly enforced in these countries. Moreover, China is much 
more racially homogeneous than most western countries, with the ethnic Han group 
taking up a share of 91.5% (2010 Population census) in the national population, and most 
other ethnic groups are physically indistinguishable from the ethnic Han group. This 
implies that the beauty ratings given by different raters are more likely to be inherently 
consistent and hence better for us to examine the beauty premium. 
Three papers discuss discrimination related to beauty in peer-to-peer lending 
markets, using data from Prosper.com. Duarte et al. (2012) find that borrowers who 
appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded, while 
borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed have better credit scores and default less 
often. Overall, their findings suggest that impressions of trustworthiness matter in 
financial transactions as they predict investors' as well as borrowers' behavior.  On the 
other hand, a further examination by Ravina (2012) confirms the existence of beauty 
premium but finds that beautiful borrowers turn out to be as likely to default as average-
looking borrowers with similar credentials, who are on average less likely to obtain funds 
and are charged higher rates. Her finding is consistent with the experiment-based results 
by Mobius and Rosenblatt (2006), Andreoni and Petrie (2008), Olivola and Todorov 
(2010) and others, who find that the beautiful are treated better, are perceived as more 
productive and are more confident, but that their actual productivity is not higher than 
that less attractive individuals. Finally, Pope and Sydnor (2011)  find evidence of 
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significant racial disparities in this market. Although interesting, peer-to-peer lending 
markets are much smaller and less important than bank loan markets. Moreover, the 
borrowers on Prosper.com post their pictures voluntarily, which makes the selection issue 
hard to tackle. Therefore, Hamermesh (2011) comments on the area: 
This discussion of credit markets illustrates yet another area where a person's 
beauty modifies an economic exchange. Research in this area is just beginning, and the 
evidence is very far from conclusive. It does seem, though, that lenders are willing to 
exchange more generous terms on loans for the pleasure of dealing with good-looking 
borrowers. They do this not because good looks predict that the loan will perform better, 
but because they are prejudiced against bad-looking applicants. 
Compared with these papers, our market structure based method also makes it 
more straightforward to distinguish discrimination from unobservable credentials that 
impact loan offers' decisions. For example, since we find that on average good-looking 
people are treated better, we may conjecture that this is partly because good-looking 
people have some unobservable creditworthy attributes. However, the market will 
compensate for this difference in profit resulting from the difference in these attributes, 
either when the market is more concentrated or more competitive. That is, with a 
changing degree of market concentration, the differences in profit resulting from the 
difference in these attributes are pretty much the same, and hence should have few 
impacts on the estimate for the interaction term. 
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2.4 Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1 Regression Specification 
We will estimate the role of market competition in mitigating discrimination in 
bank loan markets. Based on data availability, we will analyze bank loan approval 
(whether the loan application was approved or rejected if a household once submitted a 
loan application) and the annualized interest rate of the loan of the largest amount for 
commercial/industrial loan markets. We will also analyze loan approval, the annualized 
interest rate, and the down payment ratio (down payment divided by the sum of down 
payment and the amount of the loan) of the loan of the largest amount for mortgage loan 
markets.  
For bank loan approval, either in commercial/industrial loan markets or mortgage 
loan markets, we include the households who once applied a loan, and estimate the 
following regression equation: 
1 2 3 4
5 ,
isp isp isp isp isp
isp s isp
Approve Feature Market Feature Market
X
   
  
   
   (3) 
where i, s, p represents household i in community or prefecture p of province s.  
Approve is a dummy variable indicating whether the household’s loan application was 
accepted or rejected. Feature can be dummy variables for good-looking people, bad-
looking people, or gender (male equal to 1). Market represents measures of market 
concentration such as HHI, C5, or C3. For commercial/industrial loan markets, we use 
community-level measures of market concentration, and the residual from a regression of 
market concentration on the community type (rural area, small town, small city, median 
city and big city). On the other hand, because a household probably moves out of its 
original community after buying a new house, we use prefecture-level measures of 
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market concentration for mortgage loan markets, and the residual from a regression of 
market concentration on logged GDP and population size. 
The variables of major interest are the interaction terms isp ispFeature Market . 
Taking Good looks*HHI as an example, we expect a positive sign for the estimated 
coefficient in the regressions with the possibility that the loan application was approved 
as the dependent variable. X are a set of controls including an indicator for agricultural 
Hukou, rural status, household head's age, ethnic Han indicator, educational attainment, 
marital status, health status, communist party member status, and their interaction terms 
with market concentration. s  are province fixed effects. We do not use prefecture fixed 
effects to avoid having too many parameters for a relatively small sample size of 
commercial/industrial loans (the much larger R-squared than the adjusted R-squared 
implies possible overfitting). Another subtle issue is that the equilibrium combination of 
loan approval and interest rate has less within-prefecture variation for arbitrage reasons, 
especially for mortgage loans. However, we notice that the results are qualitatively 
identical and usually still significant with prefecture fixed effects.  
For commercial/industrial loan markets, we will also control for home ownership 
to further account for the impact of family wealth, though we do not try to control for 
family income because it is probably impacted by the credit support from banks. For 
mortgage loan markets, we will also control for logged family income and retirement 
status. Since the majority of borrowers in this dataset report being granted a loan between 
2009 and 2013, we use the measures of community-level market concentration in 2011 
for commercial/industrial loans (to save labor cost) and the average measures of 
prefecture-level market concentration across these five years for mortgage loans. Using 
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alternative average measures5 does not change our results because market concentration 
is highly persistent in the same market across time.  
An older borrower probably possesses better working skills, has accumulated 
more wealth and hence has a greater ability to pay back a loan. Education increases 
income potential, and loan officers might also see better-educated people as having 
greater creditworthiness. A married couple would lose more if they defaulted, while 
health can enhance productivity and bring confidence (Ravina, 2012). Indicators for 
Hukou, rural status, party member status, home ownership, family income, and retirement 
status can further serve as proxies for the repayment willingness and ability. Our 
household finance dataset does not contain a direct variable for total family income, and 
hence we define family income as the sum of wage income, agricultural income and 
business income. We do not include government subsidies here because they cannot 
signal borrowers' repayment ability in the same way as other income sources, though the 
results with government subsidies included are almost the same. 
Furthermore, we include the households whose loan application was approved, 
and estimate interest rate in both markets and down payment ratio in mortgage loan 
markets using the following regression equations: 
1 2 3 4
5 ,
ispt ispt ispt ispt ispt
ispt s t ispt
Credit Feature Market Feature Market
X
   
   
   
    (4) 
where Credit refers to the credit terms of the loan of the largest amount a 
household borrowed, such as the interest rate (winsorized at 20 percent) in both markets 
and down payment ratio (winsorized at 0.99) in mortgage loan markets, both of which 
                                                 
5 For example, we consider using the average measures of 2007-2011 or 2008-2012 for households whose 
loan application were rejected. We do not think measures with very different periods should be used for the 
accepted and rejected groups. Market competition becomes much fiercer over time, and hence a rejected 
household can probably reapply a loan several years later. 
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refer to the loan of the largest amount in corresponding markets. Although we may also 
be interested in the amount of the loan, current data available do not allow us to 
distinguish between the demand and supply sides. For example, if we observe that a 
beautiful borrower received a smaller loan amount than a less attractive borrower, we 
cannot say whether the good-looking borrower requested a smaller amount or the lender 
only guaranteed part of the requested loan. For this reason, we do not analyze the amount 
of the loan.  
Taking Good looks*HHI as an example, we expect a negative sign for the 
estimated coefficient in the regressions with interest rate as the dependent variable. China 
has experienced a housing boom since 2000, and hence a lower down payment ratio 
might be preferred. However, a larger mortgage payment associated with a lower down 
payment ratio might drive away borrowers. Besides the variables mentioned above, for 
the regressions of the interest rate of commercial/industrial loans, we also control for an 
indicator variable for a loan with collateral, an indicator variable for whether the interest 
rate is adjustable (an adjustable loan affords the bank more flexibility to adjust the loan 
interest rate, such as in times of a high deposit interest rate), and their interaction terms 
with market concentration. For mortgage loans, we also control for an indicator variable 
for public housing fund loans (gongjijin) and its interaction term with market 
concentration. Here Market represents measures of market concentration such as HHI, 
C5, or C3 in the year the loan was granted (rather than the average measures in the 
regressions of loan approval), and t  are loan granted year fixed effects. 
2.4.2 Measures of Market Concentration 
We construct HHI, C5 (the market share of the largest five banks), and C3 (the 
market share of the largest three banks), the regular measures of market concentration. 
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Following Dong (2016)’s and Chong et al (2013)'s practice, we calculate these measures 
based on bank branch presence. That is, we calculate the number of the branches 
belonging to a certain bank and divide it by the total number of branches in a community 
or prefecture, and use this as the market share of this bank. Then we calculate HHI as 
usual. We keep all the commercial banks and credit unions in China. For household 
borrowers, credit unions are quite similar to other banks and are very important in small 
towns and rural areas, though excluding them does not change our results.  
Unlike FDIC's Summary of Deposits, our dataset does not contain prefecture-
level total deposits for a bank, and hence we cannot construct measures of market 
concentration based on deposits. Although many studies on the U.S. construct HHI based 
on deposits following the practice of U.S. Department of Justice, bank regulators 
consider branch presence as a very important measure of market power, as the intrastate 
and interstate branching restrictions show; indeed, the Summary of Deposits reports state-
level and MSA-level total deposit and the number of branches together. As widely 
documented in the literature (i.e. Rose and Hudgins), the existence of a bank branch 
boosts deposits' confidence, and hence more branches can attract more depositors. In 
addition, it is easier for borrowers to find or visit a bank with more branches, and as a 
consequence after considering search cost or transportation cost, a bank with more 
branches should have larger market power. A big bank with many branches and hence 
large market power can also press small banks to follow its agenda. As to China,  we 
usually see different banks are more likely to have a similar number of branches in 
eastern provinces than in western provinces, where we usually see several big banks 
staying with many small banks with only one branch, and banks usually consider the 
former markets as more competitive. 
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Furthermore, we consider the following checks. First, using the 2013 annual 
reports for the publicly traded banks in China, we find that the correlation between the 
number of branches and the amount of deposits (or loans) is 0.7 and significant under 
the1 percent level. Secondly, using the 2013 China City Statistical Yearbooks, we find 
that the correlation between the number of branches and the amount of deposits (or loans) 
for prefectures is 0.8 and significant under the1 percent level. This would not happen if 
banks with a larger number of branches had much smaller deposits (or loans) per branch 
in a prefecture, or if  banks with a larger number of branches had much larger deposits 
(or loans) per branch in a prefecture. Thirdly, using FDIC's 2013 Summary of Deposits, 
we find that the correlation between state-level (or MSA-level) total deposits and the 
number of branches for a bank is 0.7 and significant under the 1 percent level. Therefore, 
the HHI constructed based on the number of branches should be similar to the HHI based 
on total deposits or total loans.  
We will always report the results using HHI. Although not reported in the main 
analysis for brevity, regressions using C5 and C3 always give qualitatively identical 
results. This is because the three measures are highly positively correlated. We use 
prefecture-level market concentration for mortgage loans. Although households can 
probably move out of their original community after buying a new house, it is not very 
likely that they move out of their original prefecture. It is not uncommon for an 
individual living in a certain county to work in another county in the same prefecture, and 
therefore is reasonable for him/her to borrow from a bank branch along this route. 
2.4.3 Community-level Market Concentration from Online Maps 
In this paper, community-level market structure refers to market structure within 
the 2-kilometer circle around the community office where a household is located. 
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Commercial/industrial loans for small businesses are usually relationship-based as the 
literature of relationship banking documents (e.g., Peterson and Rajan, 1994, 2002), and 
for this reason we use community-level market concentration for this market. As opposed 
to borrowers of mortgages, entrepreneurs' collateral is less liquid and has greater 
volatility in value, and they usually need to borrow from the same bank many times. This 
means that monitoring is very important (Diamond, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1995) and 
the distance between a bank branch and a small business cannot be long. Peterson and 
Rajan (2002) find that a usual borrower is less than 5 miles from its lenders in the U.S. 
using the Survey of Small Business Finances. Brevoort and Hannan (2006) suggest that 
distance could have an increasing importance in US commercial lending (lender's 
decisions). Therefore, since the key advantage of our dataset is that we can obtain the 
community identifier, for commercial/industrial loans, we will find the number of 
different banks within 2 kilometers around the community office where a household was 
located. Not surprisingly, community-level market concentration has larger variation than 
prefecture-level market concentration, can mitigate the impacts of other prefecture-level 
confounding factors, and hence can provide large identifying power for us.  
The choice of 2 kilometers is due to the labor intensive hand-collecting work of 
bank branches to a large extent, and we think it is reasonable for China. Compared with 
the U.S., China's population and thus bank branches are more concentrated (for many 
urban areas the number of branches is beyond 100 and they belong to more than 20 
banks). Moreover, cars were not very common for almost all the possible borrowing 
years in our sample. The 2-kilometer circle has an area of 12.6 square kilometers, about 
one half of the East district (25 square kilometers with 0.92 million people) or the West 
district (32 square kilometers with 1.24 million people), two central county-level districts 
in Beijing, and therefore is large and contains a substantial number of bank branches for 
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many urban areas. When we search the bank branches using the Baidu Maps, we find that 
a bank with more branches in a smaller circle is almost always has more branches in the 
2-kilometer circle. We also search bank branches beyond the 2-kilometer circle for 
randomly chosen communities and find that a bank with more branches in the 2-
kilometer circle always has more branches in a larger circle. Indeed, the level of market 
concentration in a smaller circle is highly correlated with that of a larger circle.  
Importantly, a community is small enough so that it can measure the approximate 
location of a sampled household accurately for our purpose. For example, we find that the 
East district and West district of Beijing include 187 communities and 255 communities 
respectively, which means that the community size is about 0.13 square kilometers in 
these districts, around one percent of a 2-kilometer circle (12.6 square kilometers). 
Overall, the community size is approximately comparable across the country.  
Specifically, we use the Baidu Maps (http://map.baidu.com/), an online map 
search engine like Google Maps but having a higher precision for China's locations, for 
this purpose. The procedure for constructing the community-level market concentration is 
the following: we enter the address of a community office on Baidu Maps, then search 
``Yinhang (bank in Chinese)'' in the ``Locations Nearby'' and can find the names of bank 
branches within 2 kilometers around the community office as shown on the left-hand side 
of Figure 3. Although the search results also include ATMs, we do not keep them 
because they cannot grant a loan.  
A tricky part is that the bank branches found online are those existing currently, 
rather than those existing in the loan granted years. Some of the current bank branches 
might not exist several years ago, and some branches existing years ago might have 
already closed. We can solve this issue by matching the branches sought online with the 
branch file obtained from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which 
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contains the establishment year and closing year of a branch. Noticing that the name 
sought from the online maps does not always coincide with the name in the branch file 
perfectly, it is necessary to make sure the match is correct using the address information 
from the branch file in these cases.    
2.4.4 Measure of Physical Attractiveness 
The beauty ratings are given by student surveyors of CHFS, ranging from 1 to 10, 
with a lower rating representing a a worse-looking individual. To accommodate the 
distributions of beauty ratings in our samples as shown in Figure 4 and to follow the 
practice in this literature, we classify a rating of 1-2 as bad-looking, since there is a 
natural cutoff between a rating of 2 and above. To balance the concerns about sample size 
and the danger of classifying plain-looking people as good-looking ones, we classify a 
rating of 8 to 10 as good-looking. Classifying a rating of 9-10 as good-looking increases 
the magnitude of the impact of the interaction term of good-looking indicator and HHI 
and the impact of good-looking at the mean HHI generally, whereas classifying a rating 
of 7-10 as good looking reduces the magnitude of these impacts. These findings suggest 
that the ratings are indeed statistically effective. Moreover, using the 2012 China Labor-
force Dynamics Survey carried out by Sun Yat-Sen University, which also contains 
beauty ratings given by college student surveyors ranging from 1-10 like our dataset, we 
find that each additional centimeter of height is associated with a 0.05 higher beauty 
rating for females and a 0.06 higher rating for males, and the beauty rating is also 
significantly negatively correlated with weight for females but not for males. This is 
consistent with the importance of slimness in judging women's beauty rather than men's 
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in this country. Actually, using a matched sample based on individual characteristics, we 
observe such patterns as well6. 
Indeed, although there is some concern about the subjective nature of measures on 
physical attractiveness, it is easy to adjust statistically for biases in drawing conclusions 
about the relationship between differences in beauty and any outcome. The real question 
is whether people agree on the beauty of a particular individual, and the extent of that 
agreement, if any. Although in our study and most other papers, the beauty of an 
individual was rated by a single surveyor, Hamermesh (2011, pages 24-28) provides rich 
evidence for the high correlation between ratings given by different people. Hamermesh 
and Biddle (1998) find a Cronbach's alpha of 0.75, while Andreoni and Petrie (2008) find 
an alpha of 0.86 and an intra-class correlation coefficient of 0.76. Ravina (2012) find 0.77 
and 0.76 for these two commonly used measures of reliability7 . Moreover, when 
classifying people into three beauty groups, which is the usual practice, the 
misclassification error should be small.  
The peak of the distribution at ratings 5-7 is similar as findings in many surveys 
conducted in Western countries. However, a special phenomenon in our data is the right 
skewness of the distribution, which deserves an explanation. One possible reason is that 
Western countries usually have many means-tested welfare programs and hence 
inequality is relatively low in these countries; however, there are very few such programs 
in China. The 2011 CHFS has been shown to have an income distribution that is similar 
to that of other well-known surveys in China (Zhang et al., 2014). Comparing the 
distributions of family income in the 2011 Current Population Survey March supplement 
                                                 
6 Specifically, we combine the two surveys, and run a regression with an indicator for one survey as the 
dependent variable and individual characteristics as independent variables and obtain a matched sample.}. 
7 There has not been a study documenting a weak or no correlation between the beauty ratings given by 
different people till now, which is probably not due to the ``significance bias'' in usual studies. It should be 
interesting to document  such a deviation in beauty ratings as well. 
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and the 2011 CHFS and adjusting the sampling weights, we find that only 5 percent of 
the population has family income lower than 10 thousand U.S. dollars and the density 
declines to 0 as the family income nears 0, as shown in Figure 5. On the other hand, we 
find a much larger share of households with family income close to 0 in CHFS 
(government subsidies are included here to make this measure comparable to CPS family 
income8. We remind the readers that the two samples are not perfectly comparable 
because of differences in sampling methods; however, the differences in the distributions 
are intriguing and should not be fully driven by the sampling methods. Not surprisingly, 
the distribution of physical attractiveness partly reflects the long-term accumulation of 
these kinds of inequality, though we can control for economic factors in regressions to 
obtain a direct effect of beauty. Moreover, we also notice that our sample is nationwide, 
with most households either living in underdeveloped provinces, small towns and rural 
areas, or being migrants in developed areas. When just looking at the local citizens in 
developed areas, we find a less skewed distribution of beauty ratings. 
 
2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We construct the measures of market concentration, using an administrative 
dataset obtained from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and online 
maps (for community-level market concentration). The CBRC dataset provides 
information about the address, establishment year and closing year of each bank branch 
in this country, which allows us to construct measures of market concentration in each 
                                                 
8 Not including government subsidies give an almost identical distribution. 
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prefecture/circle for each year, based on the number of branches a bank has in that 
prefecture/circle and that year9.  
The information about households' bank loans is obtained from the confidential 
2013 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) dataset, conducted by the Southwestern 
University of Finance and Economics in China. This survey employs a stratified three-
stage random sample design based on probability proportional to size, interviewing 
28,228 households across 29 provinces, 262 counties, and 1,048 communities. This 
survey is the only nationally representative survey in China that has detailed information 
about household finance and assets, including housing, business assets, financial assets, 
and other household assets. In this paper, we focus on two types of bank loans: 
commercial/industrial loans, and mortgage loans for the first home. Although this dataset 
also contains information about agricultural and educational loans, the government 
intervenes heavily in these two types of loan markets, and for this reason they are not 
analyzed here. Mortgage loans for a second home have also been highly regulated by the 
government since 2007, as part of the policies that are in place to curb the housing 
bubble. This survey was also conducted in 2011 and contains 8438 households. However, 
we do not use it because it does not contain community or prefecture identifiers, nor does 
it distinguish agricultural loans from commercial/industrial loans.  
For our purposes, we use the household heads in the CHFS, and the gender and 
most other individual characteristics hence refer to those household heads. For beauty, 
the choice of household heads is not important, because a good-looking male tends to 
marry a good-looking female, as suggested by the assortative mating theory (e.g. 
Pencavel, 1998). The choice of household heads is probably important for our discussions 
                                                 
9 Each bank branch has a branch code given by the central bank, which contains the code of the prefecture 
where this branch is located. Therefore, branch codes can be used to construct the prefecture-level 
measures. For the 2-kilometer circles, we use the online maps as discussed in the previous section. 
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on gender because most households contain both males and females. Although the survey 
asks the interviewees to name the head directly, we use a more delicate algorithm to 
determine the household heads for the main analysis. First, we retain an interviewee and 
his/her spouse, because the interviewee probably knows much better about the 
household's financial position if the household head is his/her spouse rather than his/her 
parents or children. Second, we sort educational attainment within a household and 
consider the individual with the higher level of education to be the household head. This 
is because the individual with more education should have a higher ability to understand 
loan conditions and search for better loan terms. Third, if the educational attainment is 
the same for both family members, we choose the one with a higher wage level as the 
head. This is because the individual with more income should be more likely to influence 
the borrowing decision and to repay the loan. Finally, if they have the same wage level, 
we keep the one named by the interviewee as the head. Alternatively, we also consider 
the case in which we simply keep the individual named by the interviewee as the head, 
and the results are very similar. This is not surprising, because the named head has 0.8 
years extra educational attainment (about 10 percent of the mean educational attainment) 
and 2000 yuan extra wage income (about 25 percent of the mean wage income) on 
average, and these differences are highly significant. Actually, CHFS tends to select the 
one more familiar with household financial position if there were more than one family 
members present, and hence the interviewee is more likely to be the named head.  
It should be noted that, in China, females' labor force participation is as high as 
that of males on average, and hence the gender of a household head is usually determined 
by the employment status or income of individuals in this household. Indeed, the 
marriage rate for female-headed families is close to that for male-headed families, and we 
do not find an obvious disadvantage in socioeconomic status for the former.  
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In addition, to complement prefecture-level variables such as log GDP and 
population size, we obtain relevant data from the 1995-2013 China City Statistical 
Yearbooks.  
In columns (1) to (4) of Table 1, we compare the chance that a loan application 
was approved  (or rejected) and annualized interest rate in commercial/industrial loan 
markets, for different beauty groups and gender groups. We ignore average-looking 
males and females in this comparison for clarity, and in this way we can obtain a 
``sharper'' comparison. On average, the chance of good-looking males' applications being 
approved is almost the same as their bad-looking counterparts, while there is a 
statistically significant gap of 13 percentage points for good-looking and bad-looking 
females. The gaps in interest rates are 3 and 3.3 percentage points respectively and are 
highly significant. These gaps are large since the one-year benchmark loan interest rate 
set by China's central bank was 6 percent in 2013. These facts imply the possible 
existence of favoritism toward good-looking borrowers and discrimination against bad-
looking ones. Moreover, we notice that good-looking females are less likely to have 
collateral and that the interest rate is more likely to be adjustable for them. 
Switching to individual characteristics, good-looking men and women are, on 
average, 3 and 4 years younger than bad-looking men and women respectively, which 
confirms the validity of our beauty measure. A younger individual perhaps has a lower 
ability to repay a loan, especially for commercial/industrial loans. We do not find 
statistically significant or economically large differences in most other attributes, 
implying that our measure of physical attractiveness is not very likely to reflect the 
confounding impacts of these attributes. Good-looking people have one extra year of 
educational attainment and are less likely to live in rural areas, which could be associated 
with a higher repayment ability. Moreover, good-looking men are more likely to be 
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married and own a home, and are less likely to have an agricultural Hukou than bad-
looking men, while the converse is true for women. Overall, good-looking people have a 
higher socioeconomic status than bad-looking people, but the differences are small. 
Columns (5) and (6) focus on the comparison between the two genders. Males and 
females have similar approval rates and interest rates, and the differences in collateral and 
interest rate adjustability are also trivial. Furthermore, males are older, more likely to be 
married or be party members, and own a home, but are also more likely to live in rural 
areas and have an agricultural Hukou. Overall, it is hard to say which gender group is 
more creditworthy based on these characteristics.  
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2 report the major variables used in analyzing 
mortgage loan markets for different sets of groups. The chances of good-looking males 
and females' applications being approved are 6 and 7 percentage points significantly 
higher than their bad-looking counterparts respectively, while the gaps in a interest rates 
are 1.3 and 0.2 percentage points respectively, and the gaps in down payment ratio are 
trivial. Moreover, the chance that a loan application was approved is much larger than 
that for commercial/industrial loan markets, reflecting the safety of mortgage loans, since 
a house or apartment as collateral has a pretty stable value.  
Again, good-looking men and women are 3 and 5 years younger than bad-looking 
men and women, which confirms the validity of our beauty measure. Good-looking 
people are better educated and more healthy, are more likely to be communist party 
members, have a higher family income, are less likely to live in rural areas, and are less 
likely to have an agricultural Hukou, which are probably related to better credentials. 
However, good-looking people are younger and are less likely to be married, which are 
probably related to worse credentials. Again, good-looking people have a higher 
socioeconomic status than bad-looking people, but the differences are not large. 
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Columns (5) and (6) show the differences between the two gender groups. We 
notice that males are less likely to be granted a loan and face a higher interest rate than 
females. Furthermore, males are older, more likely to be married or be party members, 
and are less likely to be retired, but are less educated, have a lower family income, are 
more likely to live in rural areas and have an agricultural Hukou. Overall, it is hard to 
determine which gender group is more creditworthy based on these characteristics. 
 
2.6 Results: Commercial/industrial loans 
2.6.1 Main Results 
As a reminder, our prediction is that costly discrimination resulting from loan 
officers' prejudice will tend to decline in a more competitive bank loan market. Indeed, if 
the group of less attractive people or a certain gender has a higher default rate on average 
and hence is less likely to obtain a loan or faces a higher interest rate, more market 
competition would probably not reduce these productive lending practices (in that case 
they are no longer prejudice). This is in the same spirit as the studies on labor markets, 
such as Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) and Black and Strahan (2001). The prejudice 
might be related to visual pleasure, but it can also be related to the willingness to extract a 
signal or ``soft information.'' For example, in labor markets an employer may see a 
certain racial group as being less productive and hence pays these workers a lower wage 
than others. If this group of workers actually has a similar productivity to other groups', 
the employer's decision leads to costly discrimination. Therefore, we consider these kinds 
of signals or ``soft information''  to be results of prejudice. This is in line with 
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and Ravina (2012).  
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For commercial/industrial loans, we report results using the community-level HHI 
or the HHI residual from a regression of HHI on the community type (rural area, small 
town, small city, median city and big city). In columns (1) to (4) of Table 3, we find that 
there probably exists favoritism toward good-looking people in loan approval decisions. 
Specifically, in a more concentrated market, i.e., those with a higher HHI, good-looking 
people are significantly more likely to obtain a loan. For example, with a one-standard-
deviation increase in community-level HHI (about 0.3), the chance that a good-looking 
male will obtain a loan is 20 percentage points higher compared with an average-looking 
male. The magnitude of this difference is very similar among females. 
Columns (5) and (6) show that males are more likely to obtain a loan in a more 
concentrated market. One possible explanation is that women are probably considered to 
have weaker business skills than males, perhaps because there are many more successful 
male entrepreneurs. When setting HHI equal to its mean value of 0.4, we find that good-
looking females are significantly more likely to obtain a loan, though neither the 
differences between good-looking males, bad-looking males, and average-looking males, 
nor the difference between the two gender groups is significant.  
The upper part of Table 4 shows that bad-looking females pay a significantly 
higher interest rate in a more concentrated market. For example, with a one-standard-
deviation increase in HHI, the interest rate faced by a bad-looking woman is 5 percentage 
points higher than that faced by an average-looking woman. The differences between 
other groups are relatively small and insignificant. This suggests that favoritism or 
discrimination in commercial/industrial loans is mainly through approval/reject decisions 
and, to a lesser extent, the interest rate. This fact is consistent with Cavalluzzo et al. 
(2002), who find that African Americans and women are less likely to obtain a loan but 
are not charged a significantly higher interest rate in a more concentrated 
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commercial/industrial loan market. They notice that Stiglitz and Weiss’s adverse 
selection hypothesis can explain this. That is, in relatively risky commercial/industrial 
loan markets, the approval decision is probably a better screening mechanism. A high 
interest rate may encourage risk-taking behavior, and hence is not always in lenders' 
interests. Moreover, our conversations with loan officers suggest the following practice: 
interest rates are usually set by the provincial offices and probably the headquarters, 
which makes it relatively harder to adjust the interest rate than to make approval/rejection 
decisions.  
Setting HHI equal to its mean, we find that bad-looking males and females pay 3 
and 4 percentage points lower interest rates respectively, compared to average-looking 
males and females, and these differences are highly significant. Males also pay a lower 
interest rate than females, though this difference is not significant.  
In the lower part of Table 4, we further separate the samples based on whether or 
not collateral was required. As we find in the websites of several banks, the types of 
collateral are various and can be any valuable assets, such as machines and inventories. 
These assets usually are not very liquid, and they are also more volatile in value than 
homes. It is possible that more favoritism or discrimination exists for loans without 
collateral because, in these cases, it is harder to verify the credentials of borrowers. We 
find that this is, indeed, true. For example, for loans without collateral, good-looking 
males pay a significantly lower interest rate compared to average-looking males in a 
more concentrated market, whereas for loans with collateral, we do not observe such a 
differential. Indeed, in the case without collateral, a loan officer may try to obtain a signal 
on borrowers' credentials, though the signal is not actually related to a higher quality, 
since such a practice declines in a more competitive market. Because the size of the 
female subsample is small, we do not conduct this exercise for it.  
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Overall, using the HHI or HHI residual as the measure of market concentration 
gives very similar results. This is perhaps not surprising. Indeed, a market of great 
economic importance is usually more attractive to firms, and hence there should be more 
applications for establishing new branches. These differences in economic levels can 
result in the differences in approval rates and credit terms across the country. For 
example, an area with a higher credit risk would be compensated by a lower approval rate 
and a higher interest rate. However, differences in economic levels should not lead to 
large differences in approval rates and credit terms among different demographic groups 
in the same area, except via the correlation with market concentration. 
2.6.2 Interpretation and Subsample Analysis 
Here we provide further interpretations of our findings through subsample 
analysis. The literature on beauty usually discusses three channels unrelated to real 
productivity: visual pleasure, the confidence channel, and verbal communication 
channels (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Gallego, 2015). That is, not only can good-
looking people bring visual pleasure, but they can also be more confident, and be more 
willing or able to communicate verbally. In other words, bank loan officers probably see 
confidence or communication skills as a signal of better quality, though these features are 
not necessarily related to higher productivity. In this sense, we can say the beauty 
premium or gender premium is a kind of prejudice. As opposed to borrowers of 
mortgages, entrepreneurs' collateral is usually much less liquid and has greater volatility 
in value. Therefore, it is necessary for bank loan officers to learn more about the 
borrowers. 
Although the 2013 CHFS does not contain questions directly related to 
confidence or oral communication, we can elicit the possible channels in an indirect way. 
 104 
We divide samples based on age 35, which is a typical cutoff for visual pleasure, though 
using 40 as the cutoff age gives similar results. If we document that bias toward good-
looking people is concentrated among the age group younger than 35, this beauty 
premium probably mainly results from visual pleasure, and from confidence to a lesser 
extent. However, if bias is concentrated among the age group older than 35, it is probably 
more likely to result from enhanced willingness or skills in verbal communication. We 
run the subsample regressions with the approval decision as the dependent variable, 
because the sample size for interest rate is smaller.  
Table 5 presents the results. We find that significant favoritism toward good-
looking males is concentrated among the age group older than 35. The situation is similar 
for good-looking females, though this is insignificant partly due to a smaller sample size. 
Our explanation is that commercial/industrial loans are risky, and hence loan officers 
give less weight to visual pleasure, but more weight to the perceived higher quality based 
on better verbal communication. Of course, we acknowledge the limitation of this 
judgment. This result is in stark contrast to that for mortgage loans, as we will discuss 
later. 
Similarly, we also find that the favoritism toward males relative to females is 
concentrated in the age group older than 35. This is also consistent with the explanation 
of a signal regarding borrowers' quality.  There are many more successful older male 
entrepreneurs than older female entrepreneurs, and therefore it is possible for loan 
officers to see older male entrepreneurs as being more reliable. On the other hand, it is 
rare to see either successful young male entrepreneurs or young female entrepreneurs, 
and hence a young male entrepreneur is not more trustable than young female 
entrepreneurs. 
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Therefore, both the findings regarding physical attractiveness and gender support 
the interpretation of a signal. However, in a more competitive market, it is less likely for 
loan officers to use this signal. This implies that the signal is not effective in revealing the 
real credentials of borrowers. This is consistent with Becker's costly discrimination. It 
should be noted that this is different from statistical discrimination. Statistical 
discrimination is toward less creditworthy groups of borrowers, and hence will not 
decline in a more competitive market.  
Starting in 2000, China's bank industry has experienced large-scale deregulation, 
with many markets witnessing an explosive growth in the number of different banks and 
the number of bank branches. Many new loan officers have very limited experience in 
dealing with borrowers, and they do not have Dun \& Bradstreet credit scores or FICO 
scores to check. Therefore, they probably choose borrowers based on some simple 
demographic characteristics. Although our dataset does not contain information on the 
characteristics of loan officers, future studies with suitable data can test whether 
experienced loan officers perform differently from new loan officers. 
 
2.7 Results: Mortgage loans 
2.7.1 Main Results 
In mortgage loan markets, home as the collateral is very safe, it should be less 
likely for loan officers to see physical attractiveness and gender as a signal for quality, 
whereas visual pleasure should be more likely to affect lenders' decisions. If this is the 
case, we should observe the favoritism is concentrated in younger groups, such as the age 
group younger than 35. Given that most loan officers are male, we probably observe that 
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females, especially young good-looking females, are preferred in a more concentrated 
market. Our empirical findings confirm this prediction. 
As shown in Table 6 and 7, we cannot find favoritism toward good-looking 
males. This is reasonable, since to male loan officers, a good-looking male borrower 
should not bring more visual pleasure than a plain male borrower. Although we do not 
find a beauty premium for the whole female sample, this is not surprising because the 
female sample contains both old and young females, and hence the results for the whole 
sample mask the pattern for the younger sample. A subsample analysis in Table 8 shows 
that young good-looking females are significantly more likely to obtain a loan in more 
concentrated markets, and young bad-looking females are less likely to obtain a loan and 
pay a much higher interest rate in more concentrated markets compared to average-
looking females. This suggests the importance of visual pleasure in these markets as we 
expect.   
The most striking findings involve gender discrimination. In stark contrast to most 
findings in labor markets, we find that women are much more likely to obtain a loan and 
pay a significantly lower interest rate in a more concentrated market. For example, as 
shown in Table 6 and 7, with a one-standard-deviation increase in HHI (0.04), females 
are 0.5 percentage points more likely to obtain a loan, and pay 0.3 percentage points 
lower interest rate. These gaps are large since the mean differences between males and 
females are 3 and 0.4 percentage points respectively. 
Furthermore, we set HHI to its mean (0.12 for loan approval and 0.14 for the 
interest rate and down payment ratio). We find that good-looking males and females are 4 
and 0.2 percentage points more likely to obtain a loan respectively, while men are 1.4 
percentage points less likely to obtain a loan compared to women. Moreover, bad-looking 
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males face a significantly higher interest rate, and males pay a higher interest rate at the 
mean HHI.  
To explain these findings, we note that there is no inherent disadvantage for 
female borrowers in mortgage loan markets. Given the relative majority of male bank 
loan officers, the preference for females is not that surprising. By contrast, one major 
concern for employers considering a female job-seeker is that women usually spend 
plenty of time in bearing and raising children, which might reduce their productivity. 
This does not pose a problem in bank loan markets. In commercial/industrial loan 
markets, women are probably considered to have weaker business skills than males, 
perhaps because there are many more successful male entrepreneurs. However, this is not 
a problem in mortgage loan markets as well.  
This fact is also inconsistent with Cavalluzzo et al.'s (2002) finding on the female 
disadvantage using the Survey of Small Business finances in the United States. Because 
the studies on costly discrimination based on market structure usually use the Surveys of 
Small Business finances, and for this reason analyze only commercial/industrial loans, 
our findings on a female premium in mortgage loan markets provide a whole picture on 
this topic. 
2.7.2 Interpretation and Subsample Analysis 
Similar to the previous section, we also divide the samples based on the cutoff of 
age 35 in Table 8. Interestingly the results are in stark contrast to those for 
commercial/industrial loans. Young good-looking females are significantly more likely to 
obtain a loan in more concentrated markets, and young bad-looking females are less 
likely to obtain a loan and face a much higher interest rate in more concentrated markets 
compared to average-looking females. This suggests that visual pleasure could explain 
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the favoritism toward good-looking females. On the other hand, visual pleasure does not 
seem to be important for loan officers when dealing with either old or young male 
applicants. This result is also reasonable because most loan officers are male. 
In columns (5) and (6), we find that the discrimination against males is 
concentrated in the age group younger than 35. This also suggests that young females are 
more likely to induce visual pleasure experience than young males.  
Compared with commercial/industrial loan markets, in a period with soaring 
housing prices, home as collateral is very safe. Therefore, loan officers might give less 
weight to verbal communication or other attributes serving as a signal and enjoy more 
from visual pleasure.  
To this point, we notice that women usually spend more time on searching, so a 
natural question is whether the observed advantage of women in mortgage loans should 
be attributed to more intensive search. We argue that this is not possible in this study. 
Search intensity is related to its opportunity costs, which is controlled when including 
education, income and other hard qualities. Moreover, although it is possible that women 
derive additional utility from shopping clothes, it is hard to believe that they also enjoy 
spending more time in a bank. The explanation of opportunity costs is also not 
compatible with the advantage of men in commercial/industrial loans. 
 
2.8 Discussion 
Bank loan terms are usually set by provincial offices and probably the 
headquarters, and hence are usually considered much more standard than labor contracts, 
especially within the same bank in a certain province. Moreover, the conditions or 
requirements can usually be found in the brochures at bank branches or online and are 
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therefore quite transparent. However, our findings imply that bank loan officers still have 
great freedom in choosing borrowers.  
Our explanation is that there are severe asymmetries of information in bank loan 
markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and thus it is difficult for banks to set a rigorous 
standard for their loan officers. Therefore, loan officers are granted great autonomy in 
selecting qualified borrowers and setting corresponding credit terms. By dealing with 
preferred but not more creditworthy groups, loan officers can probably receive private 
benefits while impose a higher cost on their banks. On the other hand, many borrowers 
might not understand complex financial products very well, and may therefore rely on the 
explanations provided by bank loan officers.  
Our findings also suggest the importance to analyze different loan markets 
separately. Commercial/industrial loans are usually riskier than    mortgage loans, and 
hence bank loan officers probably want to extract a signal regarding borrowers' 
credentials from their physical attractiveness or gender, even if the signal is not really 
associated with better quality.  On the other hand, mortgage loans are pretty safe, and 
hence it is more likely for loan officers to enjoy visual pleasure. 
Our paper is designed to elevate the understanding of costly discrimination in 
bank loan markets, an underexplored field. Therefore, our theoretical framework, 
regression results, and explanations generally achieve this purpose. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes costly discrimination related to physical attractiveness and 
gender in bank loan markets using a market structure-based method. The rationale is that 
high market concentration increases the degree of favoritism or discrimination, which is 
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confirmed by empirical evidence based on several unique datasets and online maps 
containing information about market structure and household borrowing. We document 
evidence that in a more concentrated commercial/industrial loan market, compared with 
average-looking people, good-looking people are more likely to obtain loans, and face 
lower interest rates, while the converse is true for bad-looking people. Moreover, our 
results show that males have an advantage over females.. On the other hand, in contrast to 
most findings in labor markets, we find that females have a strong advantage in a more 
concentrated mortgage loan market. Although the disadvantage of bearing and raising 
children cannot be easily disentangled from discrimination in labor markets, it does not 
pose an issue in mortgage loan markets and hence explains such findings. The consistent 
pattern shown in various regressions suggests the existence of taste-based discrimination 
in bank loan markets. 
Discrimination in bank loan markets is not widely discussed by economists, 
perhaps due to limited data access. Compared to Western countries, anti-discrimination 
laws are either nonexistent or weakly enforced in many developing countries including 
China. Our paper therefore contributes to the understanding of discrimination in bank 
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Note: the left graph plots the mean of prefecture-level HHI and logged GDP by year, and the
right graph plots the standard deviation of prefecture-level HHI and logged GDP by year.
When calculating HHI, we use the number of branches belonging to a bank dividing by the
total number of branches in this area as the market share of this bank, and obtain the sum of
the squared shares of these banks. Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) and China City Statistical Yearbooks.
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Note: the northeastern and western parts have a higher market concentration level on average,
whereas the northern and southeastern parts have a lower market concentration level on
average. However, we can find large variation in a relatively small region. When calculating
HHI, we use the number of branches belonging to a bank dividing by the total number of
branches in this area as the market share of this bank, and obtain the sum of the squared shares
of these banks. Data source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
112
Figure 2.3: Example: the map of Shaoyaojusi community, Beijing and bank branches nearby
Note: in this example, we use the Baidu Maps (http://map.baidu.com/), an online map search
engine like Google Maps but which has a higher precision for China’s locations, to search for
the bank branches around the community office of Shaoyaojusi community in Beijing. The
procedure for constructing the community-level market concentration is the following: we
enter the address of a community office on Baidu Maps, then search “Yinhang (bank in
Chinese)” in the “Locations Nearby” and can find the names of bank branches within 2
kilometers around the community office. Although the search results also include ATMs, we
do not keep them because they cannot grant a loan.
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Figure 2.4: Beauty ratings by gender and market
Note: The distributions of beauty ratings. The unit of the vertical axis is the share of the
sampled individuals with each rating in percentage points. The ratings range from 1 to 10 with
a lower rating representing a worse-looking individual. C/I loans and M loans indicate the two
major samples we use to analyze commercial/industrial loan markets and mortgage loan
markets, respectively. Data source: 2013 China Household Finance Survey.
114


















0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000
China household income






























0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000
U.S. household income
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  4.1e+03
Kernel density estimate
Note: The left graph is the income distribution for China, from 2011 China Household Finance
Survey; The right graph is the income distribution for the United States, from 2011 Current
Population Survey March supplement. The large right skewness is visible for China’s income




Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: commercial/industrial loan markets
GL Male BL Male t GL Female BL Female t Male Female t
Approved 0.84 0.85 -0.2 0.96 0.83 1.8 0.83 0.85 -0.8
Interest rate (percentage) 4.25 7.29 -3.5 3.66 6.96 -2.3 6.35 6.27 0.2
With collateral 0.29 0.29 0.0 0.11 0.29 -1.9 0.26 0.25 0.2
Interest rate adjustable 0.34 0.34 0.1 0.4 0.25 1.2 0.34 0.30 0.7
HHI (community) 0.35 0.41 -1.1 0.32 0.35 -0.4 0.42 0.37 2.1
Age 40.9 43.9 -1.7 36 39.8 -1.8 44.7 40.9 4.4
Ethnic Han 0.98 0.87 2.2 1 0.9 1.7 0.92 0.94 -0.5
Educational attainment 11.9 10.9 1.7 12.3 11.2 1.4 10.8 11.3 -1.9
Marital status 0.92 0.89 0.6 0.78 0.86 -1.1 0.91 0.87 1.8
Healthy 0.94 0.92 0.5 0.89 0.93 -0.7 0.91 0.90 0.4
Party member 0.23 0.18 0.8 0.04 0.05 -0.4 0.18 0.08 3.5
Home ownership 0.81 0.76 0.7 0.70 0.73 -0.2 0.81 0.74 1.9
Rural status 0.27 0.36 -1.2 0.19 0.21 -0.3 0.39 0.24 3.8
Agri Hukou 0.44 0.61 -2.2 0.67 0.51 1.5 0.61 0.51 2.4
N 48 189 27 110 426 220
M 29 107 13 48 230 96
Note: Descriptive statistics for the mean values of different beauty and gender groups in com-
mercial/industrial loan markets. N is the number of observations for regressions with bank loan
approval as the dependent variable, and M is the number of observations for regressions with
credit terms such as interest rate as the dependent variable. t is the t statistic for the hypothesis
that the mean difference is equal to 0. HHI is the average community-level Herfindahl index
during 2009-2013. Data source: 2013 China Household Finance Survey and China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics: mortgage loan markets
GL Male BL Male t GL Female BL Female t Male Female t
Approved 0.96 0.90 2.6 0.99 0.92 3.0 0.90 0.93 -2.8
Interest rate (percentage) 4.87 6.18 -3.5 5.21 5.45 -0.7 5.72 5.30 2.3
Down payment ratio 0.41 0.42 -0.5 0.42 0.42 0.0 0.42 0.42 0.2
Public housing fund loan 0.62 0.74 -3.4 0.57 0.66 -1.9 0.73 0.65 5.0
HHI (prefecture) 0.12 0.11 4.4 0.13 0.11 4.4 0.12 0.12 0.9
Age 42.2 45.6 -3.6 38.6 43.6 -4.0 45.8 43.1 5.8
Ethnic Han 0.98 0.90 3.7 0.96 0.93 1.5 0.91 0.93 -1.6
Educational attainment 13.4 12.1 4.0 14.5 12.2 5.7 11.7 12.3 -3.7
Marital status 0.90 0.92 -1.2 0.76 0.84 -2.0 0.93 0.82 9.3
Healthy 0.93 0.88 1.9 0.92 0.87 1.7 0.87 0.86 1.0
Party member 0.35 0.26 2.7 0.18 0.13 1.6 0.26 0.15 6.9
Log family income 8.44 6.96 3.5 8.96 6.71 4.3 6.91 7.01 -0.4
Retired 0.08 0.08 0.2 0.10 0.14 -1.2 0.07 0.13 -5.3
Rural status 0.16 0.31 -4.3 0.05 0.21 -4.3 0.34 0.19 8.4
Agri Hukou 0.29 0.42 -3.4 0.23 0.34 -2.4 0.46 0.33 6.8
N 197 1168 129 565 2185 1007
M 95 424 63 211 822 381
Note: Descriptive statistics for the mean values of different beauty and gender groups in mort-
gage loan markets. N is the number of observations for regressions with bank loan approval as
the dependent variable, and M is the number of observations for regressions with credit terms
such as interest rate and down payment ratio as the dependent variables. t is the t statistic for the
hypothesis that the mean difference is equal to 0. HHI is the average prefecture-level Herfind-
ahl index during 2009-2013. Data source: 2013 China Household Finance Survey and China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
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Table 2.3: Competition and commercial/industrial loan approval
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
Application was approved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI 0.0357 0.668** 0.596** 0.646**
(0.153) (0.323) (0.267) (0.362)
Bad looks*HHI -0.110 -0.241 0.160 0.219
(0.111) (0.184) (0.259) (0.292)
Male*HHI 0.232** 0.338**
(0.101) (0.137)
Good looks (at mean HHI) 0.022 0.046 0.247*** 0.211**
(0.058) (0.053) (0.086) (0.088)
Bad looks (at mean HHI) 0.070 0.077 -0.033 -0.032
(0.044) (0.046) (0.068) (0.066)
Male (at mean HHI) -0.012 -0.014
(0.030) (0.029)
N 423 420 218 215 646 640
Adj R-sq 0.072 0.071 0.052 0.036 0.080 0.068
Note: HHI is the average community-level Herfindahl index in 2011 (odd columns), and the
HHI residual from a regression of HHI on the community type (rural area, small town, small
city, median city and big city) (even columns); mean HHI=0.4, and mean HHI residual=0. Other
covariates include an indicator for agricultural Hukou, rural status, home ownership, household
head’s age, ethnic Han indicator, educational attainment, marital status, health status, commu-
nist party member status, their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect), and province
fixed effects. Good look and bad look indicators are included in the regressions for column (1)
to (4); male indicator is included in the regressions for column (5) to (6). Standard errors are
clustered at prefecture,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.4: Competition and commercial/industrial loan interest rate
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
Interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI -3.941 -3.222 -1.368 21.63
(2.691) (4.692) (7.108) (13.40)
Bad looks*HHI -0.256 -1.687 11.29*** 16.56**
(1.751) (2.206) (3.722) (7.316)
Male*HHI 1.840 2.556
(1.590) (1.611)
Good looks (at mean HHI) -0.695 -0.349 0.786 -0.397
(0.836) (0.844) (2.481) (1.663)
Bad looks (at mean HHI) 3.197*** 3.108*** 4.130*** 3.645***
(1.017) (0.957) (1.427) (1.195)
Male (at mean HHI) -0.428 -0.602
(0.687) (0.734)
N 225 223 95 93 321 317
Adj R-sq 0.141 0.143 0.238 0.243 0.103 0.092
Dep. variable: Male Male & Female
Collateral No Collateral Collateral No Collateral
Interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Good looks*HHI -1.122 -10.730*
11.570 (5.723)




Note: HHI is the community-level Herfindahl index in the year the loan of the largest amount
was granted (odd columns of the upper part), and the HHI residual from a regression of HHI on
the community type (rural area, small town, small city, median city and big city) (even columns
of the upper part); mean HHI=0.4, and mean HHI residual=0. Other covariates include an in-
dicator for agricultural Hukou, rural status, home ownership, household head’s age, ethnic Han
indicator, educational attainment, marital status, health status, communist party member status,
an indicator for a loan with collateral, an indicator for whether the interest rate is adjustable,
their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect), province fixed effects and loan granted
year fixed effects. Good look and bad look indicators are included in the regressions for column
(1) to (4); male indicator is included in the regressions for column (5) to (6). Standard errors are
clustered at prefecture,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The lower part divides the samples
into loans with collateral or not, where HHI always stands for the HHI residual.
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Table 2.5: Subsample analysis: competition and commercial/industrial loan approval
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
age ≤ 35 age>35 age ≤ 35 age>35 age ≤ 35 age>35
Application was approved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI -0.233 0.781** -0.558 0.509
(0.573) (0.359) (2.419) (0.517)
Bad looks*HHI -0.029 -0.183 -0.112 0.413
(0.856) (0.199) (1.224) (0.364)
Male*HHI -0.476 0.379**
(0.324) (0.157)
Note: HHI is the HHI residual from a regression of average community-level Herfindahl index
on the community type (rural area, small town, small city, median city and big city). Other
covariates include an indicator for agricultural Hukou, rural status, home ownership, household
head’s age, ethnic Han indicator, educational attainment, marital status, health status, commu-
nist party member status, their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect), and province
fixed effects. Good look and bad look indicators are included in the regressions for column (1)
to (4); male indicator is included in the regressions for column (5) to (6). Standard errors are
clustered at prefecture,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.6: Competition and mortgage loan approval
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
Application was approved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI -0.090 -0.118 0.183 -0.470
(0.285) (0.342) (0.189) (0.415)
Bad looks*HHI -0.334 0.471 -0.109 -0.576
(0.549) (0.608) (0.442) (0.585)
Male*HHI -0.233 -0.115
(0.165) (0.246)
Good looks (at mean HHI) 0.037 0.043* 0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Bad looks (at mean HHI) 0.008 0.009 0.040 0.040
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Male (at mean HHI) -0.014 -0.014
(0.011) (0.011)
N 1720 1574 797 750 2533 2339
Adj R-sq 0.098 0.093 0.082 0.098 0.097 0.090
Note: HHI is the average prefecture-level Herfindahl index during 2009-2013 (odd columns)
and the HHI residual from a regression of HHI on the logged prefecture GDP and logged pre-
fecture population (even columns); mean HHI=0.12 and mean HHI residual=0. Other covari-
ates include an indicator for agricultural Hukou, rural status, logged family income, household
head’s age, ethnic Han indicator, educational attainment, marital status, health status, commu-
nist party member status, retirement status, their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect),
and province fixed effects. Good look and bad look indicators are included in the regressions for
column (1) to (4); male indicator is included in the regressions for column (5) to (6). Standard
errors are clustered at prefecture,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.7: Competition and mortgage loan interest rate
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
Interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI -1.164 2.481 1.675 11.56
(5.484) (7.009) (11.68) (12.48)
Bad looks*HHI 5.788 0.918 4.380 15.07
(5.853) (8.006) (10.13) (10.96)
Male*HHI 8.445** 8.962**
(3.704) (4.452)
Good looks (at mean HHI) -0.009 0.177 -0.260 -0.257
(0.312) (0.290) (0.492) (0.492)
Bad looks (at mean HHI) 1.037*** 1.017*** -0.479 -0.556
(0.334) (0.340) (0.513) (0.522)
Male (at mean HHI) 0.225 0.135
(0.182) (0.209)
N 609 560 297 283 1145 852
Adj R-sq 0.079 0.066 0.029 0.060 0.047 0.045
Note: HHI is the prefecture-level Herfindahl index in the year the loan of the largest amount
was granted (odd columns) and the HHI residual from a regression of HHI on the logged pre-
fecture GDP and logged prefecture population (even columns); mean HHI=0.14 and mean HHI
residual=0. Other covariates include an indicator for agricultural Hukou, rural status, logged
family income, household head’s age, ethnic Han indicator, educational attainment, marital sta-
tus, health status, communist party member status, retirement status, an indicator for public
housing fund loan (gongjijin), their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect), province
fixed effects and loan granted year fixed effects. Good look and bad look indicators are in-
cluded in the regressions for column (1) to (4); male indicator is included in the regressions for
column (5) to (6). Standard errors are clustered at prefecture,* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
122
Table 2.8: Subsample analysis: competition and mortgage loan approval/interest rate
Dep. variable: Male Female Male & Female
age ≤ 35 age>35 age ≤ 35 age>35 age ≤ 35 age>35
Application was approved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI -0.509 0.174 0.635** -0.562
(0.489) (0.535) (0.306) (0.675)
Bad looks*HHI 0.300 0.595 -0.814 -0.528
(0.634) (0.723) (0.901) (0.673)
Male*HHI 0.534 -0.252
(0.395) (0.322)
Interest rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Good looks*HHI 4.475 0.542 12.555 17.623
(12.562) (8.829) (31.290) (17.561)
Bad looks*HHI -7.855 -0.485 25.695 4.498
(11.932) (9.320) (23.996) (14.504)
Male*HHI 17.72*** 4.573
(6.372) (4.378)
Note: HHI is the HHI residual from a regression of prefecture-level Herfindahl index on the
logged prefecture GDP and logged prefecture population. Other covariates include an indicator
for agricultural Hukou, rural status, logged family income, household head’s age, ethnic Han
indicator, educational attainment, marital status, health status, communist party member status,
retirement status, their interaction terms with HHI, HHI (main effect), and province fixed ef-
fects (for approval), and in addition an indicator for public housing fund loan (gongjijin), its
interaction term with HHI, and loan granted year fixed effects (for interest rate). Good look
and bad look indicators are included in the regressions for column (1) to (4); male indicator is
included in the regressions for column (5) to (6). Standard errors are clustered at prefecture,*




Economic Policy Uncertainty, Political Capital and Bank Risk-taking 
The existing literature has conflicting findings regarding whether protection from 
the government induces firms to take on more risk or enjoy the quiet life. We address this 
issue by studying how political connections and their interaction with economic policy 
uncertainty affect banks' risk-taking behavior. Our hypothesis is that policy uncertainty 
increases the option value of waiting but political connections can reduce such option 
value. Our findings support the existence of two types of moral hazards, but they exist at 
different periods. When policy uncertainty is low, managers in politically connected 
banks have a less tendency to take on risk than those without political connections and 
enjoy the quiet life. However, when policy uncertainty is high, politically connected 
banks have much larger loan amounts, but smaller amounts of loss provision than those 
without political connections. These facts hold for both large and small banks, and 
suggest that maintaining lower policy uncertainty is vital in restricting the rent from 
political connections. Moreover, after bank deregulation, the benefit of political 
connections declines.  
 
3.1 Introduction  
How do political connections affect financial institutions' risk-taking behavior? At 
first sight, political connections might encourage risk-taking behavior of financial 
institutions if they are more likely to be bailed out by the government. Government 
bailouts are discretionary and, like other government decisions, they can be influenced by 
political considerations and political connections. Consequently, a moral hazard-based 
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theory would predict that firms with better political connections should take on more risk 
if it would bring more profits to them. For example, Kostovetsky (2015) find that the 
presence of a senator in the influential United States Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (Senate Banking Committee) is associated with a 10\% 
increase in leverage and a 5% to 8% increase in stock volatility for financial institutions 
headquartered in his/her state, and the risk-taking behavior for politically connected 
financial institutions was more pronounced during the recent financial crisis. 
However, financial institutions may limit their risk-taking in order to protect the 
quasi-monopoly rents granted by their government charters (Marcus, 1984; Furlong and 
Keeley; Keeley, 1990), and political connections will tend to increase the quasi-
monopoly rents since the threat from competitors is alleviated. Moreover, in the United 
States, managers own very little of the firms they manage. For this reason, another moral 
hazard-based theory would predict that managers have little incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth at the expense of their position. Using the enforcement of state 
takeover laws as the measure for the threat of takeover, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) document that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages 
(especially those of white-collar workers) rise, the destruction of old plants falls, but the 
creation of new plants also falls. Similarly, with more protection granted by political 
connections and hence a weaker threat from potential competitors, bank managers may 
limit their risk-taking and ``enjoy the quiet life''. 
It is important to learn how to reconcile the two competing corporate governance 
literatures regarding protection from the government and firms' risk-taking. Especially, it 
is of vital policy concern to learn which type of moral hazard is closer to the real 
behavior of banks, and whether the existence of each type of moral hazard depends on 
policy uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to answer this 
 126 
question. Banks have a unique advantage in reducing information asymmetry in credit 
supply (Diamond, 1984; Gande and Saunders, 2012), and are the main channel of 
obtaining external funds, especially for small and median firms. Further, government 
bailouts of banks are costly, as the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)  shows 
(Blau et al., 2013). The TARP program originally authorized expenditures of $700 
billion, though the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed 
into law in 2010, reduced the amount authorized to $475 billion.  
To answer this question, we construct a sample using the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC)'s quarterly Call & Thrift Financial Reports and Summary 
of Deposits, including all the commercial banks and savings associations in the U.S. 
(hereafter referred as  ``banks''). Similar to Kostovetsky (2015), we also use the Senate 
Banking Committee representation as the measure of political connections, since it is 
more likely to be exogenous than several other measures such as lobbying expenses. 
Compared to his paper, an additional advantage is that we can use a geographic 
discontinuity design to further mitigate the endogeneity concern regarding Senate 
Banking Committee representation. Moreover, to examine whether political connections 
pay off when government policies are more uncertain, we use the economic policy 
uncertainty (EPU) index from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). Our hypothesis is based 
on the option value of waiting in high EPU periods and the role of political connections 
in reducing such option value. When there is little uncertainty around government 
policies, political connections may not bring more competitive advantages to connected 
banks. When such uncertainty increases, the risk associated with the introduction of 
unfavorable policies increases for unconnected banks, and therefore the values of real 
option of delaying increases. On the other hand, for politically connected banks, such risk 
regarding unfavorable policies is lower. Moreover, even if the government implements 
 127 
similar unfavorable policies for all banks, it is more likely for politically connected banks 
to be bailed out. Therefore, unconnected banks should reduce risk exposure during 
periods with more policy uncertainty, and hence leave extra market shares to politically 
connected banks.  
Our empirical findings support this hypothesis. When policy uncertainty is low, 
politically connected banks have a significantly smaller credit supply than those without 
political connections, and the loss provision is similar for the two types of banks. This 
suggests the mangers in the former have less risk-taking behavior under protection. 
Moreover, when the EPU level is high, politically connected banks have much larger loan 
amounts, but smaller amounts of loss provision than those without political connections. 
Quantitatively, with one standard deviation increase in the EPU index, banks with Senate 
Banking Committee representation have 0.9 percentage points (controlling state fixed 
effects) or 0.6 percentage points (controlling bank fixed effects) higher loan-asset ratio 
than those without, equivalent to 7 percent or 4 percent of the standard deviation of loan-
asset ratios in our sample. On the other hand, the loss provision ratios of the connected 
banks decline relative to unconnected banks when policy uncertainty is high. This is 
economically important for investor wealth due to the inherent leverage - gross loans are 
generally around 80\% of total assets. Especially, although the loan amounts for 
connected banks are much smaller than unconnected banks in the periods with the lowest 
quartile of the EPU index, this relationship reverses in the periods with the highest 
quartile of the EPU index (Figure 3). In addition, unconnected banks have similar 
amounts of loss provision to connected banks during periods with the lowest quartile of 
the EPU index, but much larger amounts of loss provision during periods with the highest 
quartile of the EPU index. This fact means that not only do connected banks take on more 
risk during high EPU periods relative to unconnected banks, but they also increase the 
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absolute amounts of credit supply without commensurate increases in loss provision. In 
other words, connected banks grab the market shares left by unconnected banks during 
high EPU periods. 
Although Kostovetsky (2015) uses a sample of listed financial institutions and 
hence large ones, we use a full sample consisting of both large and small banks, and 
consequently we can check whether Senate Banking Committee representation and policy 
uncertainty have differential impacts by bank size. Big banks can spend more resources 
in lobbying senators or assisting their elections. However, they may exert influence over 
senators beyond their home state, and therefore, it may not be very important whether 
senators in their home state are in the Banking Committee. Our findings show that 
compared to small banks with political connections, big banks with political connections 
are more likely to enjoy the quiet life during low EPU periods and take more risk during 
high EPU periods, though the differences are not large. In addition, since Kostovetsky 
(2015)'s sample consists of large financial institutions including both banks and non-bank 
institutions, he focuses on book leverage rather than loans and loss provision. However, 
the majority of banks in our sample are financed by deposits, which are not easily 
manipulated. Therefore, following Bordo et al. (2016)'s practice, we see lending as the 
most appropriate measure of banks' investments and risk-taking. We also analyze loss 
provision to provide a whole picture of their risk-taking, since banks regularly adjust the 
level of loss provision when the risk of their asset portfolios changes. In another analysis, 
we separate the sample into two subsamples by period: 1985-2000 and 2001-2013. Banks 
in the former period were more heavily regulated than in the latter period. The results 
suggest that after bank deregulation, the benefit of political connection declines.  
Finally, we investigate whether housing bubbles and business cycles drive the 
impacts of policy uncertainty. When adding the housing price growth, the recession 
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indicator and their interaction terms with Senate Banking Committee representation, our 
previous results are intact. Moreover, we find that in Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) with a higher housing price growth rate, politically connected banks have 
significantly less credit supply but a similar level of loss provision. An explanation is that 
unconnected banks might face large earnings growth pressure from investors (Chen, 
McInnis and Yust, 2014) during housing bubbles. On the other hand, connected banks 
have relatively stable profits and hence are less aggressive in extending credit. 
Interestingly,  although Kostovetsky (2015) finds that politically connected financial 
institutions took on more risk during the recent recession, our results show that connected 
banks reduce credit supply and increase loss provision during recessions on average. This 
could be reasonable if political connections can give them early warnings on bad 
economic conditions. For example, Jagolinzer et al. (2016) find that political connected 
banks engaged in significant trading thirty days in advance of the announcement of the 
TARP program, suggesting political connections provided these banks with private 
information related to government intervention. Overall, the evidence regarding housing 
bubbles and recessions verifies the mechanism related to the option value of waiting.  
Our paper is related to the literature on the relationship between political 
connections and rent-seeking, especially corporate risk-taking and corporate governance. 
In her seminal work, Krueger (1974) describes how economic agents can secure an 
advantage over their competitors through government means. Value to firms from rent 
seeking can come in the form of tax benefits, government contracts, fewer regulations, 
favorable trade restrictions (Stigler, 1971), or bailouts. The empirical literature usually 
verifies benefits from political connections. Faccio et al. (2006) analyze the likelihood of 
government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997-
2002. They find that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed 
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out than similar unconnected firms. Faccio (2006) examines firms in 47 countries and 
finds that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase 
in value, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign 
investment, and with more transparent systems. However, these papers neither address 
the differential impacts of political connections on corporate behavior during volatile and 
peaceful environments, nor separate benefits from enjoying the quiet life and value from 
risk-taking.  
Further, our findings on the lower risk-taking made by politically connected banks 
extend the literature on active empire building. The seminal paper by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2002) find that under more protection from the government, active empire 
building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet 
life. Cohen and Malloy (2014) find that government-dependent firms (who are likely to 
be politically connected) have lower investment, lower R&D spending, and lower sales 
growth than non-government-dependent firms. Relatedly, Kim (2015) finds that firms 
with strong political connections have lower investment, lower R&D spending, and lower 
patent citations (but higher government sales) relative to firms with weak political 
connections. A close paper to us is Akey and Lewellen (2015), who find that political 
connected firms take on risk, and policy-sensitive firms' investment, leverage, operating 
performance, Tobin's Q, option-implied volatility, and CDS spreads respond more 
sharply to the resolution of uncertainty after close elections than policy-neutral firms. On 
the other hand, our paper investigates a full universe of banks and considers the 
differences in political capital across all the banks in all the years. Moreover, we find 
both politically connected and unconnected banks are sensitive to policy uncertainty. 
Finally, our paper is also related to Koetter et al. (2012), who find that U.S. banks with 
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large market power tend to enjoy the quiet life. However, it is not directly related to 
political connections.  
In his presidential address, Zingales (2015) encourages the finance profession to 
develop a deeper understanding of the rent-seeking dimension of finance. Our paper 
analyzes these areas and has important implications for understanding the complex 
pattern of corporate rent-seeking behavior. Especially, our results strongly suggest that 
maintaining lower policy uncertainty is vital in restricting the rent from political 
connections. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives more details on the 
background, and describes the datasets and methodology. Section 3 presents the main 
results for the relationship between economic policy uncertainty, Senate Banking 
Committee representation, and loan and loss provision. Section 4 looks at empirical 
findings for different subsamples. Section 5 discusses alternative explanations. In Section 
6, we provide further evidence in supporting the exogeneity of Senate Banking 
Committee representation using a geographic discontinuity design. Finally, Section 7 
concludes. 
 
3.2 Background, Data and Methodology 
3.2.1 Senate Banking Committee representation 
Historical membership of the Senate Banking Committee is drawn from annual 
volumes of the Official Congressional Directory. For each bank and year/quarter, we 
define the dummy variable Committee Senator as equaling one if the bank is 
headquartered in a state with a senator on the Banking Committee in that quarter and zero 
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otherwise. As shown in Table 1, 44 percent of banks have Senate Banking Committee 
representation on average. 
We follow Kostovetsky (2015) in introducing the Senate Banking Committee 
representation but provide more details. At the beginning of each Congress, senators and 
representatives are given committee assignments based on their seniority, preferences, 
and prior committee assignments. The committee's areas of jurisdiction include banking, 
insurance, financial markets, securities, international trade and finance, and economic 
policy. Members of the committee write legislation in these areas and oversee (and vote 
to confirm the heads of) executive departments and other government agencies regulating 
the financial industry including the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These oversight powers provide committee 
members with a great deal of leverage to influence government decisions that affect the 
financial industry, including bailout decisions.  
Several reasons support the use of Senate Banking Committee representation as 
the measure of political connections. First, senators have extra leverage over government 
officials that oversee the banking industry, because of their advise and consent power to 
confirm these officials. The committee’s legislative record includes the major acts 
forming the banking industry. For example, the 1980 Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits, 
expanded thrift powers, and raised deposit insurance coverage to $100,000; the 1994 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act permitted interstate 
expansion; the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Biley Act allowed financial holding companies to 
offer banking, securities, and insurance products under one corporate roof and established 
sweeping consumer privacy protections; and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act that includes 
far-reaching changes in federal securities regulation. Second, most banks operate within 
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state boundaries (and often have the name of the state in their names; e.g., First Texas 
Bank). For this reason, it is appropriate to look at senators who represent individual 
states. Finally, congressional boundaries change every ten years during redistricting, and 
banks often move their headquarters to different buildings in the same city but in a 
different congressional district. Therefore, the relationship between a bank and a district's 
representative is much weaker than that between a bank and a state's two US senators. 
Importantly, having a connection to the Banking Committee is (mostly) not a 
choice variable of the bank. In addition, because committee membership changes over 
time, we can use bank fixed effects to test whether a bank changes its risk-taking 
behavior in response to changes in its political connections. A high-risk bank could move 
from a state without a committee senator to another state with a committee senator to 
enjoy that senator's protection. However, this seems unlikely, because the cost of moving 
bank branches from state to state is high, and senators in the Banking Committee may 
decide to retire or lose bids for reelection. And similar to Kostovetsky (2015), we find 
little evidence that banks move their headquarters across stateliness examining the 
National Information Center website, which has a history of FDIC-registered banks, 
including the current and former addresses of their headquarters. 
A concern is that new senators base their choice of committee assignments on the 
type of banks in their home states. This would create a spurious correlation between 
committee senators and risk-taking behavior. However, the banking industry is dispersed 
across the country; consequently the Banking committee is different from the Agriculture 
Committee in which the committee members are mostly from Midwest farm states. 
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress1 that 
                                                 
1 The CRS report for Congress is available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts. 
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explains the committee choice process, senators usually try to obtain a seat on one of the 
big-four committees (Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations), 
which have the most power and exposure. For the other committees (such as Banking), 
senators are assigned to committees to ``match the legislator's skills, expertise, and policy 
concerns''.  
Finally, because we have a large sample of banks rather than only listed financial 
institutions, we provide further evidence in supporting the exogeneity of Senate Banking 
Committee representation using a geographic discontinuity design, similar to Holmes 
(1998),  Black (1999),  Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015). The rationale is that the counties 
close to state borders are generally more similar, and hence when we compare the banks 
located in these counties, it is less likely that Senate Banking Committee representation 
capture the impact of other differences across states. We obtain counties' shortest distance 
to a state border from Holmes (1998), and keep the samples of banks in 50 miles or 20 
miles from a state border. In Section 6, we find the results are similar to those when using 
the full sample. 
3.2.2 Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Concerns about policy uncertainty have a direct impact on activities by market 
participants. A well-researched mechanism among them is that uncertainty increases the 
values of real options of waiting (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). As a result, investment, 
hiring and consumption decline as the level of uncertainty rises. Studies related to the real 
options effects of uncertainty on corporate investment include Bernanke (1983), Leahy 
and Whited (1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), 
Bloom (2009), Julio and Yook (2012), Gulen and Ion (2016), and others. Especially, 
Bordo et al. (2016) find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank 
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credit growth. Therefore, the Federal Open Market Committee (2009) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012, 2013) suggest that uncertainty about U.S. and 
European fiscal, regulatory, and monetary policies contributed to a steep economic 
decline in 2008-2009 and slow recoveries afterward.   
Importantly, political connections could have an interaction effect with policy 
uncertainty. When there is little uncertainty around government policies, connected banks 
do not have a sharp advantage in expanding their market shares. When such uncertainty 
increases, the risk associated with the introduction of unfavorable policies increases for 
unconnected banks, and consequently they could reduce credit supply and increase loss 
provision. On the other hand, for politically connected banks, such risk regarding 
unfavorable policies is lower. Moreover, even if the government implements the similar 
unfavorable policies for all banks, it is more likely for politically connected banks to be 
bailed out. Therefore, unconnected banks could leave extra market shares to politically 
connected banks. Indeed, the empirical results show that unconnected banks reduce their 
credit supply in absolute term during the periods with high policy uncertainty, whereas 
connected banks increase their credit supply in absolute term in these periods.  
To measure policy uncertainty, we use the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) 
US Monthly Index proposed and constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016)2. This 
index consists of three components: (i) news on policy-related economic uncertainty, (ii) 
federal tax code provisions set to expire in the near future, and (iii) forecaster 
disagreement on macro variables. To guarantee the quality of the index, the authors 
conducted an extensive audit to show that the indexes generated by computer algorithms 
are highly correlated with those generated by human auditors. Furthermore, the EPU 
                                                 
2 The EPU index is downloaded from the Economic Policy Uncertainty website. For more details 
regarding the EPU index, please refer to http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. 
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index has been used in several recent finance studies to measure economic policy 
uncertainty (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015; Akey and 
Lewellen, 2015; Starks and Sun, 2016), and it is carried by major commercial data 
providers to meet customers’ demands. 
The EPU index is particularly attractive for testing our hypothesis for the 
following reasons. First, it is reasonable that uncertainty related to government policies, 
rather than general economic uncertainty, has a direct impact on the role of political 
connections. Secondly, the EPU index measures uncertainty using sources that are readily 
accessible to all of the banks (either large or small) by reading major newspapers. The 
news component, which is given the highest weight in the index, is able to proxy for the 
level of uncertainty as perceived by these banks. Thirdly, the EPU index captures both 
financial and policy uncertainty and is plausibly exogenous to the activities of these 
banks.  
Since the EPU index starts in 1985, we focus on the 1985-2013 sample period. 
Following Starks and Sun (2016), we calculate the quarterly EPU index by averaging the 
monthly EPU index in a quarter, then normalize it by subtracting the mean time-series 
EPU index and dividing the standard deviation of the time-series EPU index. In Figure 2, 
we plot the time trend of the normalized EPU index. In the following part of this paper, 
we always use this normalized EPU index (and the dummy variables for the quartiles of 
the EPU index), therefore our results can be explained in terms of one standard deviation 
change in the EPU index. 
3.2.3 Regression Specification 
In most of our analysis, we estimate the following regression equation: 
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where i, s, t represents bank i in state s and year-quarter t. y equals the amounts of total 
loans or loss provision scaled by total assets, expressed in percentage points for the ease 
of reading. EPU is the normalized EPU index, a continuous measure. Comm Senator is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented 
on the Senate Banking Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. t  are year fixed 
effects and quarter fixed effects; i  are bank fixed effects. We also try settings with state 
fixed effects rather than bank fixed effects. We choose the specification with year and 
quarter fixed effects rather than year by quarter fixed effects and hence include tEPU  in 
regressions. This gives us a chance to see the dynamics of loan and loss provision ratios 
in absolute term conditional on other covariates for connected and unconnected banks, 
and hence facilitate our understandings on the aggressiveness of connected banks in 
periods with different levels of policy uncertainty. For example, we define the quarter 
dummy for June to 1 for the same quarter in every year. Therefore, the average loan 
ratios (or loss provision ratios) conditional on other covariates for connected banks and 
unconnected banks are 1 2 3 4t tEPU EPU       and 1 3 tEPU  respectively. We 
also run regressions using year by quarter fixed effects (different for the same quarter in 
different years), or regressions with different kinds of clustering3, and the results are very 
similar.  
Concerning the potentially nonlinear impact of the EPU index, we also estimate a 
variant of Equation (1), where we replace the continuous EPU measure with the dummy 
variables for the four quartiles of the EPU index: 
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(2)
 
                                                 
3 We tried the regressions by clustering at MSA, or clustering at both bank and year by quarter. 
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where j stands for the quartiles of the EPU index. Here we do not include 
stCommSenator  and the dummy variable for the lowest quartile of the EPU index to 
avoid perfect collinearity. Again, here we can obtain loan ratio and loss provision ratio in 
absolute term for connected and unconnected banks in the periods with different EPU 
levels, after controlling log total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, cash ratio, 
year, quarter, and state fixed effects. That is, we calculate the estimated 1 3 j   
(unconnected banks) and 1 2 3j j     (connected banks) for each j, as shown in Figure 
3.  
Following the regular practice, we include covariates $X$ such as log total assets, 
ROA (net income divided by total assets), ROA volatility (standard deviation of current 
ROA and the last seven quarters' ROA), dividend ratio (dividends scaled by total assets), 
and cash ratio (cash holdings scaled by assets).  Banks with a higher level of total assets 
usually have a higher ability to diversify their risk, and hence can supply more credit and 
maintain a low level of loss provision. ROA may have a positive impact on credit supply 
and a negative impact on loss provision, whereas the converse could be true for the 
volatility of ROA. In addition, dividend-paying banks may have a higher level of loss 
provision, which could be attributed to having more resources, and they may also be 
more conservative in lending. In addition, to maintain more cash reserve, banks may 
reduce both credit supply and loss provision. These variables are expressed in percentage 
points as well.  
We obtain the financial statement information from FDIC's quarterly Call & 
Thrift Financial Reports. We use one quarter lag for these variables to mitigate the 
simultaneity issue, though using the current quarter values gives identical results. We 
convert the amounts of total assets to constant dollar values of the fourth quarter of 2013, 
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using the quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) from Social Security Administration4, 
which is in turn constructed from the monthly CPI calculated by the Census Bureau. 
 
3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
In the major regressions, we keep observations from March 1985 to December 
2013, measured at the bank-year-quarter level, because the EPU index starts in 1985. The 
original number of observations is 1,183,016. We drop the observations missing the 
major variables in our regressions: loan ratio, loss provision ratio, log total assets, ROA, 
ROA volatility, dividend ratio, and cash ratio, and keep observations with loan ratio and 
loss provision ratio larger than 0. The number of observations in the remaining sample is 
877,448. 
We report the descriptive statistics in Table 1. Total assets are measured in 
thousand dollars (constant dollar values of the fourth quarter of 2013). We find that the 
mean of total assets is much larger than the median of total assets, because most of the 
banks in the U.S. focus only on a small area and hence have a small size. Indeed, there 
are only 5 percent of the bank-year-quarter observations representing banks operating in 
multiple states. Moreover, we obtain quarterly MSA-level median housing price growth 
rates constructed from data collected by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which 
have mean and median of 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points, though the housing price growth 
varies a lot across the country, reflecting the possible impacts of land supply elasticities 
and households' expectations  (i.e. Saiz, 2010; Gao, Sockin, Xiong, 2015). 
 
                                                 
4 These data can be downloaded from https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/avgcpi.html. 
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3.3 Main Results 
3.3.1 Continuous Measure of the EPU Index 
In Table 2, we report the main results with loan ratio and loss provision ratio as 
dependent variables. In Columns 1 and 4, we ignore the EPU index and check if banks 
located in a state with a senator on the Banking Committee behave differently from those 
without connections. We find that the former supply slightly more loans than the latter 
given total assets, but their loss provision ratios are 0.01 percentage points lower on 
average or 3 percent of the average loss provision ratio, which is significant under the 5 
percent level. This result is in line with Kostovetsky's (2015) findings on the financial 
leverage of listed financial institutions and implies more risk-taking behavior by 
politically connected banks on average. Notice these estimates reflect the average impact 
of political connections during low EPU periods and high EPU periods. If during most of 
the time connected banks take on less risk and during very high EPU periods they take on 
much more risk than unconnected banks, we could still find this average impact. 
However, it masks the complex pattern regarding political connections. 
Columns 2 and 5 report the results in the regressions with the EPU index and its 
interaction term with the Senate Banking Committee representation. Since we use a 
standardized measure of the EPU index, the magnitude of these two terms can be 
explained in terms of one standard deviation change in the EPU index. We find that when 
policy uncertainty increases, politically connected banks have a much higher level of 
credit supply, significant under the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, with one standard 
deviation increase in the EPU index, banks with Senate Banking Committee 
representation have 0.9 percentage points (controlling state fixed effects) or 0.6 
percentage points (controlling bank fixed effects) higher loan-asset ratio than those 
without, equivalent to 7 percent or 4 percent of the standard deviation of loan-asset ratios 
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in our sample. Due to their inherent leverage, banks’ loan portfolios are several orders of 
magnitude greater than shareholders’ equity - gross loans are generally around 80\% of 
total assets. Therefore, this is an economically large impact related to investor wealth.  
On the other hand, the loss provision ratios of the connected banks decline 
relative to unconnected banks when policy uncertainty is high. With one standard 
deviation increase in the EPU index, banks with Senate Banking Committee 
representation have 0.008 percentage points (controlling state fixed effects) or 0.007 
percentage points (controlling bank fixed effects) lower loss provision-asset ratio than 
those without, equivalent to 1 percent of the standard deviation of loss provision-asset 
ratios in our sample. This implies relatively more risk-taking behavior for politically 
connected banks during periods with more policy uncertainty. In addition, we find a 
significantly negative estimate on the EPU index in the regressions with loan ratio as the 
dependent variable, implying that banks are more prudent during periods with more 
policy uncertainty on average. The decline in loss provision is possibly a byproduct of the 
decline in credit supply.  
Our setting also allows us to detect the change in loan and loss provision ratio in 
both absolute term or relative term. The average loan ratio (or loss provision ratio) 
conditional on other covariates for connected banks and unconnected banks are 
1 2 3 4t tEPU EPU       and 1 3 tEPU  respectively. Therefore, for example, 
when the EPU index changes from -1 to 1, connected banks increase their credit supply in 
absolute term without commensurate increases in loss provision, whereas unconnected 
banks reduce their credit supply in absolute term. This pattern will be more clear when 
we use a discrete measure of the EPU index, as shown in Figure 3.  
In Columns 3 and 6, we replace state fixed effects with a full set of bank fixed 
effects; therefore, we can account for all the time-invariant bank-level factors. Because 
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committee membership changes over time, using bank fixed effects gives us a unique 
chance to test whether a bank changes its risk-taking behavior in response to changes in 
its political connections. Although the estimate on the interaction term declines by one 
third, it is still significant under the 1 percent level. Moreover, politically connected 
banks still have a slight net decline in loss provision ratio during periods with more 
policy uncertainty relative to unconnected banks.  
Overall, we find that during periods with low policy uncertainty, politically 
connected banks have a significantly lower level of credit supply, and the level of loss 
provision is even lower. This result verifies our hypothesis: when there is little 
uncertainty around government policies, connected banks do not have an advantage in 
expanding their market shares. Therefore, this kind of enjoying the quiet life under more 
protection during normal periods is in line with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and 
Koetter et al.'s (2012) findings, but in stark contrast with Kostovetsky's (2015) findings. 
Only when policy uncertainty is high and the unconnected banks become more prudent, 
connected banks increase their risk-taking.  
Turning to other covariates, we find banks with a higher level of total assets 
supply more credit and have more loss provision, while the converse is true for cash ratio. 
ROA has a negative impact on loss provision, but the impact on loans is not robust. The 
volatility of ROA has a positive impact on loss provision, but the impact on loans is again 
not robust. In addition, dividend-paying banks have a higher level of loss provision, 
which could be attributed to more resources they have, and they supply less credit since 
they should be less aggressive. These results are consistent with the usual findings in the 
literature, such as Kostovetsky (2015), Bordo et al. (2016) and others. In the latter tables, 
we do not report the estimates for the covariates because they are very similar to here. 
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3.3.2 Quartile Dummies of the EPU Index 
A continuous measure of economic policy uncertainty masks the potential 
nonlinearity in the effects of policy uncertainty. Therefore, in Table 3, we replace the 
continuous measure of the EPU index with the dummy variables for its four quartiles, 
where EPU(Q1) represents the lowest quartile of the EPU index and EPU(Q4) represents 
the highest quartile of the EPU index. We find significantly lower loan ratio and similar 
loss provision ratio for banks with Senate Banking Committee representation when the 
EPU level is low, either when adding state fixed effects or bank fixed effects. Again, this 
pattern is perfectly consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Koetter et al.'s 
(2012) findings. When there is little uncertainty around government policies, 
unconnected banks do not face an obvious disadvantage and maintain a high level of 
credit supply. Consequently, it is not attractive for connected banks to expand in this 
case.  
Moreover, we find an increasing pattern in the estimates of the interaction terms 
in the regressions with loan ratio as the dependent variable, whereas these estimates are 
more negative in the highest quartiles in the regressions with loss provision ratio as the 
dependent variable. Therefore, when policy uncertainty increases, politically connected 
banks increase credit supply monotonically relative to unconnected banks, but their loss 
provision ratios increase less or decline more than unconnected banks.  
      To see this pattern more clearly, we plot the ratio and loss provision ratio for 
connected and unconnected banks in the periods with different EPU levels  after 
controlling log total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, cash ratio, year, quarter, 
and state fixed effects. That is, we calculate the estimated 1 3 j   (unconnected banks) 
and 1 2 3j j     (connected banks) for each j in Equation (2). We can see that during 
the periods with the lowest quartile of the EPU index, connected banks have much less 
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credit supply than unconnected banks and the same level of loss provision; however, 
during the periods with the highest two quartiles of the EPU index, they extend more 
loans but have much less loss provision. Actually, compared to loss provision ratios in 
the lowest quartile of the EPU index, loss provision ratios are lower for connected banks 
and higher for unconnected banks in the highest quartile of the EPU index on average.  
This pattern is important, which suggests that not only do connected banks take 
on more risk during high EPU periods relative to unconnected banks, but also they 
increase the absolute amounts of credit supply without commensurate increases in loss 
provision. In other words, connected banks grab the market shares left by unconnected 
banks during high EPU periods. Therefore, the findings using the quartiles of the EPU 
index provide more evidence supporting our hypothesis. 
 
3.4 Subsample Analysis 
3.4.1 By Bank Size 
Big banks could spend more resources in lobbying senators or assisting their 
elections. However, they may exert influence over senators beyond their home state, and 
then it may be not very important whether the senators in their home state are in the 
Banking Committee. Kostovetsky (2015) uses the sample of listed banks and thus large 
banks. Will smaller banks show the similar pattern as big banks? In this paper, we have a 
sample consisting of both large and small banks, and consequently we can examine 
whether Senate Banking Committee representation and EPU have differential impacts in 
the different size groups. 
We divide the sample based on the percentile of total assets by year/quarter, and 
consider banks with total assets larger than 75 percentile within each year/quarter group 
 145 
as large banks, and the remaining banks as small banks. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 
shows that during low EPU periods, both big banks and small banks with Senate Banking 
Committee representation have significantly smaller loan amounts than those without, 
which suggests that both of them may enjoy the quiet life. In addition, the impact of 
Senate Banking Committee representation is slightly larger among big banks. Moreover, 
politically connected banks' (either large or small) credit supply is significantly higher 
than those without Senate Banking Committee representation when policy uncertainty is 
high, suggesting relatively less risk aversion during periods with more policy uncertainty.  
Turning to loss provision in Columns 4 and 5, we find political connections have 
a positive but weaker impact among big banks, and a significantly negative impact 
among small banks. Overall, compared to small banks with political connections, big 
banks with political connections are more likely to enjoy the quiet life during low EPU 
periods and take more risk during high EPU periods, though the differences are not large. 
In addition, we divide the sample into 10 groups based on the deciles of total 
assets and report the estimates for the interaction terms in Figure 4. We do not find a 
monotonic pattern in regressions with either loan ratio or loss provision ratio as 
dependent variables.  
Next, we divide the sample into banks with existence in a single state or multiple 
states, based on the presence of branches. Unlike the main sample, this sample starts in 
1994. The results for banks with existence in multiple states, as shown in Columns 3 and 
6, are similar to those for the full sample, though these estimates are less precise because 
of a smaller sample. 
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3.4.2 By Period 
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act eliminated all the restrictions on interstate 
banking by 1995 and branching by 1997. Because of such bank deregulation, the banking 
market was less regulated and more volatile during the post-2000 period than the pre-
2000 period. For example, the early 2000s experienced a credit boom and then the recent 
financial crisis. Therefore, a natural question is that whether political connections have a 
larger or weaker role in the later period. To answer this question, in Table 5, we divide 
the sample into two periods: 1985-2000 and 2001-2013. 
In the later period, banks with Senate Banking Committee representation have 
smaller loan ratios and higher loss provision ratios when policy uncertainty is low. 
Moreover, although loan ratios increase more with the EPU index in the later period, loss 
provision ratios also increase more with the EPU index. This is in stark contrast with the 
earlier period, since at that time loss provision ratios decline significantly with the EPU 
index. Overall, these results suggest that after bank deregulation, the benefit of political 
connections declines. 
 
3.5 Alternative Explanations 
3.5.1 ``Too Big to Fail'' 
Regulators have a main concern regarding the ``too big to fail'' (TBTF) banks, 
because of their systemic importance. These banks are likely to incur risks, believing that 
the authorities will assist them if any problems should occur (Mishkin et al., 2006). Not 
only does this thinking create instability in the banking market, but the TBTF banks are 
also too costly to save (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Therefore, there is a 
possibility that our estimates might reflect the impact of bank size, rather than political 
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connections, if these two things are highly correlated. Although we already find evidence 
consistent with our main results when dividing the sample by bank size, here we directly 
control the interaction term of EPU and log total assets to purge the impact of bank size.  
As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we find that both the impacts of Senate 
Banking Committee representation and its interaction term with the EPU index have very 
similar magnitude to those in Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2, and they are still highly 
significant. These results imply that our main results are not likely to be driven by the 
impact of banks size. Indeed, although larger banks have larger amounts of loans during 
high EPU periods, they have larger amounts of loss provision. 
3.5.2 Housing Bubbles 
Kostovetsky (2015) finds that politically connected financial institutions have 
higher leverage during housing bubbles in response to local growth in median housing 
prices. Therefore, it is possible our results relating to policy uncertainty reflect the impact 
of housing bubbles. We use the quarterly MSA-level median housing price growth rates 
constructed from data calculated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and add this 
growth rate and its interaction term with Senate Banking Committee representation in our 
main regressions.  
As shown in Column 3, the estimate of the interaction term of EPU and Senate 
Banking Committee representation declines but is still large and significant. Moreover, 
we find that in MSAs with higher housing price growth rates, politically connected banks 
have significantly less credit supply but a similar level of loss provision, which suggests 
they take on less risk during housing bubbles. An explanation is that unconnected banks 
might face large earnings growth pressure from investors (Chen, McInnis and Yust, 
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2014) during housing bubbles. On the other hand, connected banks have relatively stable 
profits and hence are less aggressive in extending credit. 
3.5.3 Business Cycles 
In addition, the macroeconomic literature documents a strong negative correlation 
between uncertainty and business cycles (e.g., Bloom, 2014). Figure 2 shows that this is 
true as well. Therefore, it is possible our results related to EPU reflect the impacts of 
recession. We control for possible alternatives related to business cycles by including an 
interaction term between a dummy variable for NBER-defined recessions and Senate 
Banking Committee representation. Since the recession variable is binary, in order to 
allow better comparison with the coefficient on the policy uncertainty variable, we 
construct a binary policy uncertainty variable that takes the value of one when the EPU 
index is above its time-series median, and zero otherwise.  
Although Kostovetsky (2015) finds that politically connected financial institutions 
took on more risk during the recent recession, our results show that risk-taking behavior 
by these banks declines during recessions on average, as shown in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6. This could be because political connections can give connected banks early 
warnings on bad economic conditions, and lead them to reduce risk exposure before the 
storm. For example, Jagolinzer et al. (2016) find that connected banks engaged in 
significant trading thirty days in advance of the announcement of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) program, suggesting political connections provided these banks 
with private information related to government intervention. On the other hand, we find 
that the impacts regarding Senate Banking Committee representation and its interaction 
term with the EPU index are intact.  
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Overall, the evidence regarding housing bubbles and recessions verifies the 
mechanism related to the option value of waiting. That is, in high EPU periods, the option 
value of waiting increases more for unconnected banks, and consequently they reduce 
credit supply and increase loss provision relative to connected banks. 
 
3.6 A Geographic Discontinuity Design 
To further address the endogeneity concern regarding Senate Banking Committee 
representation, we use a geographic discontinuity design, similar to Holmes (1998),  
Black (1999),  Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015). The rationale is that the counties close to 
state borders are generally more similar, and hence when we compare the banks located 
in these counties, it is less likely that Senate Banking Committee representation captures 
the impact of other differences across states.  
We obtain counties' shortest distance to a state border from Holmes (1998), and 
keep the samples of banks in 50 miles or 20 miles from a state border. Table 7 reports the 
results. For both samples, we find connected banks have significantly less credit supply 
and slightly less loss provision, and both of them increase with the EPU index. These 
results are quite similar to Table 2. In addition, we repeat the aforementioned full-sample 
or subsample analysis using the border sample, and the results are generally quite similar, 
and hence the endogeneity concern is further mitigated.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Our paper connects the two important corporate governance literatures related to 
bank risk-taking and enjoying the quiet life, by studying how political connections and 
their interaction with economic policy uncertainty affect banks' risk-taking behavior. Our 
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findings support the existence of two types of moral hazard, but they exist at different 
periods. When police uncertainty is low, politically connected banks have a weaker 
tendency to take on more risk than those without political connections and enjoy the quiet 
life. However, when police uncertainty is high, politically connected banks have much 
larger credit supply, but smaller loss provision ratios than those without political 
connections. These facts hold for both large and small banks; moreover, after bank 
deregulation, the benefit of political connection declines. 
These findings support our hypothesis related the option value of waiting in high 
EPU periods and the role of political connections in reducing such option value. When 
there is little uncertainty around government policies, political connections may not bring 
many additional benefits to connected banks. When such uncertainty increases, the risk 
associated with the introduction of unfavorable policies increases for unconnected banks. 
On the other hand, for politically connected banks, such risk regarding unfavorable 
policies is lower. Moreover, even if the government implements the similar unfavorable 
policies for all banks, it is more likely for politically connected banks to be bailed out. 
Therefore, unconnected banks should reduce risk exposure during periods with more 




Figure 3.1: Senate Banking Committee representation
Note: this figure plots states with a senator in the Banking committee in 1985, 1995, 2005, and
2015. The green color stands for states with a senator in the Banking committee and the
yellow color stands for those without. Data source: annual volumes of the Official
Congressional Directory.
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1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
quarter
Note: this figure plots time trend of the normalized Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index,
which is obtained by subtracting the time-series mean EPU index and dividing the standard
deviation of the time-series EPU index. Data source: the Economic Policy Uncertainty website
(http://www.policyuncertainty.com/).
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Economic Policy Uncertainty (Quartiles)
No senator Senator
Loss provision/asset ratio
Note: this figure plots the log amounts of loans (and loss provision) for banks with Senate
Banking Committee representation or not, during periods with the four EPU quartiles, after
controlling log total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, cash ratio, year, quarter, and
state fixed effects. That is, we calculate the estimated δ1 +δ3 j (unconnected banks) and
δ1 +δ2 j +δ3 j (connected banks) for each j in Equation (2). EPU=1 represents the lowest
quartile of the EPU index and EPU=4 represents the highest quartile of the EPU index.
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Loss provision ratio
Note: this figure plots the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the
interaction term of Senate Banking Committee representation and the EPU index (continuous
measure) by the deciles of total assets, estimated using Equation (1).
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3.8.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
(in percentage) Mean Std. Dev. Median P10 P90
Comm Senator 44
Multiple states 5
Loan 60.4 14.8 61.7 40.3 78.3
Loss provision 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.7
Total assets (thousand dollars) 1,048,788 19,100,000 120,835 33,405.57 671,586
ROA 0.5 1.3 0.5 0 1.2
ROA volatility 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.6
Dividend ratio 0.2 2.6 0 0 0.6
Cash ratio 6.5 5.6 4.9 2.2 12.4
Housing price growth 0.71 1.96 0.82 -1.42 2.60
Note: Comm Senator is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state
that is represented on the Senate Banking Committee in that year-quarter and zero otherwise.
Multiple states is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is operated in multiple states
and zero otherwise. Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision
stands for loss provision scaled by total assets. ROA is net income divided by total assets.
ROA volatility is the standard deviation of current ROA and the last seven quarters’ ROA.
Dividend ratio is dividends scaled by total assets, and Cash ratio is cash holdings scaled by
total assets. Total assets are measured in thousand dollars (constant dollar values of the fourth
quarter of 2013). Data source: FDIC’s quarterly Call & Thrift Financial Reports (1985-2013),
and Summary of Deposits (1994-2013).
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Table 3.2: Economic policy uncertainty (continuous measure), Senate Banking Committee representa-
tion, and loan and loss provision
Dep. var.: Loan Loan Loan Loss provision Loss provision Loss provision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPU*Comm Senator 0.931*** 0.647*** -0.00789*** -0.00695**
(0.0655) (0.0523) (0.00295) (0.00287)
Comm Senator 0.187 0.117 -0.184* -0.00958** -0.00898** -0.0135***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.100) (0.00426) (0.00419) (0.00424)
EPU -0.451*** -0.310*** -0.0110*** -0.0104***
(0.0319) (0.0255) (0.00165) (0.00165)
Log total assets 1.06*** 1.06*** 0.708*** 0.0258*** 0.0258*** 0.101***
(0.0758) (0.0758) (0.160) (0.00576) (0.00576) (0.0185)
ROA -0.635*** -0.637*** 0.0804*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.171***
(0.131) (0.131) (0.0279) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0413)
ROA volatility 0.414** 0.416** -0.411*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.251**
(0.171) (0.172) (0.117) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
Dividend ratio -0.00308 -0.00290 -0.0560** 0.0411** 0.0411** 0.0345*
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0249) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195)
Cash ratio -0.388*** -0.388*** -0.326*** -0.00439*** -0.00440*** -0.00377***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.00976) (0.000436) (0.000437) (0.000574)
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes
N 877448 877448 877448 877448 877448 877448
Adj. R-square 0.225 0.225 0.695 0.203 0.203 0.315
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. EPU is the original economic policy uncertainty index minus its
time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation. Comm Senator is a dummy
variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate
Banking Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at bank, *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.3: Economic policy uncertainty (quartile dummy), Senate Banking Committee representation,
and loan and loss provision
Dep. var.: Loan Loan Loss provision Loss provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPU(Q1)*Comm Senator -1.79*** -1.47*** -0.00163 -0.00659
(0.151) (0.125) (0.00535) (0.00461)
EPU(Q2)*Comm Senator -0.0199 -0.326*** 0.0143*** 0.00578
(0.137) (0.117) (0.00440) (0.00381)
EPU(Q3)*Comm Senator 1.00*** 0.464*** -0.0156*** -0.0166***
(0.135) (0.116) (0.00589) (0.00636)
EPU(Q4)*Comm Senator 1.13*** 0.568*** -0.0310*** -0.0352***
(0.139) (0.118) (0.00713) (0.00744)
EPU(Q2) -0.615*** -0.403*** -0.0147*** -0.0145***
(0.0632) (0.0491) (0.00498) (0.00476)
EPU(Q3) -1.40*** -1.01*** 0.00245 0.00142
(0.0749) (0.0581) (0.00413) (0.00425)
EPU(Q4) -1.15*** -0.758*** 0.00391 0.00454
(0.0854) (0.0673) (0.00445) (0.00447)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes
N 877448 877448 877448 877448
Adj. R-square 0.226 0.695 0.203 0.315
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. EPU(Q1) to EPU(Q4) are four dummy variables for EPU
quartiles, with EPU(Q1) representing the lowest quartile of EPU and EPU(Q4) representing
the highest quartile of the EPU index. Comm Senator is a dummy variable that equals one if
the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate Banking Committee in
that quarter and zero otherwise. Other covariates include log total assets, ROA, ROA volatility,
dividend ratio, and cash ratio. Standard errors are clustered at bank, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Economic policy uncertainty (continuous measure), Senate Banking Committee representa-
tion, and loan and loss provision: by bank size
Dep. var.: Loan Loan Loan Loss provision Loss provision Loss provision
≥ 75 pt. <75 pt. Multiple state ≥ 75 pt. <75 pt. Multiple state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPU*Comm Senator 0.630*** 0.608*** 0.346 0.00145 -0.0104*** -0.00319
(0.0946) (0.0604) (0.220) (0.00490) (0.00243) (0.0129)
Comm Senator -0.712*** -0.0653 -0.810** 0.00781 -0.0188*** 0.00951
(0.196) (0.114) (0.394) (0.00856) (0.00344) (0.0150)
EPU -0.366*** -0.266*** -0.267** 0.00413 -0.0149*** -0.00193
(0.0514) (0.0287) (0.114) (0.00379) (0.00175) (0.00837)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 219433 658015 25291 219433 658015 25291
Adj. R-square 0.731 0.706 0.803 0.242 0.467 0.527
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. EPU is the original economic policy uncertainty index minus
its time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation. Comm Senator is a
dummy variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on
the Senate Banking Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. Other covariates include log
total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, and cash ratio. Standard errors are clustered
at bank, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.5: Economic policy uncertainty (continuous measure), Senate Banking Committee representa-
tion, and loan and loss provision: by period
Dep. var.: Loan Loan Loss provision Loss provision
1985-2000 2001-2013 1985-2000 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPU*Comm Senator 1.48*** 0.161*** -0.0146*** 0.00399
(0.0834) (0.0625) (0.00561) (0.00292)
Comm Senator 0.115 0.0509 -0.0286*** -0.0156***
(0.116) (0.121) (0.00727) (0.00544)
EPU -0.696*** -0.152*** -0.0138*** 0.00448**
(0.0451) (0.0277) (0.00323) (0.00210)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 571044 306404 571044 306404
Adj. R-square 0.731 0.805 0.301 0.461
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. EPU is the original economic policy uncertainty index minus
its time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation. Comm Senator is a
dummy variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on
the Senate Banking Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. Other covariates include log
total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, and cash ratio. Standard errors are clustered
at bank, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.6: Alternative explanations related to bank size and recession
Dep. var.: Loan Loss provision Loan Loss provision Loan Loss provision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPU*Comm Senator 0.637*** -0.00898*** 0.544*** -0.00583
(0.0523) (0.00293) (0.0777) (0.00414)
Comm Senator -0.182* -0.0132*** -0.102 -0.00788 -0.828*** -0.00146
(0.100) (0.00423) (0.155) (0.00591) (0.108) (0.00343)
EPU -1.08*** -0.163*** -0.233*** 0.00193
(0.297) (0.0148) (0.0396) (0.00285)
EPU*Log total assets 0.0648*** 0.0129***
(0.0250) (0.00127)
Home price growth*Comm Senator -0.0579** 0.000538
(0.0242) (0.00192)
Home price growth -0.112*** -0.0202***
(0.0171) (0.00234)








Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 877448 877448 350915 350915 877448 877448
Adj. R-square 0.695 0.315 0.706 0.416 0.695 0.315
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. EPU is the original economic policy uncertainty index minus
its time-series mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation. EPU(upper) is a dummy
variable whether the economic policy uncertainty index is larger than its median. Comm Senator
is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented
on the Senate Banking Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. Recession is a dummy
variable for recession periods defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Other covariates include log total assets, ROA, ROA volatility, dividend ratio, and cash ratio.
Standard errors are clustered at bank, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.7: Economic policy uncertainty (continuous measure), Senate Banking Committee representa-
tion, and loan and loss provision: a geographic discontinuity design
Dep. var.: Loan Loan Loss provision Loss provision
<50 miles <20 miles <50 miles <20 miles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPU*Comm Senator 0.436*** 0.519*** 0.00457 0.00189
(0.0666) (0.0910) (0.00331) (0.00387)
Comm Senator -0.451*** -0.588*** -0.00634 -0.00746
(0.129) (0.179) (0.00500) (0.00466)
EPU -0.253*** -0.298*** -0.00600*** -0.00245
(0.0314) (0.0435) (0.00186) (0.00250)
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 526057 292351 526057 292351
Adj. R-square 0.698 0.698 0.279 0.460
Note: Loan stands for the total loans scaled by total assets, and Loss provision stands for loss
provision scaled by total assets. <50 miles and <20 miles stand for the shortest distance to
a state border. EPU is the original economic policy uncertainty index minus its time-series
mean and divided by its time-series standard deviation. Comm Senator is a dummy variable
that equals one if the bank is headquartered in a state that is represented on the Senate Banking
Committee in that quarter and zero otherwise. Other covariates include log total assets, ROA,
ROA volatility, dividend ratio, and cash ratio. Standard errors are clustered at bank, * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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